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**Gender and corporeality in civilian crisis management:  
whose bodies matter?**

**Analysing the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)  
in Bosnia and Herzegovina's operational response to sex trafficking.**

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KATE STULBERG: Gender and corporeality in civilian crisis management: whose bodies matter? Analysing the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina's operational response to sex trafficking.

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## Abstract

The European Union's peacebuilding efforts have rarely been studied through a gendered or corporeal lens, therefore little is known about how these concepts affect peacebuilding responses. This study seeks to remedy such shortcomings by applying both a gendered and a corporeal lens to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina's operational response to sex trafficking, with the aim of uncovering a corporeal understanding of *whose bodies matter* to EUPM, and ultimately *why these bodies matter* – the 'why' referring to how power relations operate between the hegemonic authority of EUPM and its subordinated subjects. Integrating gender into this corporeal investigation allows for the gendered consequences of EUPM's response to become visible. In line with the feminist positioning of this research, bodies are thought to be gendered in a binary manner in order to fulfil EUPM's role not only as a hegemonic authority, but also as a hyper-masculinised authority perpetuating gendered inequalities to maintain its dominant societal position.

Adopting a post-positivist approach to this research, the epistemology of particular gendered and corporeal meanings is studied using complementary discourse analytical tools, most prominently that of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory. Theoretical underpinning is provided by Judith Butler's gender performativity theory, as well as Michel Foucault's theory of sexuality and his concept of governmentality. Using these components, this study finds that the bodies mattering most to EUPM are those that resemble EUPM's own hegemonic masculine authority – that is, local male bodies performing typically hyper-masculinised acts of protection, aggression, activity and capability. Female bodies, whether positioned in active and public authority roles or trapped in a private and inferior societal space, never matter as much due to their innate sexual disorderliness, and other feminised traits of subordination. However, this does

not mean that these bodies are corporeally framed as two distinct groups – varying levels of power, agency and knowledge interact between the subordinated (and feminised) subjects of EUPM and its own hegemonic masculine authority. This relationship fuels meaning production, norm fulfilment and ultimately secures EUPM's position as the primary caregiver, protector and peacebuilder in the fragile post-conflict state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### **Key words**

Gender, Corporeality, Civilian Crisis Management, Peacebuilding, Governmentality, European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sex Trafficking, Gender Performativity

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## List of Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECMM	European Union Monitoring Mission in the former Yugoslavia
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR ALTHEA	European Union Force Althea
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
IPTF	International Police Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UN	United Nations
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

## 1. Introduction

International interventions in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia, have been studied significantly since the Bosnian War ended in 1995, and the first civilian mission was sent into the region to assist in Bosnia's rehabilitation. Following an international sex trafficking scandal that saw the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations' (UN) mission tarnish, as well as a progressive rise in the European Union's (EU) interest in the Western Balkans, the UN's civilian peacebuilding responsibilities were transferred to the EU in 2003. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina operated until 2012, focusing a considerable amount of its energy on combating sex trafficking and other organised crimes.

The EU's peacebuilding actions in Bosnia have been widely critiqued for using soft power to promote and enforce Western/European norms onto non-Western/non-European states. This 'third generation' peacebuilding strategy is highly reflective of the 'liberal peace paradox' that points to the failures of such top-down peacebuilding initiatives. Alternatively, other scholars argue that EU soft power is positive for building peace, security and development in integratory regions such as Bosnia. They also believe that EU peacebuilding activities engage much more with local communities, ultimately building a more sustainable 'fourth generation' peacebuilding solution from the bottom up.

Whichever perspective is taken in terms of the EU's peacebuilding strategies, scholars overwhelmingly use 'hard' institutional reforms to determine whether the EU performs third or fourth generation peacebuilding. There is a reluctance to analyse 'softer' topics such as EUPM's response to sex trafficking – deemed 'soft' due to its gendered and corporeal connotations. Not only is sex trafficking a corporeal violation of the individual, as opposed to a more traditional state security threat, but it is also an expressly gendered, sexed and sexualised violation. Since the majority of peacebuilding analysis completely fails to engage with these concepts, it is perhaps understandable that sex trafficking goes similarly unproblematised.

Therefore, this study aims to overcome both of these shortcomings – adding a gendered and corporeal lens to existing EU peacebuilding literature, whilst engaging with the case study of EUPM's operational response to sex trafficking to show how 'softer' topics of EU peacebuilding can similarly display instances of third or fourth generation peacebuilding. This approach should allow for a corporeal understanding of *whose bodies matter* to EUPM, within the context of sex trafficking, and ultimately *why these bodies matter*. This 'why' will be answered by studying the power relations between the hegemonic authority of EUPM and the subjects subordinated by this

power. These power relations should indicate how hegemonic norms are developed, and how subordinated bodies come to behave in a normatively prescriptive way.

In studying the gendered aspect of EUPM's peacebuilding strategy, it should be possible to uncover how different bodies are also gendered, and how this factors into a gendered dynamic of power functioning between EUPM and its subordinated subjects. The feminist positioning of this research contends that the hegemonic authority of EUPM is also hyper-masculinised, whereby gendered inequalities are required so to maintain a status of hegemonic *masculine* authority. Therefore, the ways in which gendered bodies are governed, and positioned as subordinate, is not only relevant for the study of gendered and corporeal EU peacebuilding, but also for broader feminist consideration in the fields of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies.

Chapter 2 begins by outlining this background of the Bosnian case in more detail, before probing the existing literature on EU peacebuilding and critiquing the gaps found there. Literature explaining the hegemonic masculine nature of EUPM and other international interventionists is then outlined, as well as a deeper feminist analysis into the feminisation of sex work/prostitution and sex trafficking. Here, the literature notes how particularly gendered, sexed and sexualised connotations lead not only to the strengthening of hegemonic masculinity, but also to complications in identifying certain sexual experiences with specific bodies – not to mention the active or passive nature of these engagements (i.e. if the experience was voluntary – an assumedly masculinised notion, or forced – an assumedly feminised notion).

Chapter 3 addresses the epistemological standpoint of this study, focusing primarily on the work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault. Butler's gender performativity theory denotes how gender, sex and sexuality are conceptualised in the study, as well as how productive power is seen to function in relation to these concepts. Foucault's theory of sexuality expands on this, explaining how the act of sex is an especially controlled experience in Western society, and how the power and knowledge surrounding the act of sex serves to legitimise particular systems of power and inequality – a point that complements Butler's perspective in two key ways: firstly, that this system of power and inequality is also explicitly gendered, sexed and sexualised, to benefit particular hegemonic masculine authorities; and secondly, that this interaction between power and knowledge is ultimately a form of Butler's productive power – what Foucault describes as bio-power. Foucault's concept of governmentality then connects the formation of bio-power with the control of populations – or communal subjects of hegemonic power – which coherently links these theories back to the case study of EUPM and the deciphering of EU peacebuilding objectives. Following this theoretical discussion, the methodological tools to be



used in this study are outlined – primarily Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, together with aspects of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. Finally, the data available for analysis is described, with potential analytical limitations reflected upon.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 analyse the data, uncovering not only what is found in the data in relation to the central research question of *whose bodies matter* and *why*, but also discussing these results in relation to the literature outlined in Chapter 2, as well as within the theoretical and methodological framework described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on the subject positioning of trafficked bodies in EUPM’s discourse, before looking at the related categorisations of other ‘disorderly’ bodies. This construction of normalised disorderly subject positions allows Chapter 5 to uncover silences found in the discourse – where bodies unable to complement these subject positions are seemingly silenced into discursive oblivion. Following an analysis of these abject disorderly bodies, Chapter 5 continues by addressing a second form of silencing – that of the hegemonic masculine authority of EUPM, discursively disguised as a universal and seemingly unchallengeable source of authority. Chapter 6 complicates dominant understandings of disorderly and orderly by uncovering ‘orderly’ bodies – that is, local law enforcers who are certainly idealised over the disorderly bodies found in Chapter 4, but are still subordinated by the highly orderly bodies of EUPM, as outlined in Chapter 5.

Finally, a broad conclusion and reflection is made in Chapter 7, suggesting that the bodies that matter most to EUPM are those most resembling EUPM’s own hegemonic masculine authority – that is, certain local male bodies performing typically hyper-masculinised acts of protection, aggression, activity and capability. All female bodies, whether in positions of active and public authority *or* trapped in a more private and inferior societal space, are never able to fully reach the idealised subject position of orderly – primarily due to their innate sexual disorderliness, as well as other feminised traits of subordination. Although, this does not mean that they are corporeally framed as a singular group – varying levels of power, agency and knowledge are seen to interact between feminised bodies and the hegemonic masculine authority of EUPM. However, overall, it is Western bodies that matter most to EUPM – this can be seen in the overall motivation and response to sex trafficking in Bosnia, as well as how different associations of meaning are applied to Bosnian and other international bodies.

## 2. Background and Literature Review

### 2.1. Sex scandals and soft power: the rise and fall of Bosnia's major interventionists

Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent significant socio-economic and political upheaval in the 1990's. Following the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which ignited incredible acts of ethnic violence and hostility between the various groups that had once identified (or, at least, had been made to somewhat identify) as Yugoslavian, a number of intra-state conflicts developed in the region. The international community initially observed this conflicts from afar, watching Slovenia and Croatia both gain independence. Although, this independence came at quite different costs, with Slovenia having a relatively easy break away from SFRY, in contrast to the bloody war fought in Croatia between those identifying as Croat (who wanted an independent Croatian state) and those identifying as Serb (who wanted to remain part of Greater Serbia – what would remain of SFRY) (Glenny, 1996, p. 159).

It was not until 1992, in Croatia's declaration of independence and the escalation of violence in neighbouring Bosnia – a region that was being pulled in not two but *three* directions<sup>1</sup> – that the UN deployed its Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the region. UNPROFOR attempted to constrain the violence in Bosnia until the end of the War, when an internationally brokered peace agreement and constitution for an independent (yet, divided) Bosnia in December 1995, widely known as the Dayton Agreement, deemed UNPROFOR's mandate no longer relevant. New international operations were then needed to support post-conflict Bosnia through its fragile infancy as an independent state.

Unlike traditional post-conflict environments, where military support is required before civilian/humanitarian work can begin, the Bosnian context needed immediate cooperation between both forms of interventionist – with military and civilian mandates even overlapping in places (Muehlmann, 2008, p. 387). On the military side, intergovernmental military alliance NATO handled all international military operations, until the EU took over this responsibility in 2004. EUFOR ALTHEA, the EU's military operation in Bosnia, continues to function today, overseeing the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

On the civilian side, responsibility was shared between ad hoc international institution the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the UN's new civilian mission – the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Under the guidance of the Dayton

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to Croats and Serbs each claiming Bosnian territory to belong to Greater Croatia and Serbia respectively, a large population of Slavic Muslims or 'Bosniaks' wanted a wholly independent Bosnia.

Agreement, which viewed Bosnia as a weak and failed state in need of complete reconstruction (Glenny, 1996), UNMIBH's mandate was suitably invasive, covering almost all aspects of social, political and economic development. One key component assigned to the UN was to develop the Bosnian police, since this was thought to improve both Bosnian rule of law and security. Therefore, an International Police Task Force (IPTF) was established within the framework of UNMIBH to conduct this work.

This taskforce became the subject of controversy when, between 1999 and 2001, IPTF officer Kathryn Bolkovac uncovered a major underground sex trafficking operation occurring in Bosnia. Bolkovac found that not only were local criminal groups taking advantage of illegal smuggling routes and relaxed post-Socialist borders<sup>2</sup> in order to facilitate a growing demand for prostitution in Bosnia<sup>3</sup>, but both local and international officials were aware of the crime – yet did little to stop it (Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005). To this end, Bolkovac even claimed that internationals were not only involved in this crime indirectly, through the illegal procurement of sex from enslaved individuals, but also directly involved – for instance, by tipping off traffickers prior to police raids on brothels, purchasing trafficked women for personal ‘use’ at the barracks, and helping to transport women across the Bosnian border in UN vehicles (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Mendelson, 2005).

This was considered especially shocking for two reasons. Firstly, sex work was illegal in Bosnia; therefore all figures of authority, both local and international, should have known that purchasing sex was unacceptable. Secondly, sexual violence was widely known to be used as a tool of civilian terror and intimidation during the Bosnian War, therefore a heightened sensitivity for potential sex crimes should have been in the minds of authorities – especially the international interventionists who had been sent to Bosnia in order to protect local civilians (Mendelson, 2005; Burckhardt, 2010).

Although the UN admitted that this scandal caused a “crisis of perception” (2004, p. 5) in their peacekeeping abilities, it was never directly linked to the removal of IPTF/UNMIBH in

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<sup>2</sup> Historically, and especially during the post-Yugoslav war years, a lucrative arms and opium trade moved through the Western Balkan region – typically from Asia and Eastern Europe towards the West (Glenny, 1996; Flessenkemper, 2003). When, in this later post-conflict period, a new commodity was sought after in the region – human beings for prostitution – the same criminal networks used these routes to transport this new object of trade (Harrington, 2005; Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005). This ‘trade’ was considered to be primarily made up of Eastern European women looking for job opportunities in the West (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003, p. 136). Whilst the same economic considerations could have been found *within* Bosnia – i.e. there were plenty of local Bosnian women also looking for work – legal, social and political complications likely made this a less attractive prospect for traffickers.

<sup>3</sup> This demand is explicitly linked to the arrival of international interventionists in Bosnia – who not only had the money to purchase bodies for sex, but also came from an organisational culture that seemingly allowed this sexualised and gendered interaction to thrive – a point that will be discussed later in this chapter, when looking at dominant formations of hyper-masculinity.

Bosnia. However, the similar timing surrounding these two events cannot be overlooked. The UN began seriously planning its departure from Bosnia only months after Bolkovac's discovery was made public. By January 2003, all of IPTF's outstanding objectives were transferred, via UNSCR 1396 (United Nations Security Council, 2002), to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUPM remained in Bosnia for almost ten years, finally leaving the region in June 2012.

With this shift in intervention control, claims of international involvement in the Bosnian sex industry diminished (Flessenkemper, 2014). However, sex trafficking remained a major security and human rights issue in the region. EUPM therefore continued the work initiated by IPTF following the Bolkovac scandal, in attempting to combat sex trafficking and other forms of organised crime. This was in line with an earlier IPTF objective of improving the capabilities of Bosnian law enforcement – what was considered to be the biggest obstacle facing Bosnia's development as a functional state. A more functional state was thought to be more capable of responding to complex organised crimes such as sex trafficking (Osland, 2004, p. 548).

Although EUPM's work was certainly influenced by its UN predecessor, its narrower and weaker mandate means that its approach had to differ somewhat. For instance, EUPM focused primarily on 'soft' peacebuilding techniques, encouraging local ownership of reform processes (Osland, 2004; Mustonen, 2008; Muehlmann, 2008). Soft power is a concept commonly attributed to the actions of the EU (Kagan, 2002; Nye, 2005). According to Nye (2005), it offers an alternative to the traditional 'hard' strategies of using coercion and threats to influence behaviour. Instead, soft power subtly manipulates activities through particular means of attraction and reproduction – by making certain policies, ideas and values look appealing, others will be more inclined to 'proactively' adopt them as their own. As will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, there are positives and negatives that can be found in the EU's utilisation of soft power. However, before scrutinising this component of the EU in detail, it is first important to address the EU's motivation for its intervention in Bosnia.

EUPM, a civilian crisis management mission<sup>4</sup>, was hardly put in place to manage a fresh crisis – the Bosnian War ended in 1995, yet EUPM was not established until 2003. Whilst the EU *had* been present in Bosnia before then, its role had been small and passive. Earlier missions in Bosnia, such as the European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM), merely observed the withdrawal of armed forces, making no attempt to actively intervene in the conflict. More expansive peacekeeping roles were left to the UN and NATO, until the EU began to develop its

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<sup>4</sup> Civilian crisis management is ultimately the EU's terminology for civilian peacebuilding operations.

own crisis management capabilities and responsibilities under the Petersberg Tasks of 1999 (Mustonen, 2008, p. 2).<sup>5</sup>

As the EU's first active foray into peacebuilding, EUPM became frequently referred to as the 'test case' for the EU's developing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – what would later become known as its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Arnall and Wincott, 2004; Osland, 2004; Muehlmann, 2008). ESDP/CSDP is the cornerstone of EU foreign policy. It demonstrates the EU's ability to perform as a credible and capable intervention actor and security provider, which thereby reinforces its position as a regional and international power. According to Brigadier-General Vincenzo Coppola, a former EUPM Head of Mission, as the first practical implementation of ESDP/CSDP, EUPM's actions created a "base for [sic] all future missions and reasoning: if [ESDP/]CSDP can be considered a successful story, this is largely due to the EUPM experience" (quoted in Osmanović-Vukelić, 2012, p. 65). Thus, the EU's rationale for deploying EUPM is intensely significant.

Security forms the basis of all arguments for EU intervention in Bosnia, though security for who and what purpose is often debated. Whilst optimistic scholars such as Mustonen (2008, p. 10) consider the EU to have intervened out of a moral obligation to improve Bosnian state and human security, fuelled by the guilt of the European Commission in its failure to contain the violence of the 1990's, a more cynical analysis points squarely to the proximity of the volatile Western Balkan region in relation to the relatively safe and peaceful EU. Studies by Osland (2004) and Renner and Trauner (2009) suggest that the seemingly uncontrollable cross-border issues facing the Western Balkans, such as the spread of organised crime (which includes the irregular movement of people in the form of both human trafficking and migrant smuggling), encouraged the EU to act in post-conflict Bosnia. The growing threats of organised crime could easily seep into EU borders, undermining the EU's own *internal* security.

The timing of EUPM's deployment supports this argument considerably, especially when taking into account the fifth enlargement of the European Union – agreed in 2003 and implemented in 2004. The Treaty of Accession 2003 invited ten new states to join the EU, including the Balkan state of Slovenia and neighbouring Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>6</sup> By bringing the external border of the EU right into the Western Balkans, the EU had no choice but to take a more pronounced interest in the region's security and development, even if this was to

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<sup>5</sup> The Petersberg Tasks form an integral part of ESDP/CSDP, since they outline how both military and civilian EU crisis management operations can function.

<sup>6</sup> Romania and Bulgaria did not officially accede to the European Union until 2007, however they still constitute part of the fifth enlargement.

primarily protect the EU and not those on the ‘other’ side of Fortress Europe – called such due to the comparatively rigid and impermeable external border of the EU, in comparison to its fluid internal borders (Flessenkemper, 2003; Ioannides and Collantes-Celador, 2011).

Indeed, living in the near-abroad to the EU’s so-called ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ is not always positive, since criminality is habitually thought to increase in response to the ‘promised land’ of the EU/West being temptingly close and yet frustratingly still out of reach (Flessenkemper, 2003, p. 27). Considering how Western Balkan routes continue to be a lucrative source of income for traffickers and smugglers moving their trade into the West, it seems that this claim is still relevant today (US Department of State, 2014). Nevertheless, the benefits of a close relationship with the EU seemed to outweigh these Balkan security threats – with the EU’s alluring portrayal as a political stable, economically prosperous and discernibly modern area maintaining a strong power of attraction for all the newly independent Balkan states aspiring to obtain full EU membership (Arnall and Wincott, 2004; Juncos, 2012).

Muehlmann (2008, p. 388) considers this prospect of EU membership to have given the EU significant authority in the Balkans. It was not only considered to unify a key Balkan interest and therefore promote peace and stability throughout the still-fractious region (since all could work towards the same goal of EU membership), but it also conveniently maintained the EU’s position as the most dominant actor of the region. Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler (2009, p. 8) suggest that this reminds the EU’s major regional competitor, Russia, of its continued geopolitical and ideological pull. Furthermore, a successful rehabilitation of the Western Balkans would fortify the EU’s own credibility and legitimacy as a peace actor, establishing itself as an attractive alternative to UN and NATO peace operations further afield. Legitimacy would also increase within the EU, since its member states had been discontent with EU foreign policy achievements prior to its active engagement of ESDP/CSDP (Arnall and Wincott, 2004, p. 318).

These arguments supporting Bosnian/Balkan intervention not only address the traditional securitisation of EU borders, but they also demonstrate the normative securitisation of the EU’s European identity project.<sup>7</sup> This project, which can be more broadly described as a sense of belonging to something successful, appeals to many non-EU member states – even those that do not expressly desire to perform ‘Europeanness’ exactly how EU rules dictate (Arnall and Wincott, 2004, p. 55). Indeed, prospective members may simply wish to pragmatically enjoy the

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<sup>7</sup> Securitisation refers to the process of transforming political issues into security issues (Buzan, 1997). Traditional securitisation uses hard power to secure something tangible – such as a sovereign border, which is arguably what the EU attempts to do with its many enlargement cycles. However, the EU’s soft power indicates how security can also be constructed through cooperation and symbols of unity, items that are *not* tangible. This can most clearly be observed in the prevalent idea of a shared European identity.

socio-economic benefits of EU/European inclusion, as opposed to exclusion (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1638), or they may view EU membership as a peaceful alternative to the extreme nationalism occupying much of the Western Balkans since the fall of SFRY (Kaldor, 1999, p. 57).

Whatever the individual reasons for attaining such EU membership, all Balkan states are eligible to join, provided that they can meet certain criteria outlined by the EU. Such criteria, however, may neither be easily achievable nor complementary to existing ideas, norms and values that shape (sub-)national identities and behaviour. The complications of such EU conditionality and trusteeship have not only led to stalling membership applications and enlargement fatigue but, perhaps even more gravely, a waning societal development in Bosnia and Herzegovina – at least to the standards of its principal international interventionist and peacebuilder, the European Union.

## **2.2. Bosnia's liberal peace paradox, and its missing gendered and corporeal lens**

In the contemporary unipolar era of International Relations, where there is no credible opposition to Western neoliberal thinking, an overwhelming convergence has developed in terms of how to construct a positive peace.<sup>8</sup> Commonly known as third generation, or liberal, peacebuilding; this refers to the institutional, social, political and economic reform of so-called ‘failed states’ – failed, it is assumed, due to primordial institutional, social, political and economic structures (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009). The task of rebuilding these states, and performing the required structural reforms, is a responsibility taken on by supposedly more ‘developed’ states and institutions, such as Western liberal democracies, the UN, and the EU (Chandler, 2007; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Björkdahl, 2012).

Post-conflict Bosnia is commonly considered to represent such a liberal peacebuilding environment. This is not only clear from the aforementioned foci of interventionist missions – for instance, in the law enforcement reforms of IPTF and EUPM – but it also features strongly in the wider political and economic reforms found in the Dayton Agreement (Glenny, 1996; Arnall and Wincott, 2004; Chandler, 2007; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Richmond, 2010). The moral obligation for internationals to rebuild such failed states can also be summed up in the implicating question asked by Richard Holbrooke, Dayton’s leading mediator: “can we [the international community, led here by the United States] save Bosnia as a state?” (quoted in

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<sup>8</sup> Positive peace, synonymous with sustainable or just peace, means the absence of structural violence. This is in contrast to negative peace, which refers only to the absence of direct warfare (Galtung, 1996).

Glenny, 1996, p. 269). This quote implies that Bosnia is unable to ‘save’ itself, thus requiring external trusteeship.<sup>9</sup>

The neoliberal statebuilding practices of third generation peacebuilding are obviously under tremendous influence of the West. This worries critics of the approach, because the imposition of Western ideals abroad looks to transform them into universal norms. When non-Western states adopt such norms in the aspiration of appearing more like the ‘modern’, ‘developed’ and allegedly ‘peaceful’ West, this can have damaging effects on local ideals – which, if not considered appropriately, could disrupt local cultures and potentially impede sustainable development, creating only a shallow and negative peace (Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Björkdahl, 2012). This is why liberal peacebuilding initiatives are thought to create a liberal peace paradox – where intentions to emancipate a post-conflict society end up restricting such emancipation.

One well-documented example of this is Bosnian political reform. In the Dayton Agreement, political reform refers to development of political freedom by way of democratic participation. The EU support this fairly narrow understanding of political reform because it explicitly dictates that its own member states (as well as all aspiring member states) must be democratic – because democracy is the *only* legitimate form of political activity (Arnall and Wincott, 2004, p.224). Such a perspective, and imposition of this EU/Western norm, is validated because the democratic peace theory argues that democratic states are inherently more peaceful due to their progressive political nature and ideological similarity (Penttinen, 2004; Geis and Wagner, 2011).

Quite paradoxically, however, democracy is a relatively unproven form of popular politics (Hobson, 2009). Alternatives exist that may better suit the unique ethno-political character of Bosnia, yet democracy is promoted because it is known by, and represents, the West. A major critique of third generation peacebuilding is this inability to move beyond the liberal peace paradox and develop new, creative solutions for peace – solutions that may be more locally appropriate. As such, critics encourage peacebuilders to avoid implementing an ‘Ikea box model’ of peacebuilding initiatives to post-conflict societies – called such, because they represent a ‘one size fits all’ solution that fails to account for local contextuality and ownership

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<sup>9</sup> Gradually, the EU has taken on more and more of this trusteeship. In addition to EUPM and EUFOR ALTHEA, the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) position was merged with the leader of the OHR in 2002. This combined position oversees all civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement, making the EU the most powerful international actor in Bosnia.



(Chandler, 2007; Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009; Richmond, 2010; Björkdahl, 2012; Tellidis, 2012).

This international endorsement of liberal democracy is just one example of many attributes promoted by international interventionists to further the Western liberal agenda whilst simultaneously undermining local perspectives. Other examples include the concept of good governance, improving the rule of law (i.e. the ways in which communities are secured and crimes prosecuted), and promoting universal human rights (Arnall and Wincott, 2004; Chandler, 2007; Richmond, 2010; Juncos, 2012). Although these concepts are not themselves negative – of course peacebuilders aim to improve governance systems, protect communities, and uphold human rights – the controlled way in which such critical concepts become *known* and *understood* is potentially dangerous, because these are Western understandings, Western knowledge. The origins of these concepts therefore need to be problematised – an underlying goal of this study.

Indeed, since these concepts are intimately related to EUPM's work on tackling organised crime and its subset of sex trafficking, an engagement with these concepts is especially relevant for the precise focus of this thesis' case study. Surprisingly, this type of analysis has not been conducted before, in conjunction with a critique of EU liberal peacebuilding techniques. It is possible that this academic gap stems from a wider failure to engage with gendered and corporeal topics in liberal peacebuilding debates – a shortcoming that will be addressed shortly. Instead, critics tend to use examples of 'harder' institutional reforms when critiquing EU liberal peacebuilding, for instance the administrative re-structuring of Bosnian police forces and their operational districts (Aybet and Bieber, 2011; Juncos, 2012).

Turning momentarily to what *has* been studied in terms of EU liberal peacebuilding, there is a general consensus among critical peacebuilding scholars that the EU engages somewhat with a third generation peacebuilding framework – a finding that raises deep moral questions about the sincerity of its work in the region. Chandler (2007), the biggest critic of third generation peacebuilding, is extremely critical of the EU's actions in Bosnia. This is not in ignorance of the EU's aforementioned development as a soft power – already argued to reduce international coercion and improve local ownership – but precisely *because* of this power. Rather than listen to local needs, Chandler believes the EU's "neo-colonial" (2007, p. 604) agenda aims to covertly stifle them.

This perspective is due to Chandler's (2007) controversial assertion that the EU deliberates between two foreign policy choices in Bosnia: it can either enforce EU enlargement

via imperialist statebuilding techniques (a point notably supported by the various conditionalities presented to prospective member states, such as widespread political uniformity)<sup>10</sup> or it can engulf Bosnia's fledgling sovereignty and literally become a ruling empire. Since the latter is highly unlikely, due to the geopolitical questions this would raise both in terms of EU supranational sovereignty and the longevity of the sovereign state; Bosnia remains in a liberal peace paradox, in a permanent state of uncertainty about its future. This is beneficial for the EU, since it can de facto govern the country whilst absolving itself of any sovereign responsibilities.

Here, the notion of 'peace-as-governance' must be considered, since it forms the basis of many arguments surrounding the EU's coercive normative power in peacebuilding. Studies by Merlingen (2007) and Ioannides and Collantes-Celador (2011), for instance, argue that to govern Bosnia means to avoid a truly political interaction with it. Rather, a technocratic governance approach is taken, which looks to 'objectively' suggest the best practices for reform, before simply managing the implementation of such reforms. Clearly, these best practices are anything but objective, resembling Western ideals and norms. Thus, once again, these responses prove to undermine local perspectives as to how to conceptualise 'best practices' in Bosnia – not to mention who has the authority and capability to implement such practices effectively.<sup>11</sup>

Despite support of Chandler's general assertion that the EU uses governance tactics to manage and de-politicise Bosnian reforms, his 'empire in denial' theory is often challenged as being a too extreme and also too simplifying rationale for EU behaviour. As Juncos (2012) points out, to suggest that EU enlargement (and thus EU statebuilding) is the only way in which the EU can build peace in Bosnia, is just as limiting as third generation peacebuilding supporters suggesting that this Western-led and neoliberal approach is the only way to build peace. Both approaches position Bosnia as "the recipient of strategies developed elsewhere" (Juncos, 2012, p. 68), thus failing to truly consider local interests and perspectives.

Alternatively, other liberal peacebuilding critics support the use of EU soft power in Bosnia, suggesting that the EU is the only international intervention actor to begin a shift *away* from third generation peacebuilding in its understanding that local engagement is necessary – an approach either known as fourth generation peacebuilding or hybrid peace.<sup>12</sup> These scholars

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<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed discussion surrounding EU enlargement and conditionality as a third generation peacebuilding tool, see: Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler 2009, Aybet and Bieber, 2011, and Mitchell, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Governance, as well as the peace-as-governance strategy, will be conceptually developed in Chapter 3, by engaging at length with Foucault's notion of governmentality.

<sup>12</sup> Hybrid peace is slightly different to fourth generation peacebuilding, in that it acknowledges that an entire break away from third generation peacebuilding is unlikely. Instead, local resistance for interventionist tactics tempers the negative effects of third generation peacebuilding, creating compromise and thus improving "localised legitimacy and consent" (Kappler and Richmond, 2011, p. 269).

argue that the EU's invested interest in the Western Balkan region and its related membership conditionality is not a vindictive tool of governance, but rather a capacity building technique for Bosnia to soon be able to "reduce external statebuilding and secure the process of domestic institution building" (Aybet and Bieber, 2011, p. 1914) – eventually allowing for Bosnia's full realisation as a member of the harmonised EU community.

Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler go on to suggest that EU peacebuilding aims to address "the social experiences of insecurity, rather than merely physical and institutional instability" (2009, p. 5), thus recognising that a proper engagement with local society is necessary for integration, security and development to truly prosper. This willingness to involve civil society is quite different to other interventionist approaches. The most extreme difference can be found in the peacebuilding conducted by the United States, which still uses traditional hard power and security threats to authenticate its neoliberal and heavily securitised statebuilding strategy. The UN also has a different approach – like the EU, its normative power can covertly mobilise particular societal behaviours, but it remains focused on the development and ownership of sovereign states. The EU, alternatively, appears to conceptualise 'society' in a wider sense, allowing for a more hybrid peacebuilding strategy to develop.

Having said that, there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the EU's peacebuilding activities. Its use of soft/normative power, for instance, remains a point of concern for even the more optimistic peacebuilding scholars. Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler (2009, p. 8) accept that the EU has a strong normative pull in the Balkan region, due to its integratory lure, and that this could positively influence peace, security and development. However, if looking more generally at EU approaches, they worry that success in integration regions such as Bosnia will be inappropriately transported further afield – where this context of EU enlargement is not in operation. Here, there is potential for reverting back to a neo-colonial 'one size fits all' practice that withdraws from local contextuality.

Furthermore, despite all the talk surrounding the EU's idealistic peacebuilding framework, there is little proof to suggest that this really *is* positive – with Mitchell (2011, p. 1640) warning of the negative effects of this so-called 'affective' peacebuilding – effects that resemble those outlined by sceptics such as Chandler (2007). Also, in practical terms, the EU continues to take considerable influence from the third generation approach of the UN – so it is difficult to see just how far this idealist strategy can even go. This is especially a point to keep in mind when looking at how the ideals of Brussels are translated into ESDP/CSDP operationality.

Indeed, it seems that many of the so-called 'peace gaps' created by a liberal peace paradox remain in contemporary Bosnia. Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler (2009) therefore

question if the EU has really been able to invoke the concept of ‘local ownership’ for all of its practical worth. This is why corporeality must be studied in the context of EU peacebuilding, to see if this is truly being utilised appropriately. If EUPM’s work in Bosnia is a developed and standard-setting example of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding, then it makes sense to use this mission and region as a case study. Then, in valuing the idea that a positive, sustainable peace must be localised, it must be asked: who actually makes up this ‘local’ figure in Bosnia? Does the local represent a community or an individual body, and what forms of power enact on this body, as well as within EUPM, the organisation that seemingly governs such bodies to behave in a normatively prescriptive way (Kappler and Richmond, 2011)?

Two related questions posed by Björkdahl (2012), but otherwise not particularly well developed within the analytical framework of liberal peacebuilding, are the following feminist considerations: firstly, where are the women; and secondly, when locating men and women, what does this uncover about normative understandings of gender? Then, if EUPM promotes fourth generation peacebuilding, is this local engagement gendered? Alternatively, if EUPM promotes third generation peacebuilding, are only certain performances of gender allowed, thereby limiting more creative understandings of how gender can function?<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, as an international power and authority, does EUPM itself represent a particular gender performance – and how does this interact with its hegemonic position in Bosnia, therefore impacting its operational response to gendered and corporeal issues such as sex trafficking?

These questions will be answered by combining a peace-as-governance analysis of EU liberal peacebuilding with post-modern and post-structural theories that apply a gendered and corporeal lens to this case study of EUPM’s operational response to sex trafficking. This should help to determine how the EU utilises these concepts in an operational environment, allowing for an answer to the central research question of this study: *whose bodies matter* in EU civilian crisis management operations, and ultimately *why do these bodies matter*?

### **2.3. Hegemonic masculinity and feminised sex work**

Since EU liberal peacebuilding debates generally fail to engage with the topic of gender, yet this being a major theme within this thesis, it is crucial to reflect on what is commonly understood about gender – especially in relation to sex work (of which sex trafficking is a distinctive example of) and the EU’s hegemonic and *hyper-masculine* position on the international stage. To

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example: Enloe, 2000, Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002, Higate, 2007, and Mendelson, 2005.

begin with sex work, it has already been insinuated that sex work is a highly feminised profession. This is not only a practical side effect of many prostitutes being sexed and gendered female, but it is also because the individuals typically procuring bodies for sex are sexed and gendered male. This sexed and gendered interaction reinforces the assumption that male and female, men and women, perform differently – with the act of using a body for sex becoming known as a masculine trait, whereas a body used to satisfy somebody else's sexual desire becoming a feminine trait (Enloe, 2000; Rydstrøm, 2012; Higate, 2012).

As Pajnik (2006, p. 15) explains, this assumedly heterosexual and binary gendered relationship is often considered to be a 'natural' or 'biological' phenomenon – rationalised as such due to the longevity of prostitution as a feminised and female-occupied position. However, this historical justification is dangerous, since describing prostitution as the oldest profession in society removes any space/time contexts that may have influenced its development – for example, how certain attributes have been prioritised in order to normalise particular connotations of meaning between sex work and femininity.

This assumptive connotation underlines several explanations for the 'push' factors of sex work. For instance, one common rationale for the pervasiveness of sex work points to the class-based argument of the feminisation of poverty and the subsequent lack of alternative opportunities for the feminised underclass. This is thought to encourage the social category of the desperate, the uneducated, the unwilling, into the sex trade – however, this feminised social category is clearly conflated with female bodies, thereby overlooking the experiences of other (e.g. male) sex workers (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Penttinen, 2004; Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005). Another explanation supported by sex-positive feminist researchers alternatively focuses on the more positive 'push' factors of sex work, however it is unfortunate that these studies continue to feminise the sex industry by similarly ignoring the experiences of male sex workers, focusing solely on the motivations of female-bodied prostitutes (Lobasz, 2009; Jennings, 2010).

In addition to the 'push' factors of sex work, 'pull' factors are also critical to consider – a point that Salt and Stein (1997) emphasise in their study of the sex industry as a business. Businesses require revenue, and thus customers, to successfully function. In recent years, discussions surrounding demand have slowly developed, acknowledging the longstanding relationship between typically male customers and typically female sex workers. However, public discourse still overwhelmingly attempts to forgive this relationship as something 'natural', suggesting that 'boys will be boys' – a phrase that not only justifies the actions of these

‘boys’, but further cements the illusion that those procuring sex are always male, and that the act of procuring sex is somehow masculine (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Mendelson, 2005).

Although this thesis does not advocate an essentialist viewing of sex, gender and sexuality, it is important to consider the prevalence of this standpoint. Some psychologists attempt to validate this relationship by arguing that sexual desire is not only biologically driven, but also that male bodies have an increased potency in sexual desire (Baumeister, Catanese and Vohs, 2001). There are obviously limitations to this theory when considering its male-dominated and modernist context. Nevertheless, this perspective has been used to justify male sexual behaviour and, by extension, the dominance of the masculine form as an excuse for maintaining the subordinated position of female bodies in the sex trade. Higate (2007, p. 108) remarks that this assumed link between hyper-masculinity and sexual desire is even accepted and exploited by some prostitutes, when they look to attract new male clients as opposed to female ones, since male bodies are perceived to be more vulnerable to their sexual seduction (a process that also furthers the stereotype of male clients and female prostitutes, not to mention an assumed heterosexuality of the sex trade).

An alternative psychological perspective suggests that sexual desire is not biologically determined, but rather socially constructed (Basson, 2000). Penttinen (2004, p. 14) supports this view from the viewpoint of feminist International Relations, by arguing that it is the spread of neoliberal ideas and values – ideas and values that, crucially, are also patriarchally created and reinforced, to maintain a patriarchal system of power whereby male bodies hold dominance over female bodies – that allows the sex industry to exist in its current form. Therefore, there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘essential’ about the current state of the sex trade – it is simply a socio-cultural and economic consequence of neoliberalism and hegemonic masculinity. Pajnik (2006, p. 28) agrees, challenging another aspect of the biological argument in stating that female sexuality is not necessarily weaker than male sexuality – it has just been socio-culturally restrained, and in some cases even shamed as unclean/inappropriate, so as to not pose a threat to conventional patriarchal dominance.

Embracing this social constructivist perspective, contexts are not pre-determined but historically and culturally influenced – they are normatively developed. Norms are created when dominant ideas become internalised within a culture or society. According to Wendt (1999), this forms the basis of, and legitimises, socio-cultural interaction. Sexual interaction is therefore a key example of this. The gendered and sexualised relationship that develops between dominant male bodies and subordinated feminised sex workers forms a process of gendered/sexualised normalisation – where prevalent ideas about appropriate male/female behaviour, as well as the

normative dominance of men over women, permits men to seek out female sex workers in order to satisfy their sexual urges. Women, on the other hand, become normatively expected to fulfil male sexual urges before/without gratifying their own desires (Enloe, 2000).

As will be highlighted in more detail in the next chapter, these normative expectations culminate in particular societal identifications of masculine and feminine behaviour (Butler, 1990). Väyrynen (2004) considers an exploration of masculinity/femininity to be critical for outlining the limitations associated with such a traditionally narrow and fixed understanding of gender – namely, as something that is only allowed to exist in binary form, with two distinct and opposing performances acting upon the corporeal figure. Such fixed binaries cannot account for bodies unable or unwilling to identify in this manner – nor can they account for the multifaceted reality of gender performance, where multiple masculinities and femininities occupy the same space, as well as act on the surface of the same body, at the same time.

Keeping this oversimplification of gender performance in mind, it is important to recognise that even hyper-masculinity is a multifaceted concept that must be problematised. Hyper-masculinity is a particularly overt form of masculinity. Although often considered synonymous with the terms ‘hegemonic masculinity’ or ‘militarised masculinity’, there are important differences in these categorisations. Whilst hegemonic masculinity focuses quite broadly on the dominant social position of the category identifying as ‘men’, militarised masculinity can be conceived as a subset of hegemonic masculinity, where particular masculine traits initially associated with the male-dominated military are now more widely configured to be stereotypically masculine, or representative of what it means to act like a ‘real man’. In both cases, certain traits e.g. bravery, aggression, brute strength and concerted action in the public sphere become associated with masculinity. These virtues are then contrasted with stereotypically feminised opposites – peacefulness, weakness, passivity in the private sphere – thereby retaining a gendered point of difference between male and female bodies, and an unequal system of power between those who have the capability and responsibility to protect (the masculine) and those requiring protection (the feminine) (Sylvester, 1994; Enloe, 2000; Väyrynen, 2004; Higate, 2007; 2012).

Agathangelou and Ling (2003) elaborate on this power dynamic by explaining that in many societies, and especially in the Western neoliberal societies that hold an abundance of power within contemporary International Relations, this power imbalance is sustained between the two binary genders (as well as other key demarcations of difference, such as West/non-

West)<sup>14</sup> so to uphold particular societal norms of patriarchal dominance. This is not only visible in overtly militarised units, such as state-led armies, but it can also be used to explain the actions of other militarised entities. For instance, intervention actors do not need to use military force to pursue the militarised masculinised notion of active responsibility that operates on behalf of others. The interventionist subject position is thereby masculinised, whereas an interventionist's subject of protection is feminised (Enloe, 2000; Penttinen, 2004).

To fully understand the role that hegemonic masculinity holds in international intervention operations, it is first useful to recall how international interventions have evolved in recent years. The rise of complex, messy and fragmented intra-state conflicts, often caused by the socio-political void that developed after the collapse of bipolar international relations at the end of the Cold War, have caused interventions to move beyond their traditional mandate of passively monitoring ceasefires, undertaking a much more active and varied role during/after a conflict (Kaldor, 2008). This not only involves traditional peacekeeping, but also more active *peacebuilding* (Muehlmann, 2008).

Peacebuilding quite literally refers to how peace cannot be passively kept but must be actively built by interventionists. It allows actors such as the UN and EU to pursue positions of authority that not only resemble conventional military positions, but also those held traditionally by the sovereign state. This is because the state is considered weak and in need of external protection – it is once more subordinate, once more feminised. Interventionist peacebuilders are therefore able to replace this position of state hegemony with a more international hegemonic authority – a hegemonic *masculine* authority, where actors such as EUPM are (hyper-)masculinised as strong, capable and active protectors (Väyrynen 2004). Thus, EUPM represents not only a militarised masculine authority in Bosnia, but also a wider hegemonic masculine authority. Gender is therefore a critical concept to study in relation to contemporary peacebuilding interventions.

## **2.4. The specifics of sex trafficking**

Despite a strong connection between sex trafficking and sex work, it is important to differentiate these two concepts from one another. However, this is easier said than done, because one of the two major standpoints on sex work contends that the two concepts are unequivocally linked. The

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<sup>14</sup> This refers to the sexual phenomenon known as 'opposites attract' – the global sex industry has flourished on the idea that (typically rich and Western) clients can use the procurement of sex to try something new, exotic, dangerous or otherwise unattainable (i.e. non-Western) (Penttinen, 2004; Jennings, 2010).



abolitionist feminist view argues that *all* prostitution is coercive and exploitative, due to the use of the feminised body as a sex object to be penetrated and absolved of its power. Once again, the sexualised and feminised body maintains patriarchal norms, privileges and inequalities (Penttinen, 2004; Lobasz, 2009). Such a perspective is supported by studies suggesting that the relaxation of prostitution laws will make it easier for trafficking rings to operate (Cho, Dreher and Neumayer, 2013). However, the difficulties of tracking and substantiating trafficking data make this statement practically impossible to prove quantitatively. As such, opposing studies can just as easily suggest the other extreme – that legalised prostitution actually reduces the spread of trafficking (Horning *et al.*, 2013, p. 11).

This sex-positive view does not consider prostitution and sex trafficking to be the same thing at all. Here, prostitution is considered a legitimate, even empowering, form of work. Thus, prostitution should be de-stigmatised to allow voluntary sex work to flourish, because individuals have the right to decide how to use their own body. Ensuring bodies have this ability to consent, supporters say, will in turn improve security and human rights for everyone in the sex industry – including those unwillingly trafficked into the trade (Penttinen, 2004; Halley *et al.*, 2006; Lobasz, 2009).

Lobasz (2009, p. 335) goes on to state that sex trafficking is dangerous not for its links to prostitution but for its exploitative nature – clearly an important differentiation to make, when considering that many other forms of human trafficking are not sexual at all. Horning *et al.* (2013, p. 11) agree with this reflection, noting that many studies focus solely on the sexual nature of trafficking when, in fact, many blue-collar service sectors similarly exploit individuals. Exploitative work that is neither overtly sexual nor contested legally (as prostitution often is) is *still* human trafficking.

The UN acknowledges this point when defining sex trafficking as one example of the wider organised crime of human trafficking. According to the UN's Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (otherwise known as the UN TIP Protocol), the primary reference point for all major definitions of trafficking:

“Trafficking in persons’ means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, *the exploitation of the*

*prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation...*” (United Nations, 2000, *emphasis added*)<sup>15</sup>

With an emphasised link between sex trafficking and exploitation, as opposed to prostitution and exploitation, this suggests that some prostitution may *not* be exploitative. However, it is important to reflect that there are considerable ambiguities in terms of what is and what is not exploitation, which makes responses to sex trafficking all the more complicated (Pajnik, 2006).

Such ambiguity creates a similar problem when trafficking discourses attempt to disconnect from other forms of irregular migration such as migrant smuggling. Like prostitution, the difference between trafficking and smuggling is considered to be the exploitative nature of trafficking compared to seemingly voluntary environment of smuggling (Flessenkemper, 2003; Obokata, 2006). However, in practice, such boundaries are blurry and thus very difficult to pinpoint when assessing real-life situations. What if an individual migrated voluntarily, but the conditions of their movement changed? Similarly, what if an individual voluntarily chose to become a prostitute but was then unable to move freely beyond the brothel, choose their own clientele, or ensure clients treated them appropriately?

Andrijasević (no date) then complicates matters further by addressing a gendered consideration – with experiences of human trafficking (and especially sex trafficking) so often gendered female, what happens if a trafficked individual is gendered male? Does this affect how he is considered to be a passive victim of trafficking or an active actor of smuggling? Is this actor assumed to be in the non-sexual service sector or, if clearly a prostitute, must this feminised work have been *forced* on the male body? Similarly, Burckhardt (2010, p. 3) raises the example of women procuring sex from prostitutes, or actively playing in the trafficking trade – does this threaten dominant understandings of gender performance?

The more unconventional usages of binary gender performance are incredibly important to keep in mind throughout this study, as Grey and Shepherd (2013) illustrate in their analysis of male survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. Focusing solely on the gender most commonly affected will not miraculously eliminate the violating experiences of other genders. Furthermore, to conflate sexual victimhood with a feminine gender performance – or, narrower still, the female biological sex – could not only seriously impede future admissions of male

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<sup>15</sup> This excerpt of the UN TIP Protocol defines *adult* human trafficking. Children do not need to prove that their movement was coerced, since it is already assumed that they lack the agency to make such decisions of mobility. This is a relevant point to keep in mind when analysing responses to trafficking, as often individuals who have been trafficked are infantilised to represent this childlike loss of agency.

sexual violence, but it could also reduce the usefulness of wider feminist theories surrounding gender, sexuality and power.

Another potential danger can occur when studies conflate hegemonic or militarised masculinised peacebuilding operations with sex trafficking, blurring the line between an indirect engagement with sex trafficking – i.e. a normative discourse that either legitimises or is ambivalent towards the effects that a feminisation of sex trafficking experiences and a (hyper-)masculinisation of intervention has on these bodies – and a direct pursuit of trafficked bodies, as was highlighted in the case of IPTF. It is worth stating explicitly here that this thesis does not intend to make any assumptions involving the latter, but simply aims to use EUPM's discourse as a investigative tool to determine how bodies related to sex trafficking are positioned, what this says about gender and corporeality in the EU's peacebuilding work, and thus how overarching power relations are conveyed in EU peacebuilding.

### 3. Theories, Data and Methods

#### 3.1. Performing gender on the surface of the body

In the contemporary era of third wave feminism<sup>16</sup>, a period heavily influenced by the related developments of post-modern and post-structural thinking, gender has been re-conceptualised to represent something similarly post-modern and post-structural. Whilst the second wave of feminism did already acknowledge gender as its own concept, distinct from that of sex (sex referring to the biological demarcation of male and female bodies, in contrast to gender representing the socially constructed enactment of such sexed interactions, thereby developing particular masculine and feminine expressions of gender), this polarising positioning of gender and sex only allowed for a very narrow understanding of these concepts (Butler, 1990; Sylvester, 1994).

Consider the earlier opinion of sex as a pre-discursive instrument of biological determinism. Here, pre-discursive refers to a “politically neutral surface on which culture acts” (Butler, 1990, p. 11). This blank space of neutrality leaves no room for real adaptive capacity – how can it, if sex is fixed and unable to adapt to evolving socio-cultural circumstances? Even gender, when widely accepted as a socially constructed and thus adaptable notion, is constrained if it can only develop within the confines of a male-female sexed binary. If binary sexes only allow for certain expressions of gender, then does this create similarly restrictive binary genders? Indeed, does the term ‘expression’ here itself imply that an ontological truth of gender can be found (Butler, 1990, p. 180)? If so, does this limit how masculinity and femininity can develop? Can multiple expressions of gender even exist at the same time, or on the same body, and do these expressions carry the same meaning for all bodies concerned?

These limitations are reminiscent of the simplifying and universalising assumptions made in Western-oriented, modernist and structuralist thinking, as well as in many feminist works of

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<sup>16</sup> Feminism, here, refers more precisely to feminist International Relations theory. The first wave of feminism, empiricist feminism, introduced International Relations to the category of women. Typically known as the ‘add women and stir’ approach, this did not problematise the origins of International Relations theories and methods. This came in the second wave, when standpoint feminism challenged the earlier modernist assumptions of objective or gender-neutral theorising. Looking to avoid masculinised norms, the standpoint and experiences of women began to be prioritised. The third wave, post-modern feminism, continued the work of standpoint feminists but developed a sensitivity to diversity within the category of so-called ‘women’. Indeed, the white Western orientation of this term (and its related theories) began to be problematised, and as such third wave feminists began to uncover multiple forms of power exerting in different ways, for a variety of purposes.

this period<sup>17</sup>, which is why this problematic is studied in the current era. Judith Butler, a seminal third wave feminist, responded to these quandaries in her 1990 book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. In her development of gender performativity theory, Butler contended that not only is gender socially constructed, but sex too, since the concept of sex is only relevant in relation to the concept of gender. This is clear from the way in which sex is given its meaning – it is the *res extensa* (the naming practice), the categorisation assigned to infants, which gives them their biological and (assumedly also hetero-)sexual difference (Butler, 1990, p. 10). When these bodies are sexed in a binary manner, they implicitly create a space where binary genders (and sexualities) are also produced. Maintaining such binaries therefore means to sustain particular understandings of gender, sex and sexuality, whilst simultaneously excluding alternative understandings. This, in turn, sustains particular systems of power. Therefore, in line with a general goal of post-structuralism, to challenge such power systems means to deconstruct binary assumptions.

Before looking at how power functions within and influences these performances per se, it is first important to understand how such performances actually work. Since sex and gender are socially constructed, they cannot be states of ‘being’, since this would imply that they are somewhat constant and impermeable. Instead, sex and gender are performative acts of ‘doing’ – temporal, fluid and permeable. Performances are not expressions, so there is no search for an ontological, universalising truth. It is rather the abstract nature and flexibility of performance that can create multiple possibilities for gender and sex to develop as independent concepts (Butler, 1990, p. 33). Gender’s independence from sex therefore allows for multiple masculine and feminine performances to act on different bodies – bodies that are also independent from one another, when not arbitrarily grouped in a binary manner.

Gender performance also allows for a creative and critical investigation into the boundaries of the body itself, and what the body could come to represent if taken out of its current context, as something “constituted by the markers of sex” (Butler, 1990, p. 164). For instance, an exploration of corporeal permeance, through gender performativity, may not only highlight new understandings and boundaries of the body, but also new ways in which power can

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<sup>17</sup> Butler especially critiques the totalising claims of two influential second wave feminists – de Beauvoir and Irigaray. Whilst de Beauvoir famously argued that women are the second sex, in doing so she cemented women’s position as a binary opposite to men – with all women defined as ‘Other’, as the thing in which they are not (the male Self). Alternatively, Irigaray suggested that both the Self *and* the Other are masculine. However, in describing the feminine sex as “a point of linguistic absence” (Butler, 1990, p. 15) within masculinist discourse, she similarly assumed that all women share an exclusive experience, producing a shared aspect of feminine identity (resistance to an assumed universal patriarchy).

interact with the body – which may highlight new methods of producing power, developing identity and exerting agency. It may also allow for an exploration into the rejection of particular bodies – those that do not fit in with the current impermeable perception of the binary sexed and heterosexually desiring body. These ‘socially abject’ bodies can provide important insights into how certain performances of gender, sex and sexuality are *hidden*<sup>18</sup>, in order to maintain corporeal boundaries and binary stabilities, as well as their subsequent power relations (unlike the opposing focus on the promotion of hegemonic performances as to determine what/who *is* recognised as a subject) (Kristeva, 1982; Butler, 1990).

To explain such corporeal permeance in another way, gender is not something that ‘is’, but rather something that is ‘done’. Thus, gender cannot be used as a noun, though this is not to say that there are not also complexities in its use as an adjective (Higate, 2012). For example, when an individual identifies as a woman, this individual cannot really *be* a woman but rather *does* (performs) the “identity it [being a woman] is purported to be” (Butler, 1990, p. 33). This supposition contains adjectives – legitimised over time either essentially or accidentally – that seemingly describe what it means to perform as a woman, to perform as something feminine. Then, with this feminine performance, an implicit meaning is given to the, *her* (here is the *res extensa*, once again), body. Her body is legitimised as female, via her described-as-feminine social practices and attributes – and vice versa, with the naming of her sex as female influencing her gender performance. However, such meanings are only derived from the power of language – the naming of the body as female, the naming of *her* nuanced actions as those synonymous with femininity. Gender therefore becomes a corporeal marker of identity production<sup>19</sup>, with the corporeal body acting as a site, or a surface, for power to inscribe itself (Butler, 1990, p. 143).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The location of modern sexuality in the private sphere implies that it too should be hidden. Considering the binary stigmas associated with femininity and privacy, this could suggest that sexual bodies are silenced because they are feminine (or feminised because they are silenced). Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that female bodies are especially considered in need of sexual regulation. Whether this is because female bodies are thought to be hysterical, due to their saturated sexual nature (Foucault, 1978b, p. 104) or if it is because male bodies are thought to exert an innate sexuality that can overpower and threaten female bodies (see: Chapter 2’s discussion on the psychological rationales for sexual desire development), the relationship between the female sex, feminine gender performances and sexuality is clearly a relevant intersection to study – hence the topic of this thesis.

<sup>19</sup> Butler argues that identity cannot be studied in isolation from *gender* identity, because conforming to a particular understanding of gender (and sex and sexuality) conditions the identity process. In this way, identity is not descriptive but normative – it is governed by gendered and sexual norms (1990, p. 23).

<sup>20</sup> Crucially, Butler remains aware of her own “discursively conditioned experience” (1990, p. 12) in how this shapes, and creates boundaries for, her own understanding of the body as a surface for power and identity to develop upon. This can surely be just as limiting as using the body as a biologically determined instrument, if treated as an ontological ‘truth’. However, in line with post-modern and post-structural thinking, subjectivity is always present and should therefore be reflected upon. This can provide considerable insight into the deep epistemological questions that such theories focus on. Indeed, ontological questions are not the focus here. It is hard to ask ‘what *is* this?’ if *this* is itself contested. Rather, the epistemological question of ‘how do I *know* this?’ allows for multiple,

In accepting that gender is performed upon the surface of the body, it is clear that gender performativity theory gives space to the development of new, expansive understandings of sex and gender. Gender as performance also questions the normative knowledge and related expectations surrounding binary genders, such as the appropriation of stereotypical gender roles and behaviour (through the ritualisation of particular gender performances, that over time become legitimate representations of *how to do gender right* i.e. in a binary manner), and the maintenance of particular systems of power (which use this power to regulate which performances can be considered legitimate, thereby sustaining several intersectional exploitations<sup>21</sup>). However, does this explain precisely how such power systems function? Understanding this aspect should provide a deeper explanation for why gender performances, and by relation, the corporeal plane and its sexual output, are so often regulated.

Butler's understanding of power takes substantial influence from the later works of Michel Foucault. Both agree that power is not simply a juridical instrument – referring here to the negative use of *power over* individuals, or Power with a capital P, in order to coerce and govern such individuals (or *subjects*) (Foucault, 1978b, p. 94). This type of power is most clearly visible in the hegemonic positioning of particular bodies over others – for instance, in the role of the monarch or state leaders; or, as many feminists contend, in the construction of 'men' with their hegemonic and/or militarised masculinity, as well as an institutionalised heterosexuality that can be linked to such hyper-masculine performances (Butler, 1990, p. 30). Here, in line with the views of de Beauvoir and Irigaray, 'women' and their femininities are permanently excluded, and thus seek emancipation from this position of abjection.

However, what shifts in Butler and Foucault's thinking is that these juridical systems of power actually *produce* these subjects. It is through this productive power (which vitally resembles soft or normative power<sup>22</sup>) that totalising categories remain intact, and such hegemonic bodies maintain their power. Indeed, productive power creates, and then manages, particular identities. Certain identities are given *power to exist*. This is in contrast to the view that identities pre-discursively exist, and are in a sense politically manipulated at a later date. 'Women', therefore, as a category seeking emancipation, inadvertently accept this position as a

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mobile and overlapping subjectivities – the very purpose of post-modernism and post-structuralism, and the underlying explanation for Butler's gender performativity theory. After all, Butler herself argues that the performative gendered body has "no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality" (1990, p. 173). It is, rather, an epistemological question of how the performative gendered body is known, and why it comes to be known this way (due to various enactments of power on this body).

<sup>21</sup> In addition to those discussed here, other prominent intersectional exploitations include race, age and class – these will be considered, in conjunction with gender, sex and sexuality, in the analytical chapters.

<sup>22</sup> See Chapter 2's discussion surrounding the normative/soft power of the European Union.

category in need of emancipation (Butler, 1990, p. 5). This emancipation *becomes* a feature of feminine identity, which was first produced, and is now maintained, by such productive power. To accept the need for emancipation means therefore to accept the subject position of a woman, which means to accept the dominant understanding of feminine identity, develop such an identity in relation to current unequal power relations between ‘men’ and ‘women’, thereby reinstating binary gender positions.<sup>23</sup>

This notion of productive power fits the post-structuralist epistemology of all meanings being derived from language – a point that this study seeks to capitalise on, when studying how discourse uses productive power to conceal juridical power. As Butler explains, “language assumes and alters its power to act upon the real through locutionary acts, which, [when] repeated, become entrenched practices and, ultimately, institutions” (1990, p. 148). Speaking subjects theoretically begin as equal, but prevailing hegemonic systems of power create the perception of inherent inequality, due to the enforcement of binaries and the subsequent need for emancipation. Indeed, it is when discourses force such perceivably unequal speaking subjects to admit to their inequalities and oppressive subject positions, that such inequality and oppression comes to ‘exist’ (existence in the sense of a perceived reality, not an ontological truth) (Butler, 1990, p. 146).

Therefore, it seems to fair to assume that hegemonic discourses are in place to establish and maintain particular boundaries of the body, in order to provide order and stability for those in power, and control meanings associated with the body (Butler, 1990, p. 166). The limitation of these meanings can of course be material, such as the normalising power of creating/sustaining certain taboos (for example, how to correctly perform gender or sexuality), but they can also be entirely abstract. Radical post-structuralists, for instance, consider such boundaries of the body to represent the impermeable “limits of the socially hegemonic” (Butler, 1990, p. 167). When this understanding of power, this societal dynamic, is challenged, alternative understandings and uses of power (which is immanent and everywhere, and thus does not remain confined to hegemonic structures or is unable to change) attempt to be controlled or repressed (Foucault, 1978b, p. 94). Hence, it is just as important to study what *is* found in hegemonic discourse, as to study what is *lacking* from such discourse. Thus, as Grey and Shepherd (2012, p. 122) reiterate,

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<sup>23</sup> Just because this example (and, indeed, this study) focuses on the manipulative nature of productive power does not mean that productive power cannot also be positive – hegemonic performances *can* be resisted and changed over time, a clear goal for many contemporary feminist projects (Penttinen, 2004, p. 82) and indeed, the reason that this study does not focus solely on Foucault’s conception of the ‘docile’ subject as something unable to transform itself into something resistant or changed.



questioning whose bodies are (in-)visible in a discourse is directly related to the central question of this thesis: *whose bodies matter?*

Ultimately, Butler's gender performativity theory suggests that gender, sex and sexuality are regulatory ideals that, when exposed as socially temporal and fluid norms, can be displaced and transformed (1990, p. 173). This claim is a good place to connect more deeply with Foucauldian thought since Foucault's theory of sexuality, as well as his understanding of governmentality, relies on a similar productive power and knowledge relationship. Indeed, post-structuralism as a whole aims to challenge traditional understandings of power and knowledge, in a similar way to how post-modern feminists challenge the exclusionary (i.e. gendered) normative practices that conventional knowledge and power relations construct (Penttinen, 2004). Therefore, in combining such theoretical frameworks when analysing EUPM's work, it should be possible to emphasise how EU peacebuilding initiatives understand the concepts of gender and corporeality – whether in terms of how certain responses build and maintain a binary gendered peace-as-governance system, or if they undertake a more creative understanding of gender as a performance on the surface of the body, leading to a “new configuration of politics [to] emerge from the old” (Butler, 1990, p. 189).

### **3.2. The gendered, sexed and sexualised body as a subject governed by Foucauldian knowledge and power**

In line with Butler's suggestion that gender and sex are social constructs developed to uphold certain systems of power, Michel Foucault's theory of sexuality similarly considers sex to be a normative production; a social category enforced corporeally for purposes of societal control. Unlike earlier understandings of the corporeal figure as something biologically bound and thus unchallenged and unchanged by discourse, in *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge* (1978b)<sup>24</sup>, Foucault questioned how the body is known to be sexed as male or female, relating this to how such sexed bodies become sexualised. The study of this

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<sup>24</sup> Since Foucauldian thought shifted several times throughout his career, it is important to locate this study within a particular era of Foucault's work – that being the late 1970's, and Foucault's study of modern Western sexuality and the connections this had with population control and criminality. Whilst Foucault continued to expand his understanding of sexuality in his final years, leading to a more developed understanding of how sexual subjects are formed and how they can resist/self-create sexualities (aspects especially relevant for contemporary feminist appropriation – indeed, it is these aspects that respond most vividly to the feminist critiques of Foucault's earlier work), this era of Foucault is less *directly* relevant to the topic of this master's thesis. In an ideal world, such understandings would also be problematised and incorporated into this study, however space constraints make this presently unfeasible.

transformation of the body into a sexual subject allows for connections to not only be made between sex and sexuality, but also between these two concepts and the aforementioned power relations that define and normalise them, as well as the *savoir* (deep knowledge, explicit yet underlying) used to create such definitions and thereby maintain particular systems of power.

The binary categorisation of sex, as either male or female, is just one example of how such norms are produced and internalised, however it is an incredibly important example, because the sexing of corporeal bodies is thought to lead to many other related binary categorisations that can be similarly exclusionary, silencing or refuting – such as gender (as outlined in Butler’s work) and sexuality (the focus of Foucault<sup>25</sup>, but also a important theme for Butler and other queer theorists). Foucault (1978b, p. 122) considers the binary distinctions found in sex to both be *caused by*, and be the *cause of*, narrow understandings of sexuality. Ultimately, both concepts mutually reinforce one another, in order to maintain the power systems that first produced these categorisations.

Consider how unconventional sexual practices, desires and pleasures come to be treated in society – for instance, homosexuality, adultery or prostitution.<sup>26</sup> Described in a fairly derogatory manner as sexual deviances, taboos or violations of societal sexual norms, these processes are not only taken to challenge the norms of sexuality, but also the binary of sex itself. Foucault contends that this is because deviances threaten both the biological functionality of conventional sexual behaviour – that is, the reproductive purpose of engaging in a consensual marital exchange of heterosexual relations – and the moral values that become associated with such biological utility, precisely due to the need to normalise only this limited form of sexuality (and, by relation, the limited binaries of sex) (1978b, p. 54).

This is why sexual experiences outside this very narrow understanding of sexuality are demonised as deviant, and thus hegemonic interveners attempt to regulate such experiences. In other words, norms become a social contract that cannot be broken – if it is broken, the body (as the subject agreeing to such a contract) may experience a form of punishment (Merlingen, 2007, p. 442). Punishments include the de-legitimisation of deviant behaviour, public ridicule, corporeal medicalisation, a pronouncement of illicitness, or sometimes even a lack of pronouncement at all if undergoing the procedure of abjection. These are all to maintain a

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<sup>25</sup> Butler actually explains why Foucault focused on sex, as opposed to gender, in his studies – because he considered the sexing of bodies to *influence* the gendering of bodies (1990, p. 122). This does not mean that the concept of gender is unimportant, but simply that sex is *more* important when considering how the (sexed, sexualised *and* gendered) corporeal body becomes a subject of knowledge and power.

<sup>26</sup> Keep in mind the relationship between prostitution and sex trafficking, as was outlined in Chapter 2.

particular understanding of sex and sexuality, and a particular power-knowledge dynamic – a particular social contract that must be fulfilled (Foucault, 1978b, p. 48).

Placing sex and sexuality into a mutually reinforcing and limiting binary system, where actions are either licit or illicit, permitted or forbidden, is just one way in which Foucault's so-called juridico-discursive (Butler's juridical) power operates. Another is the negative relation that power is assumed to have with sex and sexuality. Both concepts are often related to power in this manner, because they are thought to exist for the purpose of exclusion, rejection, or concealment. This can at least partly be explained by the historical and cultural context of sexual prohibition in the West and its lingering logic of censorship and confession – processes which, again, reinforce particular and uniform (normalised) ways of knowing sex and sexuality, thereby maintaining hegemonic systems of power that rely on such *savoir* (Foucault, 1978b, p. 84).<sup>27</sup>

However, context alone cannot explain why hegemonic power relations respond to, and seek to regulate, a particular *savoir* surrounding sex and sexuality. What makes these concepts so important for ensuring hegemonic control of the corporeal? Foucault suggests that it is not a singular corporeal body that this power seeks to regulate, but many corporeal bodies uniting under the term 'population' (1978b, p. 25). In the contemporary era, populations are growing at an unprecedented rate. Thus, in order to control such population growth, reproductivity must also be managed. Yet, this deployment of alliance via juridico-discursive power – i.e. in the promotion of licit marital sex vs. illicit sexual intercourse, so to manage legitimate sexual interactions and subsequent birth-rates – is not enough to explain the polymorphous techniques of control that inscribe themselves upon the contemporary body.

Indeed, a deployment of alliance, with its juridico-discursive form of power, cannot justify how an individual body (or a social body, made up of many individuals), following its transformation into a bounded sexual subject, is controlled not only with rules of when/how to engage in sexual behaviour, but also in terms of how this body is allowed to *enjoy* this sexuality. Foucault contends that this is not the result of a deployment of alliance, but rather the more expansive deployment of sexuality, where the body is first exploited as an "object of knowledge" (1978b, p. 107), and then later manipulated using this knowledge to become a socially constructed subject of power. This form of power cannot be described as juridico-discursive – instead, it is known as *bio-power*.

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<sup>27</sup> Clearly, Foucault's theory of sexuality focuses on Western sexuality, and does not intend to make totalising assumptions about how sex and sexuality are known elsewhere (although, he does contend that non-Western sexuality *is* different, which is a totalising assumption in itself). Whilst this could pose a problem for applying this theory to non-Western contexts, as the EU is an actor firmly ensconced in the West, it seems a suitable fit here.

The Foucauldian concept of bio-power, or a “bio-politics of the population” (1978b, p. 139), refers to the “administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (1978b, p. 140). To secure a particular way of life, that of Western neoliberalism and its multifaceted political economy that requires social tiering in order to maintain its hegemonic power over subordinated subjects, bodies that have been socially tied together and categorised as members of the same population must have their societal identities, experiences and actions harmonised.

This can be done by intervening in a number of social phenomena found in everyday life. In addition to sexual and gendered relations, other phenomena that can be surveilled or controlled include birth and death rates, access to housing and education, health and disease control, and migration patterns. While those in power seek to regulate such phenomena, in order to secure their own juridico-discursive/juridical power, bio-power goes a step further – looking also at how such subjects *accept* this regulation. This occurs through a normalising process of discipline, formed from the *savoir* that implicitly filters into the identities of such populations. This knowledge seems so dominant, so unchallengeable; that it is able to disguise juridico-discursive power as a more genuine and trusted form of power – the aforementioned bio-power or, as Butler describes it, power that is productive (Foucault, 1978b, p. 141).

Both bio-power and productive power represent a technique of control used to influence corporeal bodies to perform in a particular way – it is a procedure of bounded adaptation, a process of managing identities. Foucault’s theory of sexuality thereby suggests that bio-power operates to idealise corporeal bodies, signifying how they should perform sex and sexuality. This process occurs without the realisation of *why* such performances are constructed i.e. for the purpose of securing the hegemony of dominant power systems. Thus, it is no wonder that third wave feminists such as Butler have sought to extend this idea to the concept of gender, challenging how such a seemingly ‘invisible’ process has come to establish a particular valourisation of hegemonic systems of power and their related patriarchal and hyper-masculine *savoir*, thereby authorising disciplinary measures that maintain such a gendered power-knowledge dynamic – measures which, once problematised, become visible as exploitative.

Exploitation through discipline is not only a prevalent rationale within post-structuralism and post-modern feminism, but also within contemporary Peace and Conflict Studies – especially when considering how liberal peacebuilding work is envisioned. Critics of liberal peace frequently use Foucauldian bio-power to make sense of how third party interventionists act in a post-conflict situation, for instance by relating this form of power to Foucault’s understanding of governmentality – a notion that is very clearly the inspiration behind the peace-as-governance rhetoric found in third generation peacebuilding critiques. To recap briefly on

peace-as-governance, this refers to the tool of governance being used to manage how conflict-torn populations can develop and become secure. The process inadvertently also secures the power systems put in place by those pursuing the intervention, thereby limiting genuine power transfer to local post-conflict societies since they will come to rely on, and not challenge, existing systems of power (as well as their prevalent ideas, values and norms) (Mitchell, 2011).

Foucault describes governmentality as a historical process located in the West, which developed in response to this region's need to maintain its neoliberal dominance (1978a, p. 102). The process uses bio-power to target populations through a variety of different instruments and institutions. The actors using this bio-power are not necessarily sovereign, since sovereignty is not very important when the focus is on *how* power is used to produce knowledge and sustain particular power relations (as opposed to *what* form of power exists and where it came from) (Foucault, 1978a, p. 93). Instead, actors must simply be able to access and channel their own influence, their own production of knowledge, so to govern the subjects that they strive to produce and manage – through the coercive policing of subject boundaries and the homogenisation of the imagined category of 'population' (Stern, 2006, p. 193). Different actors may have different purposes for governing their subjects i.e. the achievement of different tangible objectives, but ultimately all actors seek first and foremost to secure their own power, so they can then govern others, promoting particular ideas that will normalise and discipline complementary societal behaviours (Foucault, 1978a, p. 93).

Thus, to use the example of third generation peacebuilding, after the governing actor (or interventionist) has gained the population's trust by responding to basic needs, more subjective needs can then be influenced through a process of (neoliberal) norm internalisation and identity production/management. These processes are supported by the simplification of human activity, through binary categorisations and the homogenisation of ideas, and the abjection of resistant bodies categorised as socially deviant. Subjects, over time, will develop a *savoir* that refuses to challenge the governing actor, because the juridico-discursive nature of their power is masked as something productive. In other words, the imposition of particular neoliberal (and, according to feminists, also hyper-masculine) ideas will become institutionalised (Mitchell, 2011).

Whilst Foucault (1978a) considers governmentality to occur in many contemporary societies, the atypical environment of a post-conflict zone may make this process more visible than during peacetime. This is because the regulatory ideals promoted by liberal peacebuilders (i.e. the production of an ideal population; a population that, if adhering to particular societal norms, will be able to develop and secure itself in a way that also secures the ongoing authority of liberal interventionists) may not yet be deeply entrenched. Thus, if this can be exposed as

something temporal and fluid, it can be critiqued and even resisted (Penttinen, 2004; Mitchell, 2011). If this study is therefore able to demonstrate that this process occurs in Bosnia, and that the peace-as-governance rhetoric is, at least partly, correct, thereby putting Foucauldian governmentality and bio-power in play, then this should *also* give space for a gendered and corporeal lens to be applied to such a process. This will uncover more specifically how the gendered, sexed and sexualised body serves as a subject of governmentality via EUPM's response to an obviously gendered and corporeal phenomenon (sex trafficking), thereby illuminating EUPM's incentives for constructing this particular formation of peace.

### **3.3. It's ok to talk about sex: discourse analysis and the EUPM case study**

For qualitative research to be considered credible, it must engage with a strong and coherent theoretical framework (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 22). It is for this reason that this chapter has so far gone to great lengths to develop such a framework, combining a number of complementary ideas by two highly respected scholars. This framework has been developed with the primary intention of being useful for analysing the topic of this thesis. Whilst other case studies and theories could have similarly been used for this purpose, it is important to reiterate that the choices made in this thesis belong only to me, the researcher. This is a subject position traditionally silenced in positivist International Relations research, however my post-positivist perspective considers it critical to unveil, since all choices are subjective – even research choices. My thesis is ultimately just as discursively produced and normatively conditioned as the meanings that I hope to uncover in EUPM's response to sex trafficking.

Positivist researchers contend that good research is rational and objective, with the researcher entirely invisible in their analysis (Giddens, 1993; Egan, 1997). The positivist researcher does not need to consider his (I intentionally use the male gendered pronoun here) subjectivity when analysing his data, because he is external to his findings. These findings, separate and contained, belong to the researcher – they are his to consume, his to evaluate, *his to objectify* (Penttinen, 2004, p. 220). Furthermore, such results are thought to be scientifically conclusive, through hypothesis testing, the rationale of logic, and (gender-)neutrality. In other words, the epistemological standpoint of positivism is the belief in the existence of a static ontology, as well as the setting of a fixed boundary between the researcher and his research.

This approach is in direct contrast to post-positivism which, like the many other scholarly categorisations invoking the prefix 'post-' (such as those already mentioned in this study – post-

modernism and post-structuralism), is unable to accept that such a singular ontological truth exists. Truth is something that all subjects come to know differently, depending on the context to which these ‘truths’ derive. Therefore, in adopting this epistemological perspective, post-positivist research is not only able to embrace the subjectivity of the researcher, but it is *obliged* to make this subjectivity explicit. A positive result of this approach, according to Tickner, is that “acknowledging the subject element in one’s analysis, which exists in all social science research, actually increases the objectivity of the research” (2006, p. 27).

This stance is particularly prevalent in contemporary feminist International Relations, where such methodologies continue to exist on the periphery of the discipline, assumedly for this very reason – the diversion in epistemology. This is why feminists are often vocal in their desire to use the first person in academic texts, because this serves to visibly deconstruct the assumption of the intangible and objective researcher – an assumption that is also gendered, given the physical lack of female-bodied scholars in central IR debates, as well as the binary masculinisation of particular scientific/academic traits such as rationality and objectivity (Sylvester, 1994; Penttinen, 2004; Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006). Feminist research should therefore especially intend to be reflexive, in order to allow for a continual re-interrogation of “her [*my*] own scholarship” (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006, p. 4).

Therefore, as a researcher that subscribes to these epistemological preferences, I must remain aware of how my own subjectivity, and indeed my own multiple subject positions – as a researcher, a self-identified ‘woman’, a European citizen, a counter-trafficking advocate – influence *how* my empirical data is chosen, as well as *how* I can use my chosen theories to analyse this data. This includes the important decision of what research method, or combination of methods, are to be used for analysis. This notion of combining methods is important to reflect on momentarily because, so-called “multiperspectival work” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 4) is highly valued in qualitative studies that look to analyse discourse (as my thesis does).

Multiperspectival work quite literally refers to the idea that discourses always have multiple perspectives woven though them – in addition to the multiple perspectives that different researchers have when they subjectively choose to study a particular aspect of a given discourse. Therefore, uncovering these perspectives is critical. One way of doing this is to apply different methods to the same discourse, because this will allow for divergent knowledge to be formed about the discourse, since different methods ask different questions. Ultimately, this should culminate in a more rounded understanding of the phenomenon being studied in the discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 4).

The only stipulation that Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 4) make about multiperspectival work is that the combination of methods must be epistemologically compatible with one another – in other words, these methods must support the underlying methodology of the research.<sup>28</sup> For this reason, I will primarily use a post-structural form of discourse analysis, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, so to remain true to my theoretical and methodological principles. Then, where this method lacks analytical clarity, I will engage with compatible aspects of Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis.<sup>29</sup>

Discourse analysis is an obvious choice of method for my study, considering my theoretical framework’s understanding of discourse as something that gives subjects their relational meaning, meanings that constitute particular social realities and related hegemonic systems of power. In fact, I question what else there is to analyse but discourse, when subscribing to Derrida’s view that “there is nothing outside the text” (quoted in Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 4). However, there are different ways to do discourse analysis, with some being more epistemologically compatible with my methodology than others. Critical discourse analysis, for instance, widely assumes discourse to be only one way in which meaning is created (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 66). This can be contrasted with the post-structural idea of *all* meaning being discursively produced – a view taken in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.

Discourse theory is highly suited to this study, because it not only supposes that all meanings come from discourse, but also that these meanings are themselves volatile – they adapt in line with the discourses that produce them. This does not mean that meanings cannot appear to be fixed. Often this is thought to occur, especially in hegemonic discourse.<sup>30</sup> However, this is not because such meanings *are* ontologically fixed, but rather that these meanings have become so stable, so normalised, that they are disguised as something ‘objective’. When meanings appear this way, it is incredibly difficult to change/challenge them – indeed, in discourse theory, this illusion of objective meaning leads to a process known as ‘closure’, named such because it is

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<sup>28</sup> To be absolutely clear, whilst methods are the tools used by researchers to conduct analysis, methodology refers to the overarching epistemological standpoint of the researcher. Methodology ensures that the theoretical framework and the methods for analysis are compatible, thus allowing for a coherent conclusion to be reached when answering a specific research question (Ackerly, True and Stern, 2006, p. 6). Indeed, it is this critical connection to theory that allows Ackerly, True and Stern to describe methodology as a “theoretical method” (2006, p. 7).

<sup>29</sup> The decision to exclude Foucauldian discourse analysis, despite its clear compatibility with my use of Foucauldian theory, is intentional. There are no concrete instructions in terms of how to use this method correctly, hence the turn to discourse theory – another post-structural method of discourse analysis.

<sup>30</sup> Laclau and Mouffe are heavily influenced by Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’, which looks at how dominant classes secure this powerful position. However, discourse theory’s post-structuralist underpinnings move away from the Marxist assumption that subject positions must pertain to a particular economic category or group. More generally, on a *political* level, it is decentralised systems of power (and not economically-fuelled structures) that attempt to secure their so-called hegemony. The system of power with the greatest influence on meaning production is what can be considered hegemonic (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 32).



appears impossible to re-open discussions surrounding such a dominant meaning (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 27).

One of the goals of discourse theory is to therefore deconstruct these processes of closure, in order to understand how particular meanings have become so hegemonic, and where this (dis-)places less dominant, alternative meanings. Such a focus is clearly relevant to my theoretical framework, considering it supports both the Foucauldian notions of bio-power and governmentality (i.e. the ways in which bodies are disciplined to conform with certain dominant meanings), as well as the feminist priority of locating abject bodies (i.e. the bodies that display less dominant meanings, and thus must be removed/constrained somehow). Furthermore, since discourse theory contends that a so-called ‘discursive struggle’ for hegemonic meanings exists within every discourse, no matter how hegemonic this meaning actually is, the constant threat of antagonism within discourse is clearly compatible and translatable to my methodological choices – where meanings are fluid and transformative. This transformative potential can be witnessed in Butler and Foucault’s expansive understanding of productive power, as well as their mutual desire to deconstruct assumptive and essentialist (binary) meanings.

Now that the suitability of discourse theory has been evidenced, it is important to address how such a method can be practically applied, and what limitations this approach might bring to my case study. I will also outline other key terminologies found in the method, which will be used throughout the analysis. In addition to the aforementioned understanding of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe also have a particular way of talking about identity. They introduce four basic categories that, together, highlight how identities and the subject positions occupied by these identities are constructed using discourse: articulations, discourse, moments and elements.

To recall the perspective of both Butler and Foucault, identities are given power to exist. Articulations can therefore be described as the vehicles of this power; they ‘voice’ particular identities in the discourse, quite literally representing what is said (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 26). Articulations are useful to study when attempting to make sense of how meanings develop in relation to the production of specific identities – not to mention how these articulated identities then negotiate different subject positions. Subject positions, it should be noted, are just as multiple, fragmented and changing as identities. Corporeal subjects become interpellated into subject positions – a process quite like articulation, although instead of using language to ‘voice’ a particular identity, a given subject is located (via its given articulated identity traits) into a fitting discursive social position (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 15).

Discourse is the space where articulations are activated. Perhaps an obvious category, but the way Laclau and Mouffe envision ‘discourse’ is quite difficult to manage when conducting an

empirical study. I will come back to this point later, when I outline the inclusion of a critical discourse analytical tool into my research. Then come ‘moments’ – which are the signs<sup>31</sup> that become so invested with a particular meaning that they appear to be fixed. Moments often lead to the aforementioned process of ‘closure’, via an illusion of objectivity, however the persistent fluidity of meaning means that moments will cease to *be* moments as soon as this fixedness is challenged. Then, moments transform into ‘elements’. Elements are all signs that “are not discursively articulated” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 7). This does not mean that elements only represent meanings that are silenced (quite literally, non-articulations), but also to signs that have contested or multiple meanings – for instance, if multiple articulations occur within the same discursive space.

Elements can also be described as ‘floating signifiers’, precisely for this ability to shift in meaning. I will use this term in my analysis, because the fluid nature of signs (and the meanings such signs derive) is incredibly important for the focus of my study – that is, *whose bodies matter* i.e. which identities are articulated and which are not, and how do these articulations (or non-articulations) affect the subject positions that come to be produced. These floating signifiers will therefore be a key aspect of my analysis – but it is not enough to simply identify such contested or hidden meanings in isolation. These meanings must also be related to one another. One way of doing this is to locate ‘nodal points’. Nodal points are particularly privileged floating signifiers that are intended to develop a meaningful relationship with other (less important, but related in some way) floating signifiers. Their ultimate aim is to crystallise a particular meaning of the privileged floating signifier, so that it becomes a moment. The related floating signifiers will then also become crystallised, to represent complementary meanings (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8). This practice may lead to a hegemonic formation of ‘closed’ meaning, which is what ultimately leads to development of exclusive and oppositional binaries – or, as discourse theorists would call it, a ‘logic of equivalence’.<sup>32</sup>

Another way of studying the relations between meanings is to locate ‘empty signifiers’. These are floating signifiers that challenge the seemingly fixed meanings found in moments. It is

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<sup>31</sup> I use the term ‘sign’, here, to symbolically acknowledge Saussure’s work on the creation of meaning through discourse (which leads to identity construction). Clearly, Saussure also influenced Laclau and Mouffe, but assumedly they chose not to use the term ‘sign’ in their method, because of its strong structural connotations. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe use the term ‘signifying elements’ – however, I find this term to be particularly confusing, considering the others ways in which ‘signifier’ and ‘element’ are understood in discourse theory.

<sup>32</sup> A ‘logic of equivalence’ brings compatible floating signifiers together, to create a “political frontier between two opposed camps” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 11). A clear example of this is in the formation of binary genders – an individual cannot be both a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’ due to the opposing and incompatible characteristics that such signs invoke (via meanings→identities→subject positions).

likely that empty signifiers are known to exist by their complete absence of articulation in a discourse – much like silences, and the hegemonic practice of maintaining binary meanings for the purpose of converging power and control. By articulating previously non-articulated meanings, this could dissolve a logic of equivalence – producing something known as a ‘logic of difference’ instead (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 11).<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, empty signifiers can also be represented as nodal points – where they are not silenced but actually privileged, in order to develop a meaningful relationship in discourse as something that *is not* and *can never be* (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8). In these instances, a binary ‘logic of equivalence’ remains firmly intact.

Thinking again about the space in which these articulations of meaning occur, it is unclear just where to find the boundaries of a discourse – or, indeed, if such boundaries exist at all. Consider the notion that discourse is not only constituted in relation to what *is* being articulated, but also to what is *not* being articulated. This suggests that there is only one singular, decentralised “field of discursivity” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 27), where all meanings are located. I accept that this form of deconstruction is precisely the aim of post-structuralism. I also agree that all meanings intersect with one another in some form. However, when engaging with a practical case study, it is simply unfeasible to study everything – especially when looking for what is *not there*. Locating nodal points and empty signifiers are indeed useful analytical tools, but they cannot assist with the practical question of data selection i.e. how to choose the data to perform the analysis, when at this point it is impossible to know just what will be articulated and what will not. Rather, the discourse must be meaningfully limited in another way, in order to effectively conduct research. This is why I consider it useful to introduce an aspect of critical discourse analysis into my method – that which is known as the ‘order of discourse’.<sup>34</sup>

Fairclough’s ‘order of discourse’ contends that discourses can be sorted into different domains, depending on the genre of the discourse i.e. the type of language used to discuss a particular topic within such discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 72). For instance, since

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<sup>33</sup> A ‘logic of difference’ ultimately accounts for the persistent fluidity of meaning, by expanding a discourse to allow for multiple, even contradicting meanings to be articulated beside each other. This not only occurs when previously non-articulated meanings are brought into a discourse, but also when wider socio-political changes impact how previously fixed meanings adapt. For instance, during the period of bipolar International Relations, a clear logic of equivalence was drawn between socialism and capitalism (and what each sign represented). However, nowadays, post-socialist discourse welcomes more and more the sign of capitalism. Indeed, the meaning of capitalism has changed significantly. This process began by shifting the meaning of less politically threatening signs – such as connecting the positive metaphors of ‘transition’ and ‘development’ to capitalist processes such as a free market economy and privatisation (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 11).

<sup>34</sup> In line with earlier discussions on multiperspectival work, I contend that this use of critical discourse analysis does not weaken the epistemological standpoint of this study – or at least, it is only weakened to the extent necessary for pragmatically engaging with a precise topic within the space constraints of a Master’s thesis.

the language used by politicians and the language used by the media are quite different (two distinct genres), this means that such domains of discourse can be studied independently of one another. Crucially, this does not mean that these domains are not connected – critical discourse analysis does not use the presence/absence of articulation to address such connections, although the notion of ‘intertextuality’ is instead used to support a similar point (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 73).<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, locating the boundaries of a discourse (however arbitrary such boundaries really are) can assist in analytical feasibility.

Therefore, in my study, I consider my domain or order of discourse to be that of a supranational institution. To narrow further, it is the civilian and operational level of such an institution – using a particular operation, EUPM, to exemplify this domain. Here, articulations and interpellations relating to the phenomenon of sex trafficking in Bosnia will be identified. Such relations to sex trafficking may be overt, for instance if the discourse directly refers to this phenomenon, but they may also be more covertly related i.e. in discussions surrounding human trafficking more generally, other irregular forms of migration that could potentially lead to the nexus of trafficking, or even in EUPM’s guidance for how local law enforcers should tackle sexual or organised crimes.

This flexibility in scope is not only pragmatic – since many responses to sex trafficking *are* discussed within the context of wider responses to combating sexual and migratory crimes, or organised crime quite generally – but also useful when considering the ultimate aim of discourse theory, which is to uncover overarching patterns within a discourse, so to give a plausible explanation as to what these patterns can tell about the social realities and power relations under construction there (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Therefore, I consider it sensible to keep an open mind as to where these patterns might surface.

In locating relevant articulations and interpellations, it should be possible to identify how particular identities are articulated (or not articulated) within the discourse, how this relates to the interpellation of multiple subject positions, and how such meanings (and the power processes that dictate such meaning production) corroborate with these processes. Practically speaking, I will compare different articulations with one another, to see if I am able to locate antagonisms of meaning within the discourse. I will also uncover instances of multivocality – that is, the

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<sup>35</sup> Intertextuality and articulation are not the same, however, because whilst intertextuality (and critical discourse analysis, more generally) is more interested in how meanings change, the articulation of different signs can address both the changing of meaning as well as the reproduction of perceivably fixed meanings (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 140).

characteristics that become associated with different articulations (or silences) within the discourse, in order to understand just how different voices in the discourse contribute to the production of particular meanings (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 151).

This will also allow me to study just how fixed or fluid created meanings are i.e. if they are to be considered moments or floating signifiers, and just how these signs fit together i.e. in terms of nodal points and empty signifiers, or in logics of equivalence and difference. Hopefully, this process should be able to highlight just how different identities and subject positions become seemingly fixed or fragmented, thereby reinforcing and/or contradicting the meanings that have come to locate them. Ultimately, these processes should allow me to answer my research question – in the context of EUPM’s response to sex trafficking, *whose bodies matter* and *why*, and what can this explain about the EU’s utilisation of gender and corporeality in its Bosnian peacebuilding intervention, as well as how this shapes the EU’s definitive quest for a positive peace in this fragile post-conflict region.

Due to EUPM being the clear focus of my study, I have decided to only use data authored by EUPM. I do not consider this to be problematic for my analysis since my interest is in how EUPM views the bodies associated with sex trafficking, and thus how identities and subject positions are constructed *by* EUPM. I accept that, if I were trying to understand clashes between different orders of discourse – for instance, how EUPM and trafficking survivors differed in how they view trafficking experiences – this data would not be so suitable. However, this is not my focus. Having said that, this does not mean that EUPM’s data does not engage with other actors – EU representatives, military personnel, local police officers, the Bosnian civil society and indeed trafficked bodies themselves are all able to speak *through* the EUPM domain by way of interviews, quotations, and other external (i.e. non-EUPM) references to the phenomenon in question. These additions are important in contextualising EUPM’s own response; although I am aware that EUPM will likely only reproduce the external articulations that complement (or, at least, do not overtly oppose) its own public/official standpoint. Thus, these particular findings may not be as robust as if I *was* conducting a comparative study between different actors. However, since this aspect (the ‘reality’ of external experiences vs. EUPM’s understanding of those experiences) is not the goal of my research, I am comfortable with this potential limitation.

As is usual with discourse theory, I am utilising quite a substantial volume of data in my analysis – approximately 120 pieces of data in total, with an average of 8 pages per source. This volume of data is required because I do not intend to produce a close reading of a singular text, but rather address broader patterns found across this domain of discourse. A variety of written and visual sources have therefore been selected, produced for the same internal audience (i.e.

those within the EU family). These sources include several periodic reports drafted by EUPM for the purpose of updating colleagues in Brussels of the mission's operational achievements, project implementation plans that initiated operational work on combating sex trafficking and related sexual/migratory/organised crime issues, and Mission Mag – EUPM's internal newsletter that, over a period of 6 years and a total of 95 published issues, updated its staff around Bosnia on various mission projects and forthcoming objectives.

All of this data was originally written in English; therefore there are no translation concerns. However, I accept that there may have been further sources available in the other working language of the EU (French) and in local languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian), which I have been unable to include. Also, the data purposefully spans the entire length of the mission. This is because my intention is not to review a particular operational action, but rather understand more holistically how the mission positions the various actors involved in sex trafficking. Furthermore, most of this data is public – I have collected it myself, via a number of online searches and freedom of information requests. This is potentially also a limitation, because if this data is allowed to be public, it will likely only represent an idealised version of EUPM – that is, the aspects of EUPM that the mission, as well as the wider EU, wants the public to see. I have tried to overcome this problem by also accessing internal documents, such as the aforementioned project implementation plans, which were given to me by former EUPM staff. However, again, it is likely that I have only received documents representing the same idealised vision of EUPM, since I am ultimately a member of the EU's public and not an internal colleague. Nevertheless, I consider my dataset to be sufficiently wide enough to produce some overarching trends with regard to gendered and corporeal meaning production, in the context of EUPM's response to sex trafficking.

## 4. Trafficked and other Disorderly Bodies

### 4.1. Corporeal restrictions and assumptive binary gender performances found on trafficked bodies

As the previous chapter highlighted, every discourse locates multiple bodies. These bodies have multiple and intersecting identities, as well as fluid and often contested subject positions. Considering my chosen order of discourse, I must begin my analysis by locating the bodies most visibly (or corporeally) affected by the phenomenon of sex trafficking. The articulations and interpellations of bodies trafficked for sex will be a useful starting point, as well as a focal point, for wider discussions surrounding other identities and subject positions that permeate this discourse, as well as the *savoir* production and power relations that such permeance comes to represent.

However, it is first important to highlight an immediate paradox observed in the data – a notable lack of references to the term ‘sex trafficking’ and, by relation, a fraction of bodies explicitly being described as having experienced sex trafficking. Instead, discussions surrounding the bodies that have experienced sexualised exploitation are almost always veiled under the broader term of human trafficking (or simply, trafficking). Reducing human trafficking to sex trafficking is something that I will problematise in the next chapter, however I wanted to raise this point now so to rationalise how I have come to create my self-styled category of ‘trafficked bodies’.

Within the discourse, trafficked bodies become associated with a number of related meanings. These meanings can sometimes appear quite concrete, in that it is rare for them to be challenged. Using the terminology of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, it is possible to locate multiple floating signifiers and moments in the positioning of trafficked bodies. One of these floating signifiers, which is also a nodal point since it holds a privileged position that connects many other meanings together in a complementary fashion (thereby limiting conflicting meanings and attempting to transform itself into a moment), is victimhood. In the discourse, trafficked bodies are victimised; they are considered to be ‘victims’ (European Union Police Mission, 2003a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b; 2006d; 2008j).

This correlation is readily apparent, considering the widespread consideration that human trafficking represents a “modern form of slavery” (Gaspar, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2008i, p. 7). The practice of slavery and the subject position of a ‘slave’ have their own crystallised meanings – for instance, when a slave is defined as someone with a lack of power

and control, an excessive dependence on another, and a lack of ownership for one's own body or the output that such body works to achieve (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). Although 'victim' is not synonymous with 'slave', a similar powerlessness, external dependence, and lack of ownership can also be found in principal definitions of this term (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015).

The attributes of powerlessness, helplessness and passivity are associated with victimhood precisely to crystallise the meaning of a victim as someone lacking the agency needed to perform a more active subject position. Thus, if a trafficked body is considered to be a passive victim, it is assumed to lack the agency required to flee such an exploitative situation independently (or to avoid getting into the situation in the first place). Of course, many trafficked bodies *are* unable to flee – may this be due to physical, psychological, economic, socio-cultural or even legal constraints. Thus, a common way to be 'rescued' from this seemingly perpetual state of passivity is to rely on more able-bodied actors to intervene. Actors such as EUPM therefore represent this position that exists in contrast, or in binary opposition, to the trafficked victim – performing the role of the hyper-masculine and active rescuer/protector. This binary maintains a discursive logic of equivalence, where distinct and opposing meanings interact with, and complement, one another (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8).

This victimisation of trafficked bodies continues even after physical rescues have been made, suggesting that such a response is not so much emancipatory but paternalistic, not due to a moral responsibility to protect so-called victims but a politicised desire to maintain imbalanced power relations between victims and rescuers. For example, formerly trafficked bodies (as well as others considered to experience similarly sexual crimes) are described as being taken to 'safe houses' to recover from their traumatic experiences (European Union Police Mission, 2011g, p. 14). These spaces are considered safe because they are under the protection of rescuers. This continued reliance on rescuers thus maintains the binary position of trafficked bodies as victims – and vice versa, with the continued need to rescue maintaining the binary position of EUPM and other authority figures as rescuers.<sup>36</sup>

Arguably, this corporeal restriction of trafficked bodies within a safe house is just an extension of the victimhood experienced whilst being trafficked. Of course, the intentions of traffickers and rescuers are very different, but this does not affect the outcome – to perceive the trafficked body as something powerless, weak, and unable to look after itself. These identity

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<sup>36</sup> Although the rescuer in this example is not EUPM itself, but rather colleagues of EUPM that adopt similarly active and protective traits, the continued postulation of a victim-rescuer binary is relevant to consider here in addition to EUPM's own direct responses to sex trafficking, since both articulated approaches shed light as to how EUPM understands gender and corporeality.



traits bind trafficked bodies to a seemingly fixed ‘victim’ subject position, removing alternative possibilities for agency and power exertion. In turn, the agency and power found upon rescuer bodies is strengthened, and the frontier between victim and rescuer subject positions crystallised. For EUPM, this means that its credibility as a ‘rescuer’ in Bosnia is also strengthened – thus giving added credence and authority to its peacebuilding actions in the region.<sup>37</sup>

In light of earlier theoretical discussions surrounding the connection between passivity and dominant binary performances of femininity, as well as how such binary performances are in place to restrict gendered corporeal fluidity, it is perhaps unsurprising that such an overt victimisation of trafficked bodies is also explicitly sexed and gendered. Many references to trafficked bodies as victims also assume these victims to be female. The nodal point of victim is therefore not only related to complementary meanings of powerlessness and passivity, but victimhood is also connected to a dominant understanding of femininity – or what it means to perform as a ‘woman’, through the related categorisation of women’s bodies as female. Indeed, this understanding of ‘woman’ is, like ‘victim’, a nodal point struggling to transform into a moment. Such a moment would not only evidence the binary positioning of femininity as something weak and powerless, but it would also inadvertently support masculinity representing the opposite.<sup>38</sup> This would prolong gender stereotypes, and the related assumption that only two sexes and genders exist, each of which representing a homogeneous group displaying certain pre-determined characteristics. Thus, this discursive ‘closing’ of gendered meaning once again reflects a logic of equivalence.

A prominent example of such ‘closure’ in meaning can be found in one of EUPM’s (2006d, p. 3, Image 1 in Appendix) editorials on human trafficking. It begins by presenting an image of three silhouettes. Two female figures sit back to back on the floor, each with their head in their hands, looking down. In the foreground, a muscular, masculine figure stands over them with his arms folded. Although his face is not included in the picture, it is assumed from his stance that he watches over the two female bodies. Since they are looking down, their identities are also hidden. In fact, due the shadowy nature of the image, it would be very difficult to identify any of the figures even if they were looking directly into the camera.

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<sup>37</sup> To recall, this form of peacebuilding is not in line with that of fourth generation peacebuilding – where the emancipation of local people is of critical importance (Björkdahl, Richmond and Kappler, 2009, p. 14). This patriarchal management of trafficked bodies is more aligned with that of third generation peacebuilding – a point I will capitalise on later.

<sup>38</sup> Perhaps obvious, but this indicates that EUPM, as an active protector and conveyor of authority, occupies a hegemonic masculinised subject position. Refer back to Chapter 2 for further discussions on the hegemonic masculinised nature of international interventionists.

This image comes to symbolise multiple aspects of binary gender performance and corporeal restriction – starting with the most obvious, the hyper-masculine aggressor vs. its binary opposite of the weak and fearful feminine. The image demonstrates that *he* holds juridical power over *her* – not only in his stance, but also in his perceived strength (due to his broad, muscular physique) and in his corporeal dominance of the frame (i.e. he is in the foreground whereas they are in the background). However, this image also poses a puzzling paradox – why are all three figures anonymous? Since anonymity often represents a lack of agency, it makes sense that the female bodies are unidentifiable. This once again concretises their identity and subject position as a feminised victim – with their permanent state of powerlessness read corporeally from their facelessness.

Yet, it is more perplexing that the male figure also lacks identification. If his face were visible, this would demonstrate a major point of difference between him and his female victims – that he, as the trafficker, aggressor, dominant male figure, has the agency to display these multiple identities, with their subsequently fluid subject positions. One theory for this anonymity could point to the control he already exerts over the female bodies in the image. With the female bodies already cowering in fear or shame, perhaps his face is not needed to be visible in order to maintain his masculinised authority. Alternatively, since this male figure is a trafficker, and trafficking is an organised crime, anonymity may be needed for this illegal work. This, in itself, suggests that masculinised authority, as well as masculinity itself, is not homogeneous across all male bodies. Multiple power dynamics can act on the same body or the same set of bodies; consider how a law enforcer such as EUPM or the local police would not need to hide their identity in the same way as this trafficker. Whilst traffickers do wield power over those they victimise, they do not hold the same juridical power over law enforcing bodies. This is because, as criminals, they themselves are positioned as disorderly bodies to be managed – a similarity with trafficked bodies that I will problematise shortly.

After the image of the three figures, a testimony is shared from a local ‘trafficked victim’, which outlines her (sexed and gendered female) experience of being trafficked for sex. By contrast, her trafficker is described as male – demonstrated by a consecutive use of male gendered pronouns. This male trafficker is also seen to bestow agency, since “he brought me [the speaking subject, the trafficked ‘victim’] presents, took me out, pleased me, and made me feel very special [...] he offered me to go with him to work in his restaurant” (European Union Police Mission, 2006d, p. 3). Notably, all of these actions – buying, taking, pleasing, offering – are conducted by the trafficker. Here, the trafficked body is positioned as a passive object – gifts were bought *for her*, work was offered *to her* – thus depriving her of her own agency.

This is not to say that this testimony does not display elements of agency – indeed, her ability to tell her own story, using the first person pronoun ‘I’, is a direct challenge to the meaning of ‘victim’ as something entirely powerless and passive. It also challenges the notion that the trafficked body is a totalising group that share the same (victimising) experience of trafficking – this is *her* experience, and it belongs to nobody else. Thus, the dominant meaning of ‘victim’, as well as its relation to the similarly prevailing understanding of ‘woman’, is prevented here from becoming fully crystallised. However, the fact that this individual is not named in the discourse is once again telling of the anonymity (and related powerlessness) linked to such a disorderly subject position.

Furthermore, this understanding of the trafficked body as someone with agency, with viable personal experiences, is undermined when the speaking subject appears to self-oppress this agency, in acceptance of her own victimhood. This is a result of what Butler refers to as “textual violence” (1990, p. 161). For instance, when describing her personal trafficking experience as being “locked up in a room, beaten up, raped” (European Union Police Mission, 2006d, p. 3), this not only supports the totalising imagery of victimhood pursued elsewhere in the discourse (although, such imagery may simply be an accurate representation of this individual’s experience), but it again describes actions happening *to her*, thereby sustaining the binary understanding of female bodies as passive, empty and disposable objects of sexual abuse.

The feminised speaking subject is also quick to blame her own naïveté for being deceived and exploited. Such ‘victim blaming’ is commonly found within the subject position of a victim, since abuse is often considered to be a form of deserved punishment for not behaving in an appropriate manner (i.e. as a passive feminised object should) (Foucault, 1978b; Butler, 1990). In addition, this observation suggests that a trafficked body, when positioned as a trafficked victim, is inscribed by bio-power – that is, productive power that leaves marks on the body. These marks can be literal, as in this example of sexual/physical violence, but they can also be metaphorical, for instance in the sub-conscious production of the ‘victim’ subject position, and the aforementioned process of textual violence that ensures that the speaking subject associates *herself* with this victimised subject position (Penttinen, 2004, p. 61).<sup>39</sup>

Such a gendered understanding of trafficking continues in the article, when the method of luring human trafficking victims is outlined as “[making] a girl fall in love, and [attracting] her

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<sup>39</sup> This is what Foucault means when stating that, “the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement” (1978b, p. 61). The ritual of speaking via confession/testimony is not one of self-produced agency, but actually one of conformance to a particular power dynamic that requires this confession/testimony to be spoken. The one with power is that who *listens* to the spoken statement (and subsequently judges it), not that who *speaks* the statement.

with false promises that he will find her [a] job [...] or marry her” (European Union Police Mission, 2006d, p. 3). This suggests that trafficked bodies are not only always female, but also as feminised victims and objects of male attention, they must rely on male sexual advances in order to be economically and socially secure.<sup>40</sup> Thus, *he* will find *her* a job – whether that job is a public and (assumedly) paid position, or the more private role of wife and mother. Here, it should also be noted that the identities of wife and mother are reduced to gendered functions that all female bodies ought to perform. There does not appear to be a choice as to whether such bodies *want* to be part of such a heteronormative lifestyle – or indeed any other family dynamic.

This choice is removed because its presence would imply that these bodies are able to obtain an agency of their own, and thus a *savoir* of their own. This antagonism must be denied if the floating signifiers of wife and mother are to ever become fixed moments, in relation to the aforementioned privileged nodal point of ‘woman’. Therefore, it is only the dominant male *savoir* that can be visible, with *him* rescuing *her* from the presumed insecurity that will plague her, should she not conform to the binary gendered and sexualised norms of heterosexual marriage and family life.

These ‘victims’ are not only represented as female, but as unmarried females; not only as mothers, but as potential mothers. This simultaneously totalises and narrows the spectrum for what a trafficked body can represent – totalising, in the sense that these bodies must relate somehow to the female sex and an institutionalised feminine performance of ‘women-as-mothers’ (Butler, 1990, p. 118), and narrowing in the prioritisation of maternally capable female bodies. Therefore, it is *unmarried* females with *unused* or *functional* reproductive capabilities – younger female bodies – that appear to carry the highest risk of becoming a trafficked victim. EUPM (2011f, p. 7) explicitly underline this assumption by remarking that younger women are more fearful than older women, with women generally being more fearful than men, because they are ‘easy targets’ for criminals – targeted due to this perceived victimhood. Such a group are also considered to be more afraid of public space, supporting the notion commonly posed by feminists that this space is perpetuated to be insecure for female bodies. This confines performances of femininity to a private ‘home’ space, and the related subject positions of wife and mother, allowing for continued male domination of the public sphere and the decisions made

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<sup>40</sup> Socio-economic instability as a factor stimulating the phenomenon of sex trafficking implies that trafficked bodies are of a lower class. This intersection will be considered over the next two chapters.

there (Penttinen, 2004, p. 23). Indeed, public space is only open to female bodies if an appropriate guardian (that is, hyper-masculine/patriarchal) is there to protect them.<sup>41</sup>

The positioning of trafficked bodies as potential mothers is primarily reflected throughout the discourse in two ways. Firstly, trafficked bodies are frequently subsumed under the category of ‘women and children,’ implying that this totalising group experience a similar victimhood, and thus require similar protection or guardianship (European Union Police Mission, 2003a; 2008j; 2009b; 2011e). Notably, this means that children can also be trafficked – a category not explicitly gendered though considered to exist in the same private and passive space as their (symbolic and actual) mothers. Thus, all of these bodies are assigned to the same infantilised subject position – that is, they are disempowered, and thereby situated in a subordinate and passive subject position that would traditionally only locate children (Foucault, 1978b; Turton-Turner, 2013). Again, this supports the notion that female bodies, and indeed the related social category and nodal point of ‘women’, act as empty vessels awaiting masculinised knowledge about their societal role – this role, of course, relating to the floating signifier and social category of ‘mother’.

Secondly, the discourse interchangeably uses the terms ‘women’ and ‘girls’ when talking about trafficked bodies, implying that such bodies are not only overtly female (supporting the points already made about feminised victimhood), but also that it is difficult to categorise female victims by their age (European Union Police Mission, 2003a; 2006d; 2011g; 2012b). Yet, why is this? Is it because such bodies come from a very particular age group, where the legal and cultural distinctions between girl and woman are somehow unclear? Or, is it because these distinctions actually end up meaning very little, when the hyper-sexualised nature of femininity is considered, as well as the related maternal potential found within such sexualised bodies? Or, it is again the process of infantilising adult female bodies into powerless and subordinate ‘girls’, thereby stripping such bodies of their own *savoir* and related power and agency?

I contend that all of these perspectives intersect with one another, since what is known about the demographic of sex trafficked bodies indicates that many of them are young and

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<sup>41</sup> Whilst motherhood is often thought to reflect a similar passivity and privacy as that of other deeply feminised subject positions (Puechguirbal, 2010, p. 177), mothers are arguably also active in their guardianship of children. Thus, I question whether this is considered, when the bodies of mothers (or, at least, the bodies that are perceived to be mothers i.e. older female bodies) are not as compatible with the victimhood required for trafficking. Furthermore, when a female body undergoes motherhood, it is seemingly de-sexualised, since it comes to represent something other than an unstable yet alluring sexual body that awaits male penetration – but a more stable body that cares for its child (Kronsell, 2006, p. 126). Having said that, it is important to remember that since such bodies are still female, they are still at a higher risk of victimhood than male bodies.

female.<sup>42</sup> There must be a reason for why this is the case, and indeed Enloe (2000, p. 54) claims that this perspective is the result of how a patriarchal and hyper-masculine society views and prioritises a particular formation of feminine beauty. This understanding of beauty allows youth, and its related sexual purity, to represent something attractive, which can lead to the sexualisation of younger female bodies.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the understanding of youth as something naïve and innocent once again supports the victimising and infantilising positioning of trafficked bodies, which can be taken advantage of by traffickers and rescuers alike – binding their own active and masculinised subject positions to those of passive feminised victims.

However, it is not only traffickers and rescuers that use bodies trafficked for sex. Clients of the sex industry must also associate the innocence of youth with something sexually pleasing. Yet, the sexualisation of young, clean and wholesome bodies is typically frowned upon within contemporary Western society. These bodies are often categorised as sexually forbidden, since the deployment of sexuality that exists in the West constrains how sexuality can be enjoyed. Foucault suggests that this is why forbidden sexual practices are often divorced from regular life – relegated to darker spaces of interaction that do not resemble spaces where families typically inhabit, such as the home (1978b, p. 107).<sup>44</sup>

The Bosnian sex industry is clearly representative of a darker interaction space – not only due to its illegality, but also its moral contentiousness. Therefore, the especially deviant category of the ‘sexual youth’ is also free to operate in this space. I consider this category to be well articulated in the discourse due to its dual position as an empty signifier and nodal point. Sexual youthfulness is discursively privileged not for its capability to normalise (and thereby legitimise) meaning, but for precisely the opposite reason – its articulations are privileged so to prevent such

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<sup>42</sup> The discourse claims that some 80% of internationally trafficked individuals are women and young girls, with 60-75% of these bodies being raped (European Union Police Mission, 2006d, p. 3). There are major validation problems with such statistics, which have already been discussed in Chapter 2. However, my intention here is not to accept such empirical data as truth, but to rather consider how this *perception of truth* influences how trafficked bodies are considered. This is why I consider ‘what is known’ about the demographic, as opposed to ‘what is’ the demographic, relating back to my epistemological standpoint, outlined at length in Chapter 3.

<sup>43</sup> Enloe (2000, p. 54) outlines five reasons for why female sexual purity is valued, all of which mirroring the binary gender assumptions made about trafficked bodies in this discourse: 1) women are the community’s possession, and such possessions must be protected, 2) this protection is essential because women are those who transfer community values to the next generation, 3) quite literally, this value transfer begins when women bear children, thus their reproductive capabilities are critical, 4) this community/reproductive responsibility supposes women to have no independent agency, thus they are the most vulnerable category in a community, 5) this vulnerability leads women to be considered the most susceptible to cooption by so-called insidious outsiders. In other words, *women are highly victimisable*.

<sup>44</sup> I should clarify that, rather than looking at a literal sexualisation of children’s bodies (meaning a Western understanding of the term ‘children’), I refer to the sexualisation of infantilised bodies representing youthfulness. This process is quite common in the contemporary West – consider the sexual allure of ‘schoolgirls’, ‘teens’ and ‘virgins’ in conventional heteronormative pornography (Turton-Turner, 2013).

a meaning from ever becoming normalised/legitimised. This creates and maintains a segregation of social space, where the sexually orderly cannot function and the sexually disorderly have no choice *but* to function – this spatial binary serving to uphold a logic of equivalence between privileged understandings of ‘orderly’ and ‘disorderly’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8).

Related to this infantilisation of the sexually disorderly, and potentially also in response to the difficulty of managing such bodies, is the medicalisation of the sexually disorderly. When EUPM began to plan its initial project to combat trafficking in Bosnia, one of its first objectives was to create police interrogation rooms for ‘victims’ of sexual crimes (including sex trafficking, rape and domestic violence), where such bodies felt secure enough to provide information about, and possibly even testify against, the criminals responsible for their victimhood. This meant ensuring that such spaces were within close proximity to appropriate medical facilities, as highlighted in the following quote, which addresses the benefits of so-called ‘victim suites’:

“[Victim suites] are premises used to interview victims in non hostile surroundings and with a Doctors surgery adjacent so that [a] full physical examination and interview all take place at the same location. It is also possible for victims to shower after the examination.” (European Union Police Mission, 2003a, p 33).

The authorisation to shower assumes not only that these trafficked bodies must await permission to perform such a basic human act (precisely due to their positioning as agency-less victims), but it also implies that such victims are unclean, due to their disorderly sexual behaviour. Understandably, this creates somewhat of a paradox between how youthful female bodies are initially desired for their cleanliness and purity, only to then be soiled by their clients’ illicit sexual pleasures – thus, no longer resembling the attributes that led them to such a subject position in the first place. Although, in line with the aforementioned discussion on articulating the empty signifier and nodal point of the ‘sexual youth’, the ‘sexually unclean’ hold a similar discursive position – one of inescapable deviance and disorderliness. This allows for these bodies to be interpellated into similarly inescapable subject positions commonly associated with the trafficking experience – such as the overarching nodal point of the feminised victim.

Another dynamic found in this quote is how EUPM connects two distinct counter-trafficking operational approaches – that of protecting ‘victims’ and prosecuting ‘perpetrators’. It is interesting to see that trafficking victims must *first* be interviewed and *then* examined – implying that prosecution is more important than protection. Protection also seems to be contingent on prosecution (Anderson and Andrijasević, 2008, p. 143). For example, whilst EUPM (2003a; 2004a) do acknowledge that trafficked bodies often have limited access to

healthcare and social welfare, and thus this needs to be improved, this point is only raised when these limitations cause problems for how such bodies can assist in prosecutions.

This prioritisation of prosecution over protection also implies that the perpetrators of trafficking somehow matter more to EUPM than the victims of trafficking. This does not mean that such bodies are more ‘orderly’, but rather that this distinct disorderly corporeal category poses a larger threat to EUPM, and thus requires stricter management. Consider EUPM’s mandate to establish peace and security in Bosnia – not only because this will seemingly improve the security of the wider European region, but also because Bosnia will then be able to reap the politico-economic benefits of a closer alliance with the EU. The disorderly *criminal* bodies pursuing trafficking and other organised crimes disrupt this objective, since their presence allows insecurity and violence to propagate throughout the region. Therefore, hegemonic actors such as EUPM must bring these bodies to ‘justice’ – a term understood here to reflect a juridical power held *over* subordinated subjects. When this process occurs, these bodies are interpellated into more conformable, manageable, governable subject positions – thus, no longer posing the same threat to EUPM’s peacebuilding objectives (Arnall and Wincott, 2004, p. 469).

In applying a gendered lens to this focus on disorderly criminal bodies, it is clear that the prioritised criminal bodies are also assumed to be male/masculinised. Thus, female/feminised victims are less important. In fact, these bodies merely represent criminal *evidence* – passive objects once more. This not only undermines the human rights abuses that are associated with such bodies, but it also strengthens the logic of equivalence that suggests that these feminised bodies are unable to occupy more active subject positions. Furthermore, such a response to trafficking is highly simplified – it cannot address the role of state immigration and labour policies, ensure accountability for those pursuing trafficked bodies, or consider socio-economic conditions that sustain the trafficking trade. All of these points are overlooked when the discourse prioritises criminal prosecution (Andrijasević, no date, p. 7).

The prioritisation of evidence that trafficked bodies produce is also telling. Traditional spoken knowledge, drawn out by confession or official testimony, is seemingly prioritised over corporeal knowledge – that is, evidence of inscription found on trafficked bodies. Again, this focus detracts from the corporeal experiences of those who have been trafficked, instead supporting the modernist idea that overt articulations are required for apportioning criminal blame. Considering my epistemological standpoint, I consider it important to see how such spoken ‘truths’ come to be known through the prioritisation of speaking – and indeed the critical association of speaking itself, as a purposeful action, with masculinity (Penttinen, 2004, p. 17). Thus, when EUPM prioritise speaking statements to punish criminally disorderly bodies, they



also embrace masculinised forms of knowledge. Furthermore, this entire process occurs so to reassert and maintain EUPM's hierarchal position as a legitimate conveyor of punishment, as well as an authorised protector of norms. These purposeful actions ultimately also secure EUPM's own hegemonic masculinised authority over its population of subordinate, and in this case also disorderly, subjects.

One further underlying assumption made in the process of medicalising trafficked bodies in search for corporeal evidence, is that such evidence *will* be found. By relation, this means that such bodies *will* require medical attention. Perhaps this is a responsible and pragmatic approach by EUPM and its colleagues, given the physical nature of these sexual experiences. However, this also implies that there must be something *wrong* with these bodies, because they have engaged in atypical or illicit sexual behaviour. Such corporeal medicalisation is what Foucault's theory of sexuality underlines as an example of corporeal punishment applied to the bodies that 'break' the social contract surrounding the appropriate way to engage with sexuality. The only way these bodies can be 'healed' is to confess their sexual guilt (Foucault, 1978b, p. 62).

In this sense, it is not just the criminals who are guilty but the trafficked bodies too. Thus, these confessions are not only useful for prosecuting criminals, but also for assigning blame to the 'victim'. This is demonstrative of the bio-power located earlier when the process of 'victim blaming' occurs, and these bodies come to accept a fixed subject position of 'victim' – as well as the punishments that go along with such a position. Positioning trafficked bodies in this way, however, may be problematic for the full crystallisation of the 'victim' nodal point, because it is difficult to understand how a powerless victim obtains the agency to perform a seemingly confessable and punishable crime. This discursive antagonism comes to demonstrate some of the complications found when handling unconventional sexual experiences, as well as the illicitness and illegality of trafficking as an organised crime. Indeed, the disorderly dynamic of trafficked bodies makes it impossible for their meaning to be wholly compatible with that of victimhood. This does not mean that the discourse does not attempt to make this connection, however these final observations are especially indicative that such a process is not without great difficulty.

#### **4.2. Delimiting the trafficked body: gendered and corporeal complications**

To fully understand the positioning of trafficked bodies in the discourse, it is important to contextualise and delimit these bodies – to uncover wider patterns of meaning production that relate trafficked bodies to *other* bodies – and especially other *disorderly* bodies. This should

provide an interesting dynamic where, on the one hand, complementary meanings can intersect with one another and further crystallise the desired subject position(s) of disorderly bodies. On the other hand, contradictory meanings found on these disorderly bodies can elucidate the particular distinctiveness of trafficked bodies, as well as decipher how gender and corporeality are understood differently within the same order of discourse.

To begin with some similarities, the most immediate correlation between trafficked bodies and other disorderly bodies is how the discourse maintains the prioritised position of the ‘victim’ subject position across all subjects of sexual crimes – crimes that are not only obviously corporeally affected (i.e. physically inscribed on the body), but also gendered in the assumption that they only happen to feminised subjects. This point was already hinted at, when ‘safe houses’ and ‘victim suites’ were considered to serve not only trafficked victims but also victims of rape and domestic abuse, suggesting that these bodies were intimately connected through a shared need to be rescued from their perma-state of victimhood, as well as a desire to be re-sanitised following the impure experiences that have soiled their unruly bodies.

Indeed, in another planning document, EUPM refer to these medicalised spaces as “special hearing rooms” (2004a, p. 6) for adults and children older than 12 who have experienced forms of sexual abuse. Here, all bodies residing within this corporeal category are assumed to have shared the same ‘special’ experience, therefore allowing these bodies to all respond to their experience in the same way – by testifying in a special hearing room. Those outside of this corporeal category are unable to share this experience, such as those under the age of 12, therefore they are excluded from this response.<sup>45</sup>

These sexualised bodies are also frequently assumed to be female, in a similar way to feminised trafficked bodies. For example, EUPM (2006f, p. 4) state that girls aged 12-17 are at a high risk of being sexually assaulted (and also trafficked for sex) via the use of ‘rape drugs’. Rape drugs encourage passive compliance. They allow the individual to become “physically helpless, unable to refuse sex, and [thus, they] can’t remember what happened” (European Union Police Mission, 2006f, p. 4). A failure to remember means an inability to articulate a testimony, which means these bodies are unable to assist in prosecutions. Furthermore, such helplessness means that these individuals are positioned as victims requiring a form of salvation from their sexual abuse. A connection is also made to the aforementioned youthful female bodies that are considered sexually appealing. Therefore, it can be argued that the discourse contains the effects

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<sup>45</sup> Assumedly, EUPM’s alternative response (i.e. the response assigned to the corporeal category of children under the age of 12) would be similarly one-dimensional and technocratic – since this would provide the easiest management of such bodies.

of rape drugs, and the experience of rape in general, to such victimisable (and less orderly, less meaningful) bodies. Less compatible bodies, for instance male bodies, seem unable to occupy the subject position of the helpless rape victim, which implies that these bodies cannot be victims and cannot be raped. This empty signifier of male sexual victimhood is silenced so to avoid any challenge to the dominant logic of equivalence that separates masculine and feminine experiences and capabilities.

A similar gendered pattern can be found when the discourse handles the topic of domestic violence. The following testimony by a domestic violence ‘victim’ highlights the similarities it shares with the earlier presented testimony of sex trafficking:

“He would slap me, kick me, pull my hair, insult me verbally and threaten me. I was so humiliated. He even beat me up when I was pregnant,” says a victim of domestic violence” (European Union Police Mission, 2006h, p. 10).

Here, the perpetrator is again positioned to be male, seen in the use of male gendered pronouns, whilst the victim is contrasted as female – despite the use of the pronoun ‘I’ (again, a potential symbol of her individual agency), it is *she* who is assaulted because a violent encounter happened when pregnant – an experience only afforded to ‘biological females’. Similar to the sex trafficking example, a process of feminised subordination is found when the speaking subject’s body is passively abused – he slaps her, he kicks her, etc. Furthermore, shame is exhibited when the speaking subject confesses her humiliation at having experienced domestic violence. Shame is an emotion closely linked to the aforementioned process of ‘victim blaming’, and the subsequent intuitive acceptance of a ‘victim’ subject position.

Similar associations of meaning also appear in imagery relating to domestic violence. For instance, in the same article, an image depicts two arguing silhouettes (European Union Police Mission, 2006h, p. 11, Image 2 in Appendix). The male figure leans aggressively towards the female figure with his fist raised. By contrast, she stands openly and non-threateningly. As with the earlier image used to depict sex trafficking, both figures are anonymous – although, instead of these figures being shadowed, they are blurred to resemble similarly unidentifiable corporeal shapes. Again, such anonymity may account for a lack of agency in victimhood. Alternatively, it may reflect an obvious and unspoken power balance held in favour of the dominant male body.

Furthermore, it may reflect on the societal inability to talk openly about domestic violence, since this is often considered to be something that occurs only in the home – a private space, an emotional space, a *feminised* space (Price, 2002). Notably, this is different from the earlier example, where anonymity could be linked to the criminality of trafficking. Domestic violence is also criminal, but the private nature of this act seems to downplay its criminal

implications. Nevertheless, since both trafficking and domestic violence represent societal/sexual taboos in one form or another, the bodies affected by such taboos are similarly disorderly and thus must be managed accordingly.

A major difference between these bodies, however, is how their youthfulness is privileged. Trafficked bodies are prioritised for their youth and potential motherhood, since this allows for easier deception and exploitation. However, the location of domestic violence in the home implies that these victims already fulfil the family-based gender roles of wife and mother (European Union Police Mission, 2006h; 2007c; 2007i; 2008h; 2010f; 2011g). This is why it is so difficult for them to escape their situation – a noticeably different rationale to how trafficked bodies are unable to flee their violence, although similarly victimising<sup>46</sup> – indicating that the nodal point of ‘victim’ is so strong, it can support both a traditional logic of equivalence *and* aspects of a logic of difference – where multiple, even contradicting, meanings are able to exist alongside each other (such as the association between victimhood and the family/home, as well as the conflicting association between victimhood and the sexual youth) (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8).

There are several instances in the discourse where domestic violence is connected visually to the family/home. The most overt can be found in the previously described image, which is quite literally shaped as a ‘broken home’ – with two shards of the structure penetrating and disrupting the image itself (European Union Police Mission, 2006h, p. 11, Image 2 in Appendix). The implication of this image is that there is a home, and a related heteronormative family life, at risk of being destroyed by domestic violence. Similar connotations can be found when EUPM includes, in another domestic violence article, an image of a scared child (2007i, p. 4, Image 3 in Appendix), as well as another article depicting a woman’s physical assault by her (assumed) husband, in front of their (also assumed) child (2010f, p. 9, Image 4 in Appendix). Explicitly drawing children into domestic violence furthers links this issue to family life and the home. Akin to the discursive representation of trafficking, this inclusion of children also infantilises the experience of domestic violence as something that only subordinate subject positions (women and children) experience. This is further evidenced by textual references being

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<sup>46</sup> The de-sexualised state of ‘mother’ may explain why domestic violence is more often presented as a physical crime than a sexual crime. Alternatively, the subordinate position of ‘wife’ (in a patriarchal society) may obscure understandings of sexual consent in the home. However, the underlying assumption of sexual disorderliness remains – especially when domestic violence is discussed in relation to rape and other overtly sexual offences. Yet, crucially, overt and isolated references to sexual violence in the home are rare. By contrast, the sexualised bodies of trafficked individuals are typically perceived to reside outside of the home – presumably to differentiate their position from that of domestic violence bodies.

made to domestic violence destroying the “traditional patriarchal family” (European Union Police Mission, 2006h, p. 10), as well as domestic violence campaigns looking to appeal to “family values” (European Union Police Mission, 2007i, p. 4) whilst simultaneously acknowledging and protecting *mothers* (not women) from such abuse.<sup>47</sup>

This assumed connection between women and children continues when EUPM associates disorderliness with other totalising groups involving children – namely, children who have been sexually assaulted (2004a), children used in pornography (2004b; 2011d), and juvenile delinquents (2010f; 2011g). These bodies all represent the same infantilising process that has already been highlighted – they are all thus somehow situated in a subordinate and powerless subject position. The former two categories are also inherently sexualised, and thus support the crystallised meaning of the sexualised, infantilised and feminised victim. Whilst juvenile delinquents are not sexualised and feminised in the same way, due to their overt display of active agency in their illegal actions, it is telling that they are also not punished in the same way as other criminals. This is precisely because of their infantilisation, with its related lack of agency and power – traits highly compatible with that of disorderly victimhood.

This example highlights the confusion that can unfold between the subject positions of ‘victim’ and ‘criminal’. Another example of this, highly related to the positioning of trafficked bodies, is how the discourse suggests that victims of trafficking can often be “mistaken for prostitutes” (Hadzic, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2008j, p. 2). Whilst an important recognition of Bosnia’s underground sex industry, EUPM appear to distinguish between active, voluntary prostitutes and passive victims of forced prostitution. There are a couple of complications found within this distinction. Firstly, as noted in Chapter 2, since abolitionist feminists contend that all prostitution is forced and exploitative, it is not a readily accepted claim that some sex work is voluntary whilst other sex work is not.

Secondly, this focus on victimising/criminalising the behaviour of prostitutes detracts focus from those who actually *victimise/criminalise* such bodies – not just clients and pimps, who are not at all targeted in the discourse, but also traffickers, who on the contrary have already shown to be quite well targeted in the discourse, precisely for their criminal capabilities. However, in the Bosnian case, what makes sex trafficking any more illegal or criminal than ‘voluntary’ prostitution? Even in places where sex work *is* legal, it is problematic to draw a

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<sup>47</sup> Bosnian patriarchal traditions are important to keep in mind because these assumptions are sometimes used to validate or excuse certain violating behaviours – not only in domestic violence but also in trafficking. Both Mendelson (2005) and Friman and Reich (2007)’s studies on sex trafficking in Bosnia indicate that this is widely considered a local cultural condition, related to high levels of patriarchal violence – sometimes used to excuse the phenomenon. How EUPM respond to this cultural consideration will be addressed later in this study.

definitive line between prostitution and sex trafficking. Therefore, in Bosnia, where the entire sex industry is illegal, this distinction is impossible and indeed (lawfully) irrelevant to locate.

The complicated nature of the victim-criminal binary is also visible when another type of disorderly body is located in the discourse – that of smuggled bodies. In contrast to trafficked bodies being deceived and exploited in their movement, smuggled bodies are assumed to be voluntarily mobile. In some instances, the discourse is very careful to make this distinction, for instance by stating that, “smuggling is an offence against borders [and the state], while human trafficking is an offence against persons” (Tuffrey, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2007k, p. 3). Crucially, this distinction recognises that trafficking does not have to occur across borders – internal trafficking exists. However, there are also limitations in this definition.

For instance, when EUPM (2006f, p. 6) trains local border guards to determine whether an instance of irregular migration<sup>48</sup> is organised or individual, it seems that trafficking is always considered to be an example of organised crime, yet smuggling can be either. Trafficked bodies seem to be rejected from the position of individual migrant, since the very definition of trafficking implies that somebody else has deceptively lured them into this subject position. Whilst this is legally accurate, and probably assists immensely with the ‘closure’ project surrounding all trafficked bodies being viewed as passive and helpless victims, it also implies that trafficked bodies are permanently communal, undermining the individual corporeal experiences of those who have been trafficked.

A further limitation is found when irregular migrants are considered to be “linked to smuggling *or* trafficking” (European Union Police Mission, 2006f, p. 6, *emphasis added*) implying that these subject positions are incompatible with one another. This binary categorisation also implies that it is easy to distinguish between trafficked and smuggled bodies, however as noted earlier, these distinctions are arbitrary in practice. Bodies can move between states of activity and passivity, just as they can shift between what is considered to be smuggling and trafficking. However, the discourse overlooks this fluidity. Instead, when trafficking and smuggling *are* considered together, they are not holistically framed under the umbrella term of ‘irregular migration’, but are rather reduced to represent ‘illegal migration’ (European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2006a; 2006d; 2006f; 2007h; 2010c).

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<sup>48</sup> Irregular migration refers to “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (International Organisation for Migration, 2015). Thus, irregular migrants can be both smuggled and trafficked. There are still major problems with the notion of the ‘irregular’, since this implies that there is also a ‘regular’ migrant that is somehow more desirable/orderly. Nevertheless, it is an attempt to locate unconventional migratory bodies without judging their irregularity.

Reducing irregular migration to illegal migration is similarly problematic to the simplifying assumptions found when clustering all instances of so-called ‘sexual crimes’ together, and treating them as a coherent and singular phenomenon. In the same way, the multifaceted questions surrounding irregular migration – not only who migrates but in what way and for what purpose – are seemingly answered via a singularly coherent response, not to mention an overarching assumption that these irregular migrants are also involved in a migratory *crime*. These trafficked and smuggled bodies thereby come together to represent illegality – a relationship that makes it problematic to understand just which bodies are active and which are passive, which are victims and which are perpetrators. This is not because this categorisation allows for multiple subject positions to be occupied at the same time, but in fact the opposite – binary oppositions are intended to remain in place, yet the new floating signifier of ‘illegal’ is quite incompatible with other crystallised meanings in the discourse – for instance, that of the passive trafficked ‘victim’.

The dominant understanding, the *savoir*, of the word ‘illegal’ is that it describes an action that is legally prohibited, morally dishonest, criminally punishable. Illegal migrants are therefore assumed to *know* that their actions are prohibited. They should *know* that they act dishonestly, and thus they *know* that they bestow criminal responsibility that can be punished. EUPM’s own distinction between smuggling and trafficking can therefore only comfortably associate illegality with that of smuggled bodies. However, when interchangeably referring to smuggled and trafficked bodies within the context of illegality, the experiences of trafficked bodies become subsumed within this other, previously irreconcilable, category. Thus, a sharp antagonism in meaning is created between the earlier positioning of these bodies as passive victims, and the new positioning of them as criminally responsible, active and illegal migrants.

The following statement highlights this antagonism in action:

“Illegal immigrants at Bosnia and Herzegovina’s borders are not considered to have committed a felony. Rather, the crime is treated as a misdemeanour and these individuals are classified as victims. However, one should not forget that although these individuals are victims, illegal immigrants might often be part of organised crime networks. Therefore, they can often provide valuable information that is useful in further investigations (European Union Police Mission, 2012c, p. 10)

Here, EUPM acknowledge that while illegal migration is obviously a crime, a lesser sentence is given to the ‘perpetrators’ of this crime because such migrants are also ‘victims’ – although, since these victims could also be involved in organised crime, it is ambiguous as to just how victimisable these bodies are. Indeed, it is also unclear as to which bodies are referred to here – smuggled bodies, trafficked bodies, or an appreciation that irregular migrant bodies can inhabit

both subject positions. If the discourse intends to reflect this latter perspective, this is a positive step towards the deconstruction of fixed and pre-determined binary categories such as victim-perpetrator, active-passive, voluntary-forced, etc.

However, considering the dominant ‘closure’ project associated with the nodal point of ‘victim’, and the relation this has with gendered binary norms of what it means to perform masculinity or femininity, to act as a man or a woman, this forward-thinking understanding of irregular migration must be problematised further. Why would a hegemonic system of power, until now unyielding in its desire to complete the crystallisation process of turning these floating signifiers into moments, suddenly authorise a perpetrator to inhabit the previously contrary subject position of a victim?

I consider one possibility to be the benefit in accepting this antagonism outweighing the consequences of weakening a binary logic of equivalence. For instance, it may be more valuable for law enforcers to obtain information about wider organised crime networks than to prosecute an individual illegal migrant. On the one hand, this may reveal a form of agency that illegal migrants can access – their knowledge of organised crime gives them power, thus they are considered useful and treated differently from the passive and infantilised trafficked victims that are supposed to know very little about their exploitative experience.<sup>49</sup>

On the other hand, the ability to bend the will of illegal migrants to obtain useful information is demonstrative of the uneven power relations acting between those who prosecute (the orderly), and those at risk of being prosecuted (the disorderly). Consider how the bodies associated with illegal migration are covertly surveilled by the authority of EUPM – for instance, when a CCTV image captures migrant smuggling in action (European Union Police Mission, 2009d, p. 1, Image 5 in Appendix). This symbolises the power imbalance between the disorderly and the orderly, between the surveilled and the surveilling. EUPM’s governmentality also surfaces here, since it can locate, monitor and eventually punish the subordinated subjects that threaten its constructed order.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to the complexity that arises when bodies are unknown to be trafficked or smuggled (or both), the application of a gendered lens to these corporeal categories provides

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<sup>49</sup> Even when trafficked bodies *are* considered to obtain useful knowledge about their experience, it should be recalled using the example of ‘victim suites’ that this knowledge must be probed much more sensitively and covertly, due to the presumed nature of trafficked bodies (i.e. fragile and passive women) as well as the presumed nature of their crime (i.e. feminised, sexualised, infantilised, victimised).

<sup>50</sup> Hopefully it is clear to see that there is a multi-layered dynamic of power at work here. Not only does power flow between the hegemonic authority of EUPM and its criminally disorderly subjects, but there are also power imbalances *within* the category of criminally disorderly.



further complications, with the gendering of illegal migratory subjects being much more fragmented and contradictory – indeed, more discursively antagonistic – than the gendered meanings found located on sexually disorderly bodies. To begin with a less divisive example, consider how EUPM describe an incident at a border crossing, where a car with foreign licence plates is “suspicious for some reason [therefore] both male passengers are asked to leave the vehicle and take out their suitcases for checking” (2010c, p. 4). It is unclear from this description why they are suspicious – is it due to the car being foreign, or that the car carries male bodies, or is it a culmination of nationality *and* gender? Since there is no explanation for this, I must assume that both features are relevant to this story.

Although it is plausible to suggest that a border guard would need to search foreign cars entering Bosnia, I cannot find a similarly reasonable explanation as to why the gender of these passengers is relevant here. Therefore, I question if two female passengers in a foreign car would have been similarly suspicious. Maybe so, but the overt statement that suspicious bodies are also *male* bodies once again symbolises the dominant association of meaning found between activity and masculinity. This points to the dominant assumption that a masculine gender performance is strong, aggressive and potentially threatening – to further support this argument, consider how all the perpetrators mentioned so far have been gendered male. Thus, bodies that are interpellated into the active and self-aware subject position of ‘illegal migrant’ may also be gendered male. Female bodies, by contrast, are assumedly trustworthy, since their subordinated and victimised subject position discounts any real capacity to exert such (threatening) agency. Again, this supports the aforementioned nodal point of a ‘woman’ coming to represent particularly feminised attributes such as peacefulness, weakness and passivity.

Despite this example displaying a clear logic of equivalence that supports the gendered stereotypes perpetuated elsewhere in the discourse, other descriptions of criminally disorderly bodies are not so compatible with this dominant view. Two examples especially complicate these meanings, allowing female bodies to be considered active criminal participants. Firstly, there is the naming of a Balkan-wide police operation to combat migrant smuggling as ‘Tara’ (European Union Police Mission, 2009d, p. 1). Tara has a couple of meanings in the Balkan region – one innocently referring to the Tara Mountain in neighbouring Serbia.

However, the second meaning is much less innocent – Tara is a feminised given name. It seems counter-intuitive to give an operation seeking to locate smuggled bodies, bodies that are overtly active, illegal and criminal, a feminised name. Whilst this may reflect the notion that smuggled bodies can also be female, and thus female bodies can inhabit the subject position of the ‘victim’ as well as ‘criminal’ or ‘perpetrator’, it may also draw another parallel between

smuggled and trafficked bodies – trafficked bodies are also illegal, though this does not mean that such bodies are overtly *at fault* for this illegality. Thus, perhaps the smuggled bodies targeted by the ‘Tara’ operation are similarly victimisable. Indeed, this point is supported when considering how other feminised subject positions become associated with a particular feminised given name. Sex trafficked bodies in Eastern Europe are often collectively known as ‘Natasha’s’ or ‘Tatjana’s’, which further communalises the trafficking experience, reduces individual agency, and furthers the assumption that these feminised bodies are merely objectifiable commodities to be bought and sold (Penttinen, 2004, p. 169).<sup>51</sup>

A second gendered complication arises when a female perpetrator, someone who cannot under any circumstances be forgiven as simply a naïve or passive feminised victim, is described in the discourse. Until now, all references within this category have been male. There is only one reference in the discourse to a female trafficker – although, notably, this person is suspected of *child* trafficking (European Union Police Mission, 2008a, p. 6). Whilst this body is prosecuted and shown to display responsibility and agency for the crime committed, it is telling that the trafficked body in this scenario is that of a child – a baby, in fact, only three months old. Most overtly, a female body trafficking a child symbolises the same assumed connection in meaning between all female bodies and motherhood, as has been highlighted elsewhere in this study.

A more covert assumption can also be made in relation to the trafficker’s gender. There is no mention of sexual exploitation in this child’s experience, thus perhaps this instance of human trafficking is not related to sex trafficking at all. However, this assumption allows for the continued supposition that sexuality is somehow owned/controlled by dominant male bodies. To assume that this instance of trafficking is not sexual relates to the trafficker being female – with female bodies again being assumed to lack the ability to implement sexual control/abuse.

Furthermore, since children do not need to be coerced in order to be trafficked, the female trafficker does not need to prove her capability of active coercion. This is important because, once again, the female body is associated with a feminised *incapability*. Thus, while it is important that the discourse makes reference to threatening female bodies, they are still weak in comparison to male bodies. Female perpetrators are unable to fully occupy this active subject position, because they are not entirely compatible with the hyper-masculinised traits found

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<sup>51</sup> Even if the ‘Tara’ operation was intended to be named after the Tara Mountain, it is still important to problematise the gendered meaning of the term given the context of which it is being used i.e. not only by Balkan actors, but also by EUPM. Indeed, with this Balkan signifier coming to signify a Western concept, this floating signifier can be renamed a ‘hybrid signifier’ – precisely for this ability to become appropriated for another conflicting meaning (Ho and Tsang, 2009, p. 141).

within this position. Therefore, a gendered logic of equivalence is able to maintain feminised bodies as 'disorderly', with masculinised bodies posed to order them accordingly.

## 5. Missing Bodies

### 5.1. Silencing the abject

Whereas the previous chapter focused on the overt articulations and interpellations that restrict corporeal permeance and thus fixate on the binary gender performances of so-called disorderly bodies, so to maintain patriarchal and hyper-masculine styles of power and control, I will now study what is *not* articulated in the discourse, as well as locate the subject positions that are *not* interpellated in relation to disorderly bodies. This means to radically deconstruct the discourse, to ‘read between the lines’, and question what silences appear and why (Kronsell, 2006, p. 115).

Before submerging in this process, I acknowledge the potential irony found in searching for *what is not said* in the discourse, since this implies that silences are somehow in binary opposition to *what is said* in the discourse. However, as Foucault crucially reminds, there is “not one but many silences, and they are all part of the strategies that underline and permeate discourse” (1978b, p. 27). Thus, silences are not only multiple – produced by different subjects for different purposes – but they also do not oppose discourse, instead complementing it. This is precisely why this sub-chapter is necessary, so to increase the plausibility of explanations already made about disorderly bodies, as well as to support forthcoming analysis surrounding more orderly bodies.

The discourse presents trafficked bodies in a highly contained manner. Sexualised and feminised victims with little agency of their own, any capabilities these bodies do have relate to their private and reproductive responsibilities as (potential) wife and mother, and the subsequent inherence of a meaningful relationship between women and children. There is an unwillingness to associate any other bodies within this category – for instance male bodies. An example of this was already raised when rape was positioned as a risk for female bodies. The discourse therefore silenced male experiences of sexual violence – these experiences seemingly *did not happen*.

However, as the literature in Chapter 2 evidenced, these experiences *do happen*. To not reference them at all means to further stigmatise these experiences, thereby limiting future admissions of male sexual violence, and thus maintaining the location of sexual violence and sexual victimhood to a feminised space where male bodies (as assumedly strong and assertive protectors, as opposed to victims in need of protection) are unwelcome (Grey and Shepherd, 2013). Therefore, this empty signifier is not only silenced so to avoid creating an antagonism of meaning that challenges the dominant structure of a binary logic of equivalence but also, as D’Costa (2006, p. 143) contends, this silence is partially self-censored – because the communal

identity performance of ‘men’ is prioritised over the individual identity performance associated with a singular violating/victimising male experience. Since coherent communal identities and subject positions are obviously easier to manage than fragmented ones, and EUPM’s hegemonic authority depends on its ability to manage its subjects effectively (so it can pursue its desired peacebuilding project), it is critical for EUPM to smother these individual experiences, since they potentially threaten pre-determined illusions about how the victim-protector binary functions, and thus how these disorderly bodies can be governed (D’Costa, 2006, p. 146).

Despite the discourse ignoring the potential sexual victimhood of male bodies, a semblance of non-sexual male victimhood *is* referenced within the discourse. For example, in one discussion on domestic violence, men are accepted as possible subjects of this violence, when their injured bodies are also invited to recover in safe houses (European Union Police Mission, 2010f, p. 11). In another discussion on domestic violence, EUPM similarly state that, “although rare, there are also cases where the victim is a man” (2011g, p. 6). Downplaying male domestic violence as rare is not merely informative as to the ‘typical’ demographic of domestic violence victims.<sup>52</sup> It also further alienates male experiences of domestic violence, articulating them as something especially unusual and different. This is also a form of stigmatisation that attempts to silence such ‘atypical’ experiences, thereby removing the possibility for these victims to experience ‘justice’ – an explicitly gendered term, now when considering not only which criminals matter (as was raised in the previous chapter), but also which *victims* matter (D’Costa, 2006, p. 146).

Accepting that male bodies can be domestic violence victims, yet simultaneously silencing male sexual victimhood, forms something of a paradox when considering how domestic violence is often related to other sexual crimes. Of course, such a paradox supports the aforementioned claims that male bodies cannot be sexually assaulted. However, a deeper problem can also be located here – one that was briefly raised in the last chapter. Even when female bodies experience domestic violence, the sexual dynamic of this experience is obscured. I questioned whether this was related to the de-sexualisation of female bodies in the home, or to the ambiguous ‘rights’ of subordinated female bodies in a patriarchal societal environment. Now, I would like to suggest a third theory – one that incorporates this reluctant inclusion of male bodies as subjects of domestic violence. Here, sexual connotations are distanced so to not dispute the assumption that sexual violence only happens to those sexed and gendered female.

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<sup>52</sup> The search for a ‘typical’ trafficking demographic is also demonstrative of an ontologically focused search for truth, as opposed to an epistemological exploration of how this ‘typical’ demographic comes to be known e.g. through the articulation of the compatible, and the silencing of the incompatible.

Considering how human trafficking is typically reduced to mean sex trafficking in the discourse, it therefore makes sense for adult male bodies to similarly be excluded from the category of ‘trafficked’. Sexual exploitation appears to be something that male bodies cannot experience, because this would challenge dominant performances of masculinity – as both sexual aggressor and protector of female sexuality. Furthermore, since trafficking is a passive crime, and passivity is clearly associated with femininity, this is similarly incompatible with the dominant meanings associated with male bodies. It was already suggested in Chapter 2 that many male trafficked bodies become categorised as smuggled, in order to avoid this distinction of feminised passivity. Already, the discourse has evidenced examples of masculinising active migrant smuggling (see Chapter 4), therefore this further supports the argument that the category of the ‘trafficked male body’ is an empty signifier that must be ignored – since it cannot corroborate with the crystallised associations of meaning found between trafficking, passivity, victimhood, and femininity.

These crystallisations further explain why human trafficking can be so easily reduced to sex trafficking – since the intersection of sexuality supports the presented logic of equivalence that maintains binary sexes and genders (Foucault, 1978b; Butler, 1990).<sup>53</sup> The impossibility of male (hetero-)sexual exploitation is maintained when this experience is considered feminine. This is why trafficked children do not need to be categorised by gender in the same way as adults – for instance, when Roma children are known to be subjects of trafficking in Bosnia (European Union Police Mission, 2011e, p. 9). Firstly, the infantilisation argument raised earlier remains intact here – ‘women and children’ come together to form a singular feminised category. Secondly, in support of Foucault’s (1978b, p. 28) claim that children are prevented from legitimately exerting sexuality, it is seemingly quite possible that boys, before they become men, can similarly be positioned as sexually exploited victims.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Turning this point on its head, is sex trafficking similarly reduced to mean human trafficking? Is the eroticised taboo associated with sex trafficking downplayed, making room for a similarly heinous crime but one that pertains a less controversial sexual connotation? I consider this to be possible, however it is not so plausible an argument here, because the sexual nature of trafficking is made quite explicit in the discourse, so to segregate hyper-sexualised bodies (the youthful female) from less sexualised bodies (the maternal female, the active male).

<sup>54</sup> Notably, these Roma children are thought to be trafficked for domestic servitude and begging, and not for the sex industry. This actually furthers the claim that female bodies are the ones typically considered to be sexually exploitable. However, since this connection has already been raised multiple times, I consider it more important here to acknowledge the distinction between ‘man’ and ‘boy’ because boys, unlike men, are allowed into the broader category of ‘trafficked’ – a category that significantly blurs what is sexual exploitation and what is not, especially with the frequent reduction/assumption of human trafficking to mean sex trafficking. Therefore, this suggests that boys are not entirely incompatible with such sexual exploitation. Yet, this relationship seems to dissipate once boys reach sexual maturity, lose their infantilised state, and begin to perform as ‘men’.

The limited relationship articulated between gendered corporeal experiences and related imposed binaries is also reflected in EUPM's practical responses to sex trafficking and related sexual/migratory issues. Chapter 4 already highlighted how EUPM prioritises the prosecution of criminals over the protection of those having experienced the crime, due to the security motivations that require such a response. Indeed, both prosecution and protection counter-trafficking approaches allow EUPM to maintain an authoritative position over its disorderly subjects. Thus, these approaches also resemble a third generation peacebuilding strategy. EUPM ultimately monitor, punish and impose compatible norms upon disorderly bodies, as opposed to truly engaging with all facets of the 'local' (orderly *and* disorderly) that are involved in sex trafficking and related sexual/migratory issues. This means that the peace and security built by EUPM cannot reach all individuals affected by these issues.

This limitation becomes apparent when uncovering the discursive silencing of a third counter-trafficking approach – prevention. Prevention, unlike protection and prosecution, is proactive. It seeks to educate and raise awareness for threats such as trafficking *before* these threats are actualised. The lack of prevention articulations in the discourse implies that such an attempt is futile and that this situation can only be reactively *managed*. Managing this assumption is a critical tool of governmentality and the related application of EUPM's bio-power. It also summarises EUPM's priorities in Bosnia – that 'hard' Bosnian/Balkan/European security is considered more important than the (gendered, sexed and sexualised) human security of trafficked bodies (Ackerly and True, 2006, p. 253).

The bio-power operating within the silencing of trafficking prevention is testament to how the nodal point of 'victim' is managed into its position of immense normative privilege. There is a reluctance to allow trafficked bodies to leave this deliberately crafted subject position, because challenging this nodal point would also challenge the connected floating signifiers of hyper-sexualisation, infantilisation and objectification. Since a new category of not-quite-but-almost trafficked bodies would dilute the fixed meanings associated with trafficked bodies and other feminised victim subject positions, this conflicting empty signifier – of prevention, of possibility – must be rejected. Subjects of trafficking therefore remain in a position where it is impossible to obtain preventative knowledge – since the threats facing these bodies are ever-present, unavoidable. These threats can merely be *protected from* and *prosecuted against* – actions that disallow trafficked bodies to exert preventative agency, while maintaining the hegemonic masculinised authority of EUPM and other orderly figures.

Notably, even if these bodies *were* able to learn preventative knowledge, their assumed naïveté would seemingly prevent them from being able to use this knowledge successfully. This

is not only demonstrative of gender stereotypes surrounding agency and ability, but also gender's intersection with class. It was already briefly mentioned that trafficked bodies are assumed to be of a lower socio-economic class. This implies that these bodies lack the education, wisdom and opportunity to utilise any such preventative knowledge given to them. Let it be noted here, that I purposely refer to knowledge being given *to them* and not produced *by them*, because it has already been assumed in the discourse that these bodies are unable to truly produce their own knowledge, aside from productive knowledge relating to their victimhood. This, in itself, is a consequence of the hegemonic authorities giving *power to* these subjects in order to maintain inequalities between subject positions, thereby upholding a crystallised and governable logic of equivalence (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8).

To fully make sense of the silencing of trafficking prevention strategies, it is important to also locate instances where the discourse *does* respond preventatively to security threats affecting disorderly (and resultantly, feminised) bodies. For instance, EUPM claim that prevention is the “best measure against domestic violence” (2007j, p. 7). Considering the discursive similarities between subjects of domestic violence and trafficking, this may at first glance appear to reject the earlier argument of gender stereotypes limiting preventative measures to be utilised by the feminised bodies occupying a ‘victim’ subject position. However, this anomaly is precisely *why* such a mobilisation of prevention in domestic violence discourse should be compared to the absence of prevention articulations in the trafficking context. This should indicate whose (disorderly) bodies matter, via the related question of whose bodies are worth engaging with when looking to prevent disorderliness.

Differences in the positioning of domestic violence and trafficked bodies help to explain why preventative strategies can be used with the former category but not with the latter. Firstly, the possibility of male victimhood in domestic violence begins to dismantle the assumption that all subjects of domestic violence are female, which by extension also muddies the relationship between active male bodies and passive feminised subject positions (i.e. an inevitable feminised victimhood). This binary blurring allows space for preventative knowledge to be utilised, precisely because male and female bodies are allowed to occupy the same subject position – a partial opening of meaning in a logic of difference, as opposed to trafficking's strict logic of equivalence (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 8). A further difference points to the de-sexualisation of domestic violence, which positions subjects of domestic violence quite differently to hyper-sexualised trafficked bodies. Moving away from this highly sexed and gendered arena of sexuality also allows for the active consumption of preventative knowledge – again, precise because male bodies can occupy this subject position.



Another difference, similarly reflective of a logic of difference, is that domestic violence is connected to the societal norms of family and the home, unlike trafficked bodies that are only *potentially* connected to these norms – in fact, their deception and exploitation often occurs when they are falsely promised access to the (hetero-)normative subject positions of wife and mother. Thus, bodies residing in the home can be considered more able to access, understand and utilise preventative knowledge not only due to the inclusion of male bodies in the perceived risk of domestic violence, but also in the need of wives *and* husbands, mothers *and* fathers, to uphold these particularly idealised subject positions in society (Foucault, 1978b, p. 3). Thus, their societal potential and related worth – attributes that derive from related heteronormative and binary conforming sex/gender interpellations, as well as an assumed socio-economic capability that once again intersects here with gender – are intimately related to their ability to maintain such ideals. Prevention is thus possible because it is *valuable*.

In addition to the aforementioned intersections of sex, gender, sexuality and class, another intersection to be problematised here is that of nationality or citizenship. The ‘home’ idealised within the discourse is that of a Bosnian home, with the idealised bodies that reside there assumedly Bosnian citizens. Since domestic violence is considered preventable, it seems that the citizens involved (male and female, perpetrator and victim) exert a power dynamic that *non-citizens* are unable to possess.<sup>55</sup> This relates to the desire of EUPM to situate Bosnian citizens as capable of securing their own community (European Union Police Mission, 2011c, p. 4). Such a capability would suggest that Bosnian civil society is ‘developing’, a requirement for Bosnia’s successful accession to the EU – where these respectable and norm-conforming bodies can transform from Bosnian citizens into citizens of the EU and prosperous West.

EUPM staunchly supports this aspiration. This support was made especially explicit following the adaptation of EUPM’s mandate to include the hopeful end-state of Bosnia’s full EU membership (Council of the European Union, 2005). A successful accession would therefore demonstrate a major success for EUPM as a peacebuilding (and statebuilding) mission. It should therefore not come as a surprise that EUPM actively engages with civil society on local development and security issues such as domestic violence, suggesting that Bosnian citizens must take responsibility for these private societal problems. However, this does not mean that domestic violence prevention strategies have been locally obtained – it simply demonstrates that EUPM supports the transformation of fragile and potentially disorderly Bosnian citizens into

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<sup>55</sup> To clarify, the term ‘non-citizen’ refers to all third country nationals that are neither Bosnian nor European/traditionally ‘Western’.

more orderly EU citizens. Indeed, with regard to this point, it is important to once again locate the bio-power found within this discourse on prevention – preventative strategies are only given the power to exist here, because this benefits EUPM and the EU (Chandler, 2007, p. 606). The productive power and agency cultivated here is only perpetuated so to disguise EUPM's underlying hegemonic (masculine) juridical power – it does not *replace* this type of power (Kappler and Richmond, 2011, p. 264).

Since non-citizens are not required for the EU's expansion project, and thus EUPM's achievements of its peacebuilding/statebuilding goals, then these bodies are not required to obtain preventative agency. Preventative strategies relating to these bodies can therefore be discursively silenced. Furthermore, since non-citizens are not the bodies that EUPM are mandated to protect/manage, it may simply be pragmatic that such an operation prioritises local bodies over international bodies. Whatever the prime reason, it is apparent that local Bosnian citizens matter significantly to EUPM. Thus, it seems unsurprising that internationally trafficked bodies are often positioned as non-citizens – unwanted side-effects of globalisation and relaxed post-Soviet borders, and thus a frustration that must simply be managed, if they cannot be avoided entirely.<sup>56</sup>

This positioning can be seen when, for instance, trafficked and smuggled bodies are linked together – assumedly all international, and therefore able to accept the articulation of floating signifier 'illegal', which makes it much easier to authorise reactive management and punishment strategies. EUPM focuses a considerable amount of time and energy on this international aspect, even taking the lead in "coordinating international support for the fight against organised crime" (2007b, p. 2). It seems that international cooperation makes it easier to target/prosecute foreign instances of trafficking (and smuggling – which, by its very nature, is always foreign) than local criminals. Another allusion to non-citizenship references the risk of trafficking within Bosnia's Roma population (European Union Police Mission, 2008j; 2011e). This risk appears to be directly proportional to the inability of Roma people to locate themselves fully within the subject position of the Bosnian citizen, precisely due to their nomadic nature. Since these bodies are less-than-ideal, it is unlikely that they would be able to benefit from the proactive prevention strategies afforded to fully idealised members of the Bosnian population.

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<sup>56</sup> It is worth noting that, despite the focus on managing disorderly bodies and not a holistic silencing of them, their presence is downplayed in many ways – from the aforementioned reduction of human trafficking to sex trafficking, to internationally disorderly bodies being written off as irregular, "isolated and individual cases" (Dumančić, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2011f, p. 2). This reduction, and the stigmatisation produced by such reduction, only serves to push the secretive nature of sex trafficking further and further into Bosnia's criminal underground (Frisendorf, 2007, p. 381).

A related point to be raised here is the intersection of race/ethnicity with nationality/citizenship. All of the discourse's images of trafficked bodies are white and assumedly of European origin (as well as, obviously, female). While many individuals trafficked internationally into/through Bosnia *are* white European, it is telling that the experiences of third country nationals – i.e. non-white Europeans, the bona fide 'non-citizens' – are entirely silenced in the discourse. Here, I must recall Spivak's important work on subaltern women, where such bodies are "doubly effaced" (1988, p. 32) – firstly, through the political marginalisation of those occupying a colonial subject position (the subaltern, the third country national, the 'non-citizen' in general); and secondly, through the feminised subject position occupied by women within this marginalised group. Thus, not only is male dominance maintained here, but also Western dominance – ensuring that non-Western (i.e. non-white European) female bodies are at an exceptionally high risk of becoming abject, marginalised, silenced.<sup>57</sup>

The discourse's focus on white European trafficked bodies also reflects its crystallised relation of meaning between a trafficked body and a pure, victimisable body. Purity is often used to symbolise whiteness and, by relation, white societal privilege (Pajnik, 2006, p. 40). Thus, not only do articulations of the 'white slave' silence the experiences of those who are not white, but it also prioritises and validates the experiences of those who are white. Pajnik (2006, p. 41) contends that this is because these white victimised bodies are recognisable to the West; they *belong* to the West somehow. Therefore, in EUPM's Western/European order of discourse, the experiences of such 'white slaves' can be articulated, because their whiteness makes them recognisable, relatable and ultimately *worth protecting*. This is in contrast to non-white European bodies resembling an extreme and exclusive Other, unpermitted to speak and thus unable to secure the same level of protection as those representing the white European Self (D'Costa, 2006, p. 137).

In addition to this expansive and dynamic silencing located across the bodies of international trafficking, discursive silencing also occurs when discussing internal trafficking. With the stigma of illegality removed, locally trafficked bodies are positioned quite differently to internationally trafficked bodies. Locatable without a victim-criminal antagonism of meaning,

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<sup>57</sup> Bosnians and other non-EU Europeans are not Western, but rather *Westernisable* – referring here to the EU's ongoing project of 'developing' Bosnia and other post-Soviet states that acquire to join the EU. These states, it should also be noted, are predominantly made up of white Europeans. Therefore, these white European bodies appear to matter more than those that are not white European. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these bodies are still subordinated by the hegemonic system of power of (typically white and masculinised) Western bodies. Furthermore, not all Westernisable bodies (in terms of nationality/citizenship) conflate with whiteness – for instance, many Bosniaks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The experiences of these non-white, yet somehow still Westernisable, bodies are silenced in a similar way to entirely non-citizen bodies.

these bodies are easier to sympathise with as victims. This positioning allows EUPM to easily utilise its desired counter-trafficking approach of protection, in acknowledgement that these locally trafficked bodies, the locally disorderly, are somehow recognisable and valuable because they resemble the Self – again, in contrast to the internationally disorderly, the distinctive Other.

Despite an increased clarity found in the positioning of locally trafficked bodies, the discourse still keeps references to internal trafficking at a minimum. This creates somewhat of a paradox when considering a point I raised in the last chapter – that local patriarchal traditions are often blamed for the insurgence of sex trafficking and related issues in Bosnia (Mendelson, 2005; Friman and Reich, 2007). However, now when looking at the partial silencing of internal trafficking, it seems that EUPM wish to distance Bosnian culture from this problem – assumedly to show the world that Bosnia is ‘developing’ and will therefore eventually acquire EU membership. I contend that this represents a shift from a logic of equivalence towards a logic of difference, where these trafficked bodies, albeit disorderly, can carry multiple meanings – some of which are more positive, more ‘orderly’ (e.g. as potentially progressive Bosnian citizens).

The idealisation of norm-abiding Bosnian citizens thereby intends to represent Bosnia’s progress as a functional and well-oiled state that might not be devoid of, but can at least appropriately manage large-scale and organised security threats such as sex trafficking. The incompatibility of individual disorderly Bosnian bodies makes it difficult for these subject positions to be fixedly interpellated throughout the discourse – these bodies pollute the normative boundaries of what EU envisions as a healthy, developed Bosnian civil society.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, in order to maintain this clear idealisation of civil society, the experiences of the less-than-ideal, the abject, must be managed into discursive oblivion (Butler, 1990, p. 168). As a result of this silencing of the abject, the hegemonic masculine power and authority of actors such as EUPM is protected.

## **5.2. Silencing the hegemonic?**

In line with Foucault’s understanding that there are many different forms of silencing, Kronsell (2006, p. 111) argues that the silencing associated with the maintenance of hegemonic masculine norms is two-fold: not only are these norms sustained via the purposeful silencing of abject bodies and their anomalous or incompatible experiences (as outlined above), but discourse can

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<sup>58</sup> I have purposefully used medicalised language here, to represent how the discourse frequently equates societal development with health, suggesting that those who are unable to ‘develop’ (the disorderly) are unhealthy and must be treated accordingly. Refer back to Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on this.

also sub-consciously perpetuate hegemonic masculine norms when the origin of such norms are not problematised. Here, hegemonic masculine power and authority is hidden or taken for granted, via a process of universalising norms and ideals that are compatible with the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity.

In the traditionally hyper-masculine environment of International Relations, this universalising process has come to situate the category of men, as the actors performing hyper-masculinity, as the “[standard] of normality, equated with what it is to be human” (Kronsell, 2006, p. 109). These norms end up becoming so deeply entrenched in society, that it appears impossible to challenge them – a process not dissimilar to that of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘closure’ of meaning. Therefore, in this sub-chapter I will look to locate instances of this assumed universality, to determine how the discourse normalises particular notions of hegemonic masculinity whilst simultaneously stifling gendered and corporeal mutability.

The installation of universalised and correspondingly hegemonic masculine norms, i.e. in the binary depiction of feminised victimhood vs. masculinised authority, has already been highlighted multiple times throughout this study in relation to disorderly bodies. However, now that I attempt to uncover the silencing of hegemonic masculinity, I must focus on more orderly bodies – and especially the most orderly of all, EUPM. The way EUPM displays its hegemonic masculine power and authority to its many subordinating subjects – both disorderly *and* orderly – should illustrate how certain hegemonic masculine norms associated with EUPM, and by relation the EU/West more generally, have actually been disguised as universal norms that go unproblematised in the discourse. This process intimately connects back to Foucault’s understanding of governmentality and the pitfalls of third generation peacebuilding.

Despite EUPM’s connections to the EU, and the lure of EU membership for Bosnia (thus enticing Bosnian cooperation with EUPM’s norms), the propagation of this juridical power is fairly well hidden at the surface level of the discourse. For instance, EUPM (2004a, p. 3) is careful to use terminology such as ‘assisting’, ‘supporting’ and ‘enhancing’ political and socio-economic development in Bosnia, as opposed to ‘imposing’, ‘enforcing’ or ‘demanding’ change. This is symbolic of the EU’s wider soft power strategy. Additionally, EUPM attempts to distance itself from the political objectives of the EU in the Balkans by describing itself as an “impartial and objective” (2006a, p. 8) actor with “no [political] ties to the region” (2009f, p. 5). Sex trafficking is also handled by EUPM in a neutral and unprejudiced manner – for instance, by treating all victims and perpetrators in the same way, regardless of their nationality or ethnicity (both highly politicised concepts in Bosnia) (2008j, p. 2).

This de-politicised, non-imposing, and locally/culturally aware approach to peacebuilding in Bosnia is clearly representative of the critique surrounding third generation peacebuilding, in that heavy-handed international interventions impose foreign norms on fragile states, regardless of their compatibility. Thus, it is positive that EUPM appear to take this into account in their operations, remaining detached from both national and international politics, and reflecting on the unique context of post-conflict Bosnia and the experiences/needs of local Bosnians. However, when applying a gendered lens to this approach, this detachment becomes more complicated.

For instance, when EUPM is seen to value attributes such as impartiality and objectivity, this supports the positivist and highly patriarchal understanding of knowledge as something ontologically true, tangible and evidential, distinct and unaffected by EUPM's own subjectivity. The ability for EUPM as an actor to then obtain a so-called ontological truth, in terms of how to convincingly respond to sensitive issues such as sex trafficking (via objectivity/political distance), thus represents EUPM's own hyper-masculine subject position – as an actor that can locate a scientific 'one size fits all' solution to complex issues such as sex trafficking, as an actor that indirectly validates and universalises the hegemonic masculine norm of scientific and objective knowledge as something not only worth prioritising but also as something *observable*. This is hardly conducive to a fourth generation peacebuilding approach that centres on locally/culturally contingent knowledge, nor does it recognise the post-positivist perspective that all knowledge is known subjectively.

To further exemplify this, consider how EUPM's operational response to sex trafficking is highly technocratic and standardised. It is frequently stated in the discourse that this approach is necessary because EUPM must achieve quick and tangible results within the short time frame of its mandate – the success of the mandate hinges on the amount of perpetrators arrested and/or prosecuted, in addition to the number of victims saved from major and organised crimes (European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2006g; 2007b; 2007c; 2012a; Council of the European Union, 2009). Yet, this quantitative approach to trafficking leaves no room to qualitatively examine the individual and unique experiences of trafficking or other sexual/migratory crimes. It also cannot address the root causes of the phenomenon, thus future threats of sex trafficking remain. All experiences of trafficking are simply managed in the same way, regardless of how divergent their origins and outcomes actually are.

I interpret this response to be a result of the discursive medicalisation of organised crime, of which sex trafficking is considered a "cancerous menace" (European Union Police Mission, 2003a, p. 26) that must be stamped out systematically. This perception of organised crime leaves

no space to engage thoughtfully with individually affected bodies. All of these bodies are already ‘unhealthy’, awaiting the same ‘cure’ of protection and/or prosecution. As such, they can all be rationally categorised, assessed, treated – there is a reluctance to engage empathetically with them. Prioritising rationality over emotionality in this way is once again representative of a hegemonic (and militarised) masculinity performance. Consider how a strong patriarchal leadership is typically measured by how rational it remains in difficult situations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 37). Thus, to reiterate a key finding already raised in this study, the patriarchal and hyper-masculine characteristics of EUPM’s response to trafficking, as a ‘manager’ of inevitably disorderly bodies, allows the same gendered assumptions to be made about this phenomenon – where the orderly are masculinised as active and powerful, and the disorderly feminised as passive and powerless. This further showcases the discourse’s attempt to simplify, and make universal assumptions for, the multifaceted nature of sex trafficking – by allowing privileged meanings to stabilise in a binary logic of equivalence.

Another assumption left unproblematised is the notion that all experiences relating to sex trafficking are criminal. The problems of criminalising trafficked bodies have already been discussed in Chapter 4, but it is important to note here just how useful this approach is in validating EUPM’s priority for criminal prosecution over more holistic human rights protection or the prevention of traumatic/violating experiences for all affected/at risk individuals. By relation, an accepted criminality of sex trafficking authorises and maintains the power imbalance found *within* the category of the disorderly – where only some (feminised) bodies can be ‘cured’ from their disorderliness. This point has already been noted with the silencing of widespread preventative techniques, as well as the prioritisation of citizen protection.

In addition to the systematic surveillance, profiling and management of potentially disorderly bodies, the more orderly bodies in Bosnian society also undergo this process – for instance, when the local police are trained to pursue intelligence-led policing strategies that reactively manage criminal activity (Solana, 2003; European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2008e; 2009d; 2010e). This process symbolises EUPM’s governmentality, since it is this overarching position of authority that regulates these responses. Bio-power legitimises the work of these authorities, as the subordinating subjects of EUPM – the surveilled disorderly, the orderly ‘in training’ – come to accept its overarching authority. This authority is not only clearly hegemonic, but also masculinised – since the scientific, ontological knowledge of EUPM is prioritised over more subjective knowledge, such as that of the feminised disorderly, or even the broader native community – still feminised by EUPM, as a representative of the subordinated ‘failed’ state requiring EU trusteeship (Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Mendelson, 2005).

EUPM's hegemonic masculine authority is overwhelmingly secured in the discourse by the maintenance of a silenced yet universalised assumption that it must be respected due to its position as an agent of the developed and peaceful West. Its bio-power merely disguises this juridical power; it does not remove it. A clear example of this process can be seen when EUPM validates its strategies relating to sex trafficking and organised crime by noting that these approaches reflect the 'best European/international practices' when it comes to policing such matters (Council of the European Union, 2002; European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2004c; 2006c; 2009a; 2009e).

This statement is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when the notion of 'international' is reduced to mean 'European', this suggests that international ideals and norms are the same as European ideals and norms – and vice versa, that European ideals and norms are the same as international ideals and norms. Since Europe is clearly situated in the West, this further implies that the 'international' articulated here is also Western in orientation. Moreover, when specifically looking to understand the best European *policing* practices, it is unclear just what this point means – after all, there is no 'European police' to look to for guidance here, and the national police units of different EU states all undertake their work quite differently from one another (Merlingen, 2007, p. 448). Therefore, the underlying assumption found in this statement is that all European/international (Western) practices are better than Bosnian practices, precisely *because* they are European/international (Western).<sup>59</sup>

Furthermore, although trafficking is widely known to blossom in the Balkans because of its weak security structures and porous borders, the discourse assumes that the phenomenon is primarily the result of irregular migrants wanting to eventually reach the prosperous EU (European Union Police Mission, 2003a; 2009d). Positioning Bosnia solely as a transit country for EU trafficking has three main consequences – firstly, it undermines the fact that Bosnia is also a destination country, overlooking demand factors for the Bosnian sex industry (as noted in Chapter 2); secondly, Bosnia is increasingly becoming an origin country, therefore these experiences are also downplayed (presumably to idealise the Bosnian population as 'orderly' – a point raised earlier in this chapter); and thirdly, which I consider to be the most important consequence for universalising EUPM's hegemonic masculine norms, is that the acceptance of this assumption gives the EU further credence to impress its own opinions as to how to

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<sup>59</sup> Winter (quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2009e, p. 2) acknowledges that there is no singular 'European police practice' – however, he still contends that some combination of European practices *will* be suitable for Bosnia. Therefore, the assertion that 'the European way is better' remains intact.



appropriately respond to sex trafficking and related forms of irregular migration – because its borders are also perceivably at threat.

Therefore, with the EU now not only functioning as an example of political stability and socio-economic prosperity for Bosnia, but also it appears that Bosnia's unstable actions threaten the security of the EU itself, it is no wonder that the EU's 'best practices' are so willingly adopted by Bosnia. Only by doing so will lead Bosnia to achieve a similar stability and prosperity as that which is found in the EU, as well as to secure the European community that Bosnia wants to eventually become part of. However, to do this means to discard some local/cultural practices – practices that EUPM frequently refer to as 'traditional' as opposed to the 'modern' practices of the EU (2007d; 2007l; 2008f).

The discourse's understanding of 'modernity' is highly hegemonised (and masculinised), not least because Bosnia is *expected* to want to obtain EUPM's conception of modernity – because it is assumedly positive. However, it is important to recall that this is simply one perception of modernity – influenced by what the hegemonic masculine West also perceives to represent modernity. Over time, a partial 'closing' of meaning, enticed by such hegemonic masculinised power and authority, has allowed a relatively narrow Western democratic conception to become accepted as a universal norm – even in more 'traditional' environments such as Bosnia.<sup>60</sup>

In line with the perspective of Clohesy (2000, p. 70) I contend that this 'closing' of meaning results not only in a fixed moment where Western-oriented 'modernity' is rarely challenged, because alternative meanings have been extinguished by hegemonic powers. It is also an empty signifier – so perfected in meaning that transitional states such as Bosnia will never be able to fully articulate it. Indeed, Bosnia's modernity will always pale in comparison to its neighbours in the West. It will always be less modern, less mature – therefore, in establishing modernity as a stable yet empty signifier, a permanent power imbalance and logic of equivalence resides between those transitioning towards Western-style modernity e.g. the feminised and fragile Bosnia, and those who maintain the knowledge of how to attain this perfect modernity e.g. EUPM, representing the hyper-masculine EU/West (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1637).

This assumed relationship between modernity and maturity is also noted elsewhere in the discourse. Bosnia's youthful democracy, for instance, is described as being susceptible to forms

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<sup>60</sup> Positioning Bosnia as 'traditional', in contrast to the 'modern' EU is also known as 'Balkanism'. This term, introduced by Todorova, suggests that the Balkans are "the Other within Europe" (quoted in Björkdahl, 2012, p. 301) – not entirely Other (i.e. like the internationally trafficked 'non-citizens' described earlier), but also too 'undeveloped' to be entirely Self. To transition fully into the inclusive Self of the EU means to adopt progressive liberal norms compatible with this subject position.

of security threats and corruption that a more mature democracy, such as those in existing EU member states, would not be at risk of (European Union Police Mission, 2012b, p. 11). This metaphorical positioning of Bosnia as a junior member of the European community not only indicates the juridical power that more senior members (i.e. the EU/EUPM) hold over it, but the *acceptance* of this power imbalance (seen in Bosnia's desire to become more 'modern') also indicates the presence of bio-power in this relationship. Applying a gendered and corporeal lens to this dynamic, it is easy to parallel this political relationship with something more commonly found in family life. Here, the Bosnian state is personified as a subordinated and infantilised figure (also feminised, to recall the assumptive relationship between 'women and children'), whose responsibility is to respect the norms and values of the 'head of the household' (in this case, the head of the European community). By contrast, the patriarchal guardianship associated with such a (hetero-)normative family dynamic is portrayed by the hegemonic masculine EUPM.

The discourse presents this metaphor of family numerous times (European Union Police Mission, 2006b; 2007a; 2007e; 2010b). Often, this is only to indicate the assumed power imbalance between the feminised and infantilised Bosnia and the hegemonic masculine power and authority of its EU guardian, but in some cases the unruly and rebellious nature of Bosnia is made more explicit – suggesting that Bosnia must be “*brought back* into the European family” (Sadović, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2008d, p. 3, *emphasis added*). This quote suggests that, rather than Bosnia becoming an entirely new member of Europe, it was once European before, but acted so inappropriately that it was rejected from this community. Therefore, by “upgrading [its] ethics and values” (European Union Police Mission, 2004a, p. 6), Bosnia can be allowed back into this family. Here, I am reminded of how juvenile delinquents are treated in the discourse (see Chapter 4) – punishable, but also somewhat excusable due to their infantilised nature. Thus, as the ‘runaway child’ returning home, it is critical for Bosnia to be brought back under the strict control of its patriarchal authority EUPM.

In addition to the aforementioned parent-child dynamic, the nodal point of ‘family’ is further expanded when the metaphor of (assumedly, heterosexual) marriage is used to reflect the Bosnian-EU relationship. When Bosnia is thought to have “tied the knot” with the EU (European Union Police Mission, 2008f, p. 1), this once again positions the EU as the hegemonic masculine role in the relationship, whilst Bosnia is in its binary opposing position – as the bride passively wedded to the groom, in the hopes of performing the subject position of the loyal and obedient

(and orderly) wife.<sup>61</sup> This again reduces Bosnia's identity and subject position to something passive and feminised, under the control of its patriarchal and hyper-masculine authority EUPM.

This potential orderliness found in a personified and feminised Bosnia is similarly found in that of Bosnian citizens – indeed, this point was already raised earlier in this chapter, within the context of preventing sexual disorderliness. Described as 'allies' in the fight against organised crime, citizens are once again privileged as a category too orderly/idealised to be involved in this crime (European Union Police Mission, 2008g, p. 1). The term 'ally' is an interesting choice here because it implies that inclusive and cooperative action is possible. *All* Bosnian citizens, regardless of their perceived sex or gender, have the potential to be interpellated into this privileged subject position – a position usually reserved for those corporeally compatible with dominant performances of masculinity. This is certainly an encouraging step forward for EUPM's full engagement with Bosnian civil society – that is, *all* members of civil society. Arguably, it may even represent developments towards a more hybrid peacebuilding approach.

Having said that, there is another connotation found within the term 'ally' – the notion of *militarised* cooperative action. The military is of course highly related to understandings of masculinity and indeed both hegemonic and militarised masculine authority. Thus, whilst at first glance, this extended invitation to Bosnian civil society to respond to global atrocities such as sex trafficking is positive and inclusive, it may also reflect a covert attempt to only attract the truly capable and active bodies of Bosnian civil society – Bosnia's *militarised masculinised* bodies. Feminised bodies, and the cooperative activities that these bodies can produce, are once again smothered by an innate subtext of passivity and inaction (Enloe, 2000, p. 58). Therefore, a subtle silencing of feminised bodies exists even in the more positive encouragements and privilege of civil society engagement – which reflects the need for EUPM to maintain its hegemonic masculine power and authority over such bodies.

Thus, it seems that even Bosnian citizens are a discursive category bestowing gender stereotypes, corporeal restrictions and related power imbalances. They may be potentially 'orderly', but this orderliness is based on a conformance to the hegemonic masculine authority of EUPM. Indeed, when applying a gendered and corporeal lens to EUPM's own positioning within the discourse, its hybrid peacebuilding approaches are overwhelmingly revealed to be well-

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<sup>61</sup> Foucault (1978b, p. 46) speaks at length about the assumed feminised passivity associated with heterosexual marriage – indeed, this social relationship not only normalises specific undertakings of sex, gender and sexuality, but it also symbolises the similarly sexed, gendered and sexualised power dynamic occurring in the home e.g. in a woman's responsibility to procreate and care for the private household vs. a man's responsibility to make decisions in the public sphere, and externally provide for the household.

veiled forms of third generation peacebuilding. Governmentality is once again used to inscribe idealised meanings upon particular bodies (as well as personified states, treated as gendered and corporeal entities of their own), so that any peace built in Bosnia remains complementary to the idealised hegemonic masculine norms of the EU. It is this conception of peace that requires not only the abject to be silenced, but also for the hegemonic to be silenced – by treating the hegemonic masculine norms of EUPM, as well as the binary gender performances that flourish within these normative meanings, as universal, natural and ultimately unchallengeable attributes (Butler, 1990, p. 174).

## 6. ‘Orderly’ Bodies

### 6.1. A gendered and corporeal ordering of local law enforcement

The previous sub-chapter indicated that EUPM’s hegemonic masculine authority has allowed for particular responses to sex trafficking, and related sexual/migratory issues, to advance in Bosnia. The so-called ‘best practices’ of Western law enforcers – fuelled by particular meanings of order, development and peace, so firmly shaped into fixed moments that it is difficult to contextually adjust their meaning – have been adopted by local law enforcers, because this norm transfer has been thought to aid the transformation of a fragile, post-conflict local law enforcement system into something much more orderly, developed, peaceful, *European*. Bio-power has once again played a critical role in how this transition is governed by EUPM – with power being distributed between different law enforcement bodies (international/EU, local/Bosnian), so to highlight their unity against those without such power.

Crucially, this categorisation of local law enforcement bodies as ‘orderly’ does not simply refer to a pragmatic distinction between these bodies and the ones referred to earlier in the study as the ‘disorderly’ Other – the weak, the passive, the protected, the feminised. Nor does it simply make reference to this shared position of authority with international law enforcers such as EUPM, where both bodies represent a societal role that quite literally maintains law and order in and around Bosnia – the strong, the active, the protector, the masculinised. In addition, the term ‘orderly’ refers to how these bodies are themselves ordered as a subject of a wider system of power. In other words, the subject position of the ‘orderly’ local law enforcer in Bosnia is not an inherent interpellation, but is rather given power to exist by other, more powerful bodies articulating this ‘orderly’ identity, cementing and legitimising the interpellation of law enforcer. This multifaceted understanding of orderliness not only diminishes a binary reading of orderly-disorderly, but it also raises further challenges for the connected, dominant meanings of masculinity (as orderly) and femininity (as disorderly).

Before looking at the specific gendered and corporeal ordering of local law enforcement, it is important to acknowledge that EUPM does positively engage with the concept of local ownership – a fundamental pillar of fourth generation peacebuilding. The discourse makes many references to the importance of ensuring local ownership when tackling threats to peace and security (European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2006a; 2006b; 2007f). One reference even equates the aforementioned ‘best practices’ of European policing to the development of “sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership” (European Union Police Mission, 2006c, p. 1). Thus, EUPM plainly recognises the capabilities of local law enforcement.

This is quite different to how IPTF viewed the functionality of local law enforcers when working in Bosnia – a comparison that EUPM itself acknowledges when lamenting that, prior to the arrival of EU civilian crisis management staff, there was “no or little ownership by the local police in the fight against human trafficking because previously the IPTF officers organised and executed the raids and investigations” (European Union Police Mission, 2004a, p. 2). This critique of IPTF’s heavy-handed and top-down intervention technique is testament to EUPM wanting to move away from a strictly third generation peacebuilding approach in Bosnia, which in turn indicates how the EU can use its soft power and normative influence in place of such heavy-handedness (Kagan, 2002; Nye, 2005). It also reifies EUPM’s understanding that local ownership, cooperation and knowledge are essential tools to engage with, when looking to improve peace and security (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 293).

That being said, a more critical interrogation of this quote locates similarities in the power relationships found between local law enforcers and the two international peace operations. The fact that EUPM blames IPTF for the lack of local ownership in earlier counter-trafficking strategies supposes that IPTF held an observable juridical power over local law enforcement – it was IPTF’s strategy that mattered, with local police having no choice but to conform to this foreign strategy. This positions the local police in a relatively passive subject position, not unlike the disorderly bodies described in Chapters 4 and 5. By the same token, EUPM’s focus on local ownership is similarly demonstrative of its own juridical power over these local bodies – just like IPTF, it is EUPM’s strategy employed in Bosnia. Local law enforcers are given power to participate and take ownership of this strategy – a marked improvement in the realisation of ‘local’ capabilities, as well as a much needed focus on the deployment of local agency – however this strategy is still foreign; it does not belong entirely to the ‘local’, and it is still saturated with EUPM’s hegemonic masculine bio-power.

Here, I must also repeat a question that was originally asked in Chapter 2: in valuing the idea that a positive, sustainable peace must be localised, who actually makes up this ‘local’ figure in Bosnia? An answer to this question began to be corporeally framed in Chapter 5, when the discourse presented all members of the Bosnian community as a collective ‘local’ that could potentially be considered ‘orderly’. Within this orderly population, EUPM consider local law enforcers to have the greatest potential at developing orderliness – with EUPM even referring to the local police force as the “healthiest segment of [Bosnian] society” (2009b, p. 2).<sup>62</sup> However,

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<sup>62</sup> Notably, this presents yet another example of medicalisation in the discourse – with articulations of orderliness and health (connected to masculinity) coming together in a logic of equivalence that opposes its binary of

as witnessed in the above example, even this highly pronounced category of ‘orderly’ bodies can be limited in their activities, thus illustrating how orderliness functions in relation to multiple layers of power, as well as how complex corporeal relations develop in response to different identifications of ‘local’. Incorporating gender into this discussion further complicates the matter, since gendered limitations and exclusivities are also often present within this ordering of local law enforcement – a consequence of the discourse’s dominant logic of equivalence compounding the floating signifiers of orderliness and activity with masculinity.

An explicit example of this can be found when, in line with modernist assumptive binary gender roles, the ‘orderly’ bodies of local law enforcers are assumed to be male-bodied. In one EUPM article describing the work of Public Security Centres – locations around the country where young people in the community can go to learn more about, and build a rapport with, their local police force – police officers are interchangeably referred to as policemen (European Union Police Mission, 2007f, p. 2). This confusion in terminology equates male bodies with active police officers, which only serves to further the already dominant perception that policing is a “man’s job” (European Union Police Mission, 2009c, p. 1).

Not only could this perspective of the local police disengage non-males from showing an interest in such active public positions, but it also alienates and devalues the many police officers already working in Bosnia who are not gendered male. Bringing this back to the overarching question of *whose bodies matter* and *why*, it is apparent that the orderly bodies of local law enforcement matter considerably to EUPM – however, if these bodies are assumed to be male, then once again female bodies (as well as other bodies unable or unwilling to identify in a binary manner as male) are somehow considered less important, less orderly, less able. Identifiably male bodies, on the other hand, are automatically assumed to be proficient protectors and guardians, active citizens with a perceivably greater societal worth.

Unlike the discourse’s persistent use of gendered stereotypes when positioning trafficked and other disorderly bodies – many of which centring around the dominant theme of victimhood – EUPM (2008b, p. 5) have attempted to overcome gendered stereotypes in the police and other active/public law enforcement positions – especially since its third mandate began in 2008. In

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disorderliness and disease (connected to femininity). Furthermore, the gendered binary of public-private is once again activated here - public positions of authority (typically conducted by male bodies) are prioritised over private functions (typically conducted by female bodies). Indeed, for all of EUPM’s focus on improving female participation in public spaces, as will be outlined in this chapter, there is no similar engagement with female bodies operating in private spaces. Neither is there a willingness to engage with (or even acknowledge) male bodies functioning in private spaces. It seems that private space, and the bodies populating these spaces, simply do not matter as much as those operating in public spaces.

addition to multiple calls for greater female participation in both local and international law enforcement operations (European Union Police Mission, 2008b; 2008j; 2009c; 2010f), in 2009 a full-time Gender Advisor was deployed to the mission (Donlon, 2010, p. 55). Arguably, in the post-UNSCR 1325 era, it would be very difficult for a leading organisation such as the EU to avoid the incorporation of gender mainstreaming into its work – thus, perhaps these steps are not so surprising.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, it is encouraging that EUPM acknowledge that job roles relating to policing and other aspects of criminal investigations have traditionally been “male dominated” (2008c, p. 6), and that this needs to change in the future. EUPM very clearly state their position on this by suggesting that, “women can do any job in the police” (2007g, p. 2).

However, in spite of this positive engagement with policewomen, the way the discourse presents these female-bodied individuals is often problematic. For instance, when a female police officer is interviewed on this very problem – that policing is considered to be a man’s job – the article is titled “(Role) Model” (European Union Police Mission, 2011a, p. 10). This play on words symbolises that she is a role model for Bosnian women, since she has obtained a less traditional societal role by working in the police, in addition to her being a “beautiful and proud blonde woman [who is likely often mistaken for] a model, an actress” (European Union Police Mission, 2011a, p. 10). Although the former message is positive for challenging typical associations of meaning with the category of ‘woman’, the latter message seems detrimental – even contradictory – to this forward-thinking notion. This female police officer is once again reduced to a sexualised object, prided on her appearance as opposed to her capabilities as a police officer. Furthermore, the bracketing of the word ‘role’ suggests that this latter subject position, the beautiful blonde model, is more important than the more capable subject position of the policewoman role model.

Somewhat ironically, some the most shocking discursive examples of sexualising and objectifying female police officers appear in a EUPM newsletter (2011g) produced to promote the important role of policewomen in Bosnia’s peaceful development. Here, EUPM pride one female police officer for doing this highly physical/active job in high heels (2011g, p. 6), describe another as a “tall and slim brunette” (2011g, p. 16), and value another for not only being female, but for also being youthful and petite in stature (2011g, p. 9). All of these examples indicate the necessity for EUPM to remark on feminine beauty – as if these traits are somehow connected to the active and public profession of a capable police officer. Some connections

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<sup>63</sup> UNSCR 1325 (2000) was the first of many Resolutions relating specifically to the theme of Women, Peace and Security. It acknowledged the need to engage with women in peacekeeping, as well as applying a more gender-sensitive approach to all conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.



raised here, such as the dominant connection in meaning between femininity, sexuality and age, and the need to imagine female bodies as tall and slim or petite (both of which opposing a broadness associated with the traditional masculine protector), have already been discussed at length in Chapter 4. In addition, there are new associations in meaning – such as the need to describe a woman’s hair, and note that she wears high heels. According to Weitz (2001), a woman’s hair is an important standard of feminine beauty, often used to symbolise (hetero-)sexual attraction. Stolic (2014, p. 47) similarly contends that high heels are sexually appealing, used to elongate a woman’s legs. High heels are also often connected to the allure of the sex industry, and thus the sexually disorderly – thereby posing the question: are these ‘orderly’ bodies still posed as (sexually) disorderly, because of their femininity?

A broader, yet equally palpable limitation found in this engagement with gender mainstreaming in the local police, is the reduction of gender’s meaning, so that it only refers to female-bodied individuals, or those identifying as women. Not only does this reinstate the assumption that there are only two ‘options’ for gender (man or woman), but it also fails to address that the topic of gender also applies to male-bodied individuals, or those identifying as men (as well as individuals representing neither binary gender standard). On this point, I agree with Willett (2010), who argues that the floating signifier of gender, when entwined with the dominant and crystallised meanings assigned to that of ‘woman’, further isolates female/women’s experiences as something different and abnormal. Meanwhile, male/men’s experiences can avoid the same level of scrutiny, because their experiences are already socially normalised. This process, reminiscent of EUPM’s hegemonic masculine silencing observed in Chapter 5, ascribes masculinity a higher societal value than femininity, thereby upholding and reinforcing existing patriarchal power imbalances.

The discourse provides many examples of isolating and abnormalising the experiences of female local law enforcers, starting with an interview that EUPM conducts with its legal team. Notably, this is described as a “competent all-female team” (European Union Police Mission, 2010a, p. 4). I dispute that the same statement would be made for an all-male team, because it is normatively expected that male bodies perform this type of public and authoritative societal role. This normalisation also means that the competence of such male public authority figures is unlikely to be brought into question. Indeed, putting gender momentarily aside, surely an underlying assumption surrounding *any* job position is that the person doing the job is competent at it. Thus, to specifically make reference to the competence of female public authority figures suggests that this is *not* an assumedly present feature – precisely because of their femininity and the crystallised meaning of incapability that is often associated with this gender performance.

Alongside this antagonism of femininity and capability, another antagonism – one of femininity and rationality – also surfaces in this aspect of the discourse. This study has already raised at length the perceived relationship between male bodies, masculinity and rational behaviour – a relationship that not only forms the validating core of all patriarchal power relations, but also explains the gendered shortcomings in modernist International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies. Thus, when EUPM interpellate female bodies into subject positions of authority – positions that are assumed to be highly ‘rational’ in their actions – it seems that this engagement must be legitimised.<sup>64</sup> Interestingly, however, female rationality is not legitimised through articulation, as female competence is. The discourse makes no attempt to describe female law enforcers as rational thinkers, nor are they described using any other ‘hard’ personality trait typically reserved for male bodies.

Instead, the local feminised bodies that are ‘orderly’ enough to become associated with public positions of authority are allowed to do so precisely *because* of their feminine irrationality – or emotionality, as it is often described when presented in binary opposition to rationality. It seems that the stereotypical ‘softness’ of female bodies is an appealing feature when working in a fragile post-conflict environment, because softness translates into peacefulness – another floating signifier that desperately attempts to become fixed in a moment, so that all dominant and aggressive actions can be owned by those in power (masculinised bodies), with all subordinate and docile activities conducted by those serving this power dynamic (feminised bodies). These assumptions resonate across the discourse – with EUPM suggesting that policewomen are more able to “moderate extremes in the use of force” (2009c, p. 1) – presumably because they are seen as less violent and more peaceful than their male counterparts. EUPM also remark that “women are better leaders than men because they are more sensitive” (2012b, p. 1), and women often display a “more peaceful way of solving problems” (2011g, p. 16).

In line with the epistemological standpoint of this thesis, not only are personality characteristics unable to be categorised in such an essential and binary manner, but also it is dangerous to perpetuate this perspective when working in international peacebuilding. This sweeping assumption suggests that those gendered male are threats to peace and security, whilst those gendered female are not. This ignores the fact that many male bodies are peaceful, law-abiding and trustworthy. Furthermore, female combatants exist, and they are just as capable as their male combative counterparts in performing violent crime (Penttinen, 2004, p. 24;

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<sup>64</sup> As an aside, this process itself demonstrates the hegemonic masculine authority of EUPM, since its own undisputed position of authority is based on this same pattern of omnipresent patriarchy.

Väyrynen, 2004, p. 135). In light of Chapter 4's discussion on masculinised criminality, it seems that once again an underlying assumption positions male bodies as the agents of criminal activity, whereas female bodies appear to lack the capability to successfully perform such a task. Furthermore, since masculinised traits are overwhelmingly prioritised in the discourse, this suggests that even negative masculinised traits can be valoured – which may be useful in times of conflict or negative peace, but are certainly not conducive to the type of positive peace that interventionists such as EUPM seemingly aspire towards.

Although the discourse significantly embraces the traditional notion of female bodies displaying 'soft' feminised attributes, even when they are local law enforcers, these 'orderly' female bodies *do* have a place in the public sphere. This is progression from the earlier suggestion that female bodies should only reside in the private sphere, functioning as obedient wives and mothers, or infantilised victims in need of protection – as seen in the discursive positioning of disorderly feminised bodies. However, I question if these meanings of public and private, of masculine and feminine, have really changed all that much when considering what role female law enforcers play in this public arena. Focusing on the work of the local police force, the discourse presents the activities of female police officers quite differently to that of male police officers. For instance, female police officers are those that work on combating sex trafficking, as well as the many related sexual crimes outlined in Chapter 4.

These crimes, it is important to recall, are not only highly sexualised but also feminised and infantilised in the discourse. Female police seem to be valued for their sensitivity and understanding of these so-called 'gender-sensitive' issues, because those who have experienced such traumas are likely to be much more comfortable in speaking to authority figures of the same gender (European Union Police Mission, 2004a; 2010d; 2010g; 2011b; 2011e). This is the softer gender, the gender able to care and empathise with the experiences of the sexually disorderly. It is no coincidence that care and empathy are highly maternal features, reminiscent of feminised private sphere functions. Here, typical binary gender stereotypes are again free to flourish – even the female bodies that are encouraged to exert agency and utilise a more public/active social space only appear to do so if they perform the idealised role of the compassionate and nurturing mother figure (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1634).<sup>65</sup>

I also consider the expressly gendered expectation that female officials are more relatable to the sexually disorderly to be telling of what female bodies are, in general, positioned to

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<sup>65</sup> This relates to the earlier analysis on the concept of 'potential motherhood' – where all female bodies are considered influenced by the possibility of rearing and protecting infants.

represent in the discourse – fearful, subordinate subjects inscribed with hegemonic masculine power (Butler, 1990, p. 172). Regardless of social stature or position of authority, this is a critical reminder that all female bodies face the same threat of becoming sexually disorderly, because all of these bodies remain subordinated in a silenced yet ubiquitous patriarchal system of inequality. It is the very notion of femininity, the very corporeal space of the female body itself (as articulated by the outward gender performance of ‘woman’, with its pronounced feminine naïveté and weakness), which maintains not only this category but also the threat perceived *by* this category.

To elaborate on this point, I refer again to the notion of ‘gender-specific’ sexual threats – threats that in some cases are not even described so vaguely as gender-specific but discursively reduced to mean “women[‘s] issues” (European Union Police Mission, 2006e, p. 4). The ‘victims’ of these experiences are all assumed to be women (or children), all part of the abused and sexualised underclass that sullies every feminised body – a body permanently positioned in a state of victimhood and passivity. By contrast, the perceived comfort in speaking to female officials leads to the assumptive conclusion that there is an ever-present and justifiable fear in speaking with male officials about these experiences – because these bodies cannot understand, empathise, experience this type of trauma.

Once again, a process of normalising and self-censoring particular gendered meanings is at work here. Male officials would seemingly prefer to stay associated with the hegemonic and militarised masculine identity performance of the ‘feared and aggressive man’, even if this causes male officials to be unfairly stigmatised as threats to peace and security, rather than accept a more feminine identity performance – allowing their bodies to be articulated with ‘softer’ feminine traits such as compassion and empathy. I consider this fear of the feminine to also reflect the earlier assumption of male criminal behaviour, where traumatic (hetero-)sexual experiences are perceived to have been caused by (also, heterosexual) male bodies – therefore, it is this representation of gender (and sex, and sexuality) that is primarily feared, subsequently dominant, and ultimately powerful.<sup>66</sup>

As a group partially emancipated from the restrictive private sphere of the home, yet remaining highly connected to the assumed ‘maternal instincts’ of the female body, female local

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<sup>66</sup> Crucially, this is not to say that gender (and sex, and sexuality) does not matter when it comes to crimes of a gendered, sexed or sexualised nature. It is quite possible that a female sexual assault survivor, assaulted by a male, would feel more comfortable speaking to a female official. Similarly, it might very well be that some female officials feel especially empathetic to these issues and want to help those who have been affected by them. I do not intend to denounce or belittle these experiences – but rather to question why these personal experiences and choices are not more broadly contextualised to encompass other features in addition to gender (and sex, and sexuality).

law enforcers represent many of the antagonisms found in the discourse that relate femininity with the family/home. Sometimes this antagonism is very clearly stated, for instance when one female police officer considers the administrative aspect of policing (another example of ‘soft’ police work) to be better suited for women, because ‘hard’ operational work such as police raids and arrests would be “less rewarding for women because I, like many women, have a family, so it is much easier to do office work and raise a child” (Hajdarević, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2011e, p. 9). It is quite possible that administrative work *may* be more suitable for this individual raising a family. However, such a perspective is alarming because it suggests that the *communal* female body must assume responsibility for securing a stable home life.

This standpoint is shared by another female police officer who, when interviewed by EUPM, seems unhappy that her sister’s role as a housewife allows her to be “fully devoted to [the] family and [the] obligations of upbringing children” (Vidić, quoted in European Union Police Mission, 2011g, p. 14), whereas her role as police officer does not. Performing an active and public societal role makes this individual feel guilty, since she considers her time spent away from the home reflective of a reduced devotion to her family and home life.

Obviously, this perspective is influenced by the historical and cultural context of gender and family relations in Bosnian society, as well as this individual’s personal experiences. Still, the inclusion of this discussion in EUPM’s discourse is meaningful. Acknowledging a relationship between local female bodies and the private sphere of family/home is one thing, but to avoid similar discussions with local (and international) male police officers suggests that EUPM value a similar standpoint to this police officer – that there *is* an inherent connection between the floating signifiers of ‘women’, ‘family’, and ‘home’. Although EUPM show their ability to recognise and value local cultural traits in Bosnia, it is no coincidence that by doing so, ‘traditional’ patriarchal systems of power are also partially legitimised – i.e. the parts that complement the hegemonic masculine authority of ‘modern’ EUPM, as well as the EU’s highly uneven third generation peacebuilding initiatives (Björkdahl, 2012, p. 291).

Other examples in the discourse also showcase this patriarchal perspective – such as the insistence to question female police officers on their private lives, asking personal questions about marriage and children (European Union Police Mission, 2006e; 2010g; 2011e). In addition, female police officers are prided on their ability to “balance the competing demands of a family life and work with developing a successful career” (European Union Police Mission, 200e,p. 4), again suggesting that this home-work balance is a gendered responsibility. By contrast, male police officers are neither questioned on their home-work balance, nor asked about marriage and children. Again, this disparity not only reflects on the historical and cultural

composition of Bosnian society, but also on EUPM's presentation of this society – which has its own gendered and corporeal consequences for *whose bodies matter*.

Despite the limitations found in EUPM's positioning of female law enforcers, these bodies clearly matter somewhat to EUPM – they are important in their resemblance of a conforming and compatible 'local' body. Furthermore, whilst their 'softness' potentially limits their own personal development and exertion of agency, this is still a positive attribute that can assist in the rehabilitation of the Bosnian post-conflict community. Therefore, female experiences and perspectives *are* being valued in public societal spaces like never before. However, a subtle undercurrent remains in the discourse, that female law enforcers are somehow weaker, less able, and less powerful than their male counterparts. This not only creates yet another level of gendered power imbalance between male and female 'orderly' bodies, but it also keeps the binary distinction of male/female intact. Female experiences also continue to be totalised, to represent a communal 'woman' permanently at risk. Indeed, even the most 'orderly' of female bodies struggle to avoid the threat of disorderliness, and especially sexual disorderliness – reiterating the hyper-sexualised pitfalls of femininity, and the continued prevalence of patriarchal governance and hyper-masculine power and inequality.

## 7. In Conclusion: Whose Bodies Matter?

This thesis has aimed to overcome two major (and related) shortcomings found in peacebuilding studies: firstly, the lack of a gendered and corporeal lens when studying peacebuilding operations; and secondly, the failure to engage with peacebuilding responses that tackle so-called ‘soft’ issues i.e. those that have gendered and corporeal connotations. Therefore, upon engagement with a feminist epistemological standpoint and the utilisation of post-modern and post-structural theories, I have used the case study of EUPM’s operational response to sex trafficking in Bosnia (a ‘soft issue’) to uncover its most gendered and corporeal implications – namely, how power relations discursively unfold between the hegemonic and hyper-masculine authority of EUPM, and its array of subjects subordinated by this hegemonic masculine power. Ultimately, this exploration aims to answer my central research question: in the aforementioned context, *whose bodies matter* to EUPM, and *why do they matter*?

Despite having three analytical chapters, I initially only wanted two. One was to focus on the bodies discursively positioned as orderly i.e. those complementary to the hegemonic masculine norms of EUPM and therefore the bodies that mattered most, whereas the other would focus on more disorderly bodies i.e. the incompatible, troublesome bodies that, whilst needing the strictest sense of EUPM order and control, did not matter as much, since they did not conform to hegemonic masculine norms. However, this separation swiftly became problematic, due to how orderliness and disorderliness operate in the discourse. I therefore decided to divide my analysis into three chapters: Chapter 4 analysing the overtly disorderly, Chapter 5 studying how certain bodies are silenced (either due to excessive disorderliness or an innate orderliness), and Chapter 6 looking at the superficially ‘orderly’. Together, these three chapters would answer my central research question, thereby fulfilling my research aim.

Chapter 4 defined trafficked bodies as a collective mass sharing the same disorderly experience of deception, exploitation and force into the sex industry. Individual trafficking experiences, when articulated at all in the discourse, only served to support this assumed corporeal unity of disorderliness, and the related assumption that these bodies needed to be ordered somehow. This order was primarily disguised in the discourse as protection and rescue – the communal victimhood of trafficked bodies disallowing such bodies from protecting or rescuing themselves from such traumatic experiences. Instead, active and able-bodied guardians needed to take up these responsibilities – guardians such as EUPM, who could conveniently reassert its own hegemonic masculine power and authority over its feminised subordinated subjects by performing this hyper-masculinised task.

This gendered power dynamic was maintained by the discursive perpetuation of decisive gendered binaries, strung together via compatible nodal points and floating signifiers (i.e. articulations of compatible meaning, interpellations of compatible subject positions). The victimhood assigned to disorderly trafficked bodies became associated with other traits such as passivity, powerlessness and weakness – highly feminised traits that allowed for a wide-sweeping assumption to linger in the discourse, that sex trafficking happened only to those sexed and gendered female (or similarly feminisable bodies e.g. children). The masculinised binary opposites of these traits – activity, power, strength – were therefore left available for more capable and orderly bodies to utilise, such as EUPM. This distinction was beneficial for EUPM's hegemonic masculine position of control, since a patriarchal system of power and inequality would complement EUPM's own patriarchal desire to govern its (similarly feminised) native subjects – a symbol of EUPM's governmentality, disguised bio-power and hyper-masculine third generation peacebuilding strategy in Bosnia.

Other associations used to further the link between victimhood and feminised trafficked bodies included the articulation of similarly feminised identities 'wife' and 'mother'. Although, a further relation of meaning between sex trafficking and hyper-sexuality meant that trafficked bodies could only *potentially* associate with the terms 'wife' or 'mother', since their sexual disorderliness made it impossible to entirely fulfil these orderly (as in complementary and conforming to hegemonic masculine norms) family/home-based identities and subject positions. Nevertheless, the discourse assumed that trafficked bodies' desire for orderliness underpinned their transition into sexual disorderliness – with the promise of a binary gendered/sexed (and heterosexual) family/home life used to coerce these bodies into sex trafficking.

Hyper-sexualised trafficked bodies were often also imagined to be young and beautiful, and therefore sexually appealing. This infantilisation signified the taboo of a sexualised youth – a taboo further connecting the experience of sex trafficking to that of sexual disorderliness. It also attached the stigmas of guilt and shame to trafficked bodies, further displacing them as unwanted and problematic, which allowed EUPM to order these bodies using processes of discursive and corporeal medicalisation. Here, trafficked bodies were encouraged to confess their guilt of being disorderly, as well as accept treatment that would purify or cure such bodies. This process simultaneously strengthened EUPM's hegemonic masculine authority over its feminised subjects of subordination, whilst further preventing trafficked bodies from associating themselves with more orderly, active or public (masculinised) identities and subject positions. Thus, key discursive binaries including disorderly and orderly, feminine and masculine, passive and active, were maintained.



Crucially, however, the apportionment of guilt for trafficked bodies *did* locate the first contradiction in the utilisation of these binaries – with guilt assuming a sense of agency. This was investigated later in Chapter 4, when other bodies categorised as disorderly were compared to trafficked bodies. For instance, traffickers and smuggled migrants were also found to represent disorderliness, although in holding a much more active societal position, they were not so easily feminised. Instead, these bodies were allowed to reflect certain masculinised traits such as agency and capability, and the majority of individuals caught trafficking or illegally entering Bosnia were explicitly gendered male. Furthermore, unlike the corporeal reduction of trafficked bodies to that of a communal and passive group, these bodies were much more independent of one another. This meant that they held individual responsibility for pursuing their illegal actions, and thus they could be ordered via a new method of discipline, surveillance and prosecution. Again, due to EUPM's active role in this ordering, its hegemonic masculine authority was strengthened in relation to these still subordinated, through notably less feminised, subjects.

This did not mean that it was easy to separate smuggled bodies from trafficked bodies – migratory experiences (what the discourse would categorise more narrowly as migratory crimes) were found to be highly complex, especially when searching for evidence of exploitation. Disorderly sexual experiences, however, were positioned much more collectively. Bodies experiencing rape and domestic violence were effortlessly positioned to be victims. They were also feminised and infantilised in the same way as trafficked bodies. However, one important difference noted was how domestic violence experiences were not similarly hyper-sexualised. In fact, the sexual nature of many domestic violence cases was entirely downplayed – a point argued in Chapter 5 to relate to two features of dominant patriarchal society: firstly, domestic violence's connection to the conventional family/home prevented such sexually disorderliness from occurring (with wives and mothers being more capable, more 'orderly'); and secondly, because male bodies could also be considered potential victims of domestic violence (albeit, the discourse was careful to assure that this notion of male victimhood was rare and should therefore not detract from the principal correlation created between victimhood and femininity).

Despite this reluctant engagement of male victimhood, male *sexual* victimhood could not be similarly articulated – even if given the caveat of rarity. This was considered, firstly, to relate to the staunch feminisation of the sexually disorderly, and secondly, to the desire for EUPM to communalise the experiences of those it governed – it being much easier to control a collective corporeal entity, a unified population with distinct associations of meaning, rather than to engage with highly problematic individual experiences *within* such a population. Thus, in the case of sex trafficking, all trafficked bodies had to remain female/feminised, and all productive responses to

sex trafficking had to come from binary opposing figures of hegemonic and hyper-masculine authority, such as EUPM. I argued that this was why counter-trafficking prevention strategies were silenced in the discourse, in contrast to the considerable amount of focus given to protecting disorderly victims and prosecuting disorderly criminals. Preventing sexually disorderliness had to be positioned as an impossibility, so to maintain the clear-cut binary separating sexually disorderly bodies from the other disorderly bodies that, whilst still requiring EUPM's heavy-handed guidance and control, had a greater potential to display compatibility with EUPM's own hegemonic masculine norms.

The sexually disorderly were therefore shown to be the corporeal category that mattered least to EUPM, due to their inability to form compatibilities in meaning with EUPM's hegemonic masculinity. The discourse perceived this to not only relate to their performances of gender, sex and sexuality, but also many other incompatible intersections – including class (lower socio-economic classes were considered less able to obtain useful knowledge on preventing positions of powerlessness and incapability), nationality/citizenship (Bosnian citizens, as aspiring EU citizens, were shown in the discourse to demonstrate a greater *potential* to become 'orderly' i.e. to obtain the knowledge required to escape sexually disorderly subject positions), and race/ethnicity (as argued with post-colonial feminist theory, whiteness remains closely associated with purity, innocence and victimhood, due to an underlying yet still prevalent white privilege originating from dominant Western hyper-masculine powers like EUPM).

In addition to limiting and silencing the identities and subject positions of disorderly bodies found incompatible with the hegemonic masculine norms promoted by EUPM, and especially the oppressive silencing of the *sexually* disorderly, EUPM's own position of power and authority was also studied in the discourse, to uncover how its highly Western normative perspective was similarly concealed, to be portrayed as something universal, unchallengeable. Particular values carried by EUPM, such as impartiality and objectivity, were considered demonstrative of its ability to undertake a more hybrid peacebuilding position – acknowledging the need to let local Bosnians participate in their own rehabilitation. However, gendered complications were found to exist in these prioritised values – with impartiality and objectivity symbolising highly masculinised traits, as well as masculinised productions of knowledge being prioritised over other formations.

Also, with such a focus on the technocratic management of disorderly bodies – both 'victims' and 'criminals' (a binary itself dismantled in the analysis) – EUPM's response to sex trafficking further represented a hyper-masculinised and modernist approach to Bosnian development, since it prioritised ontological and quantitative results over a more instinctive and

epistemological fluidity. It further became clear that this approach was *not* for the benefit of holistic local engagement, but these guided strategies once again represented EUPM's governmentality and use of bio-power to disguise Western/European norms as innate, universal markers of peace, security and development. Then, when the Bosnian population guilelessly accepted these Western/European norms as universal norms, these Western/European meanings as their own meanings, this allowed for the production of a governable and manageable Bosnian population – one EUPM could maintain its normative authority over.

Ultimately, EUPM's actions were to complement its overarching strategy in Bosnia – to secure security in the EU's near abroad, and to encourage Bosnia to behave more like its EU/Western neighbours. Similar to the prioritisation of Bosnian citizens as *potentially* orderly, and the gendered and corporeal links this had with a conventional (i.e. Western-oriented and patriarchal) family dynamic, the Bosnian state was here promoted to be *potentially* modern – with modernity similarly representing a Western and patriarchal system of power (and traditionalism acting as modernity's undesirable binary opposite). This *potential* again reflected EUPM's manipulation of bio-power, used to attract Bosnian compliance and conformance and thereby produce an obedient population that would uphold the EU's Westernised and hegemonic masculine norms.

However, thinking back to how the sexually disorderly were also *potential* wives and mothers, yet unable to transform this potentiality into actuality, a 'modern' Bosnia faced the same fate – due to how EUPM discursively positioned the Bosnian state as a subordinate, feminised and infantilised representative of the European/Western community (similar again to the sexually disorderly). Therefore, whilst the state of Bosnia represented a corporeal category that clearly *mattered* to EUPM, it could never matter as much as fully identifiable EU states possessing the same hegemonic masculine power and authority as EUPM.

This hegemonic masculine power and Western-centric norm manipulation was also found elsewhere in the discourse – for instance, when EUPM employed the term 'best practice' to describe its peacebuilding strategies, this term actually referred to best *European* practices – again, reflective of heavy-handed governmentality and a productive power dynamic. Similarly, when the discourse positioned sex trafficking as a phenomenon happening in Bosnia due to its proximity to the EU, this allowed Bosnia to be positioned again as a passive entity of transit that required external governance to manage this situation – a governance that the EU was somehow entitled to, due to its own security concerns and patriarchal responsibility to combat sex trafficking in its near abroad. This not only overlooked instances of trafficking originating and

terminating in Bosnia, but it also disallowed the state of Bosnia to actively manage this situation itself – relying once again on the hegemonic masculine power of the West, via EUPM.

In addition to how the Bosnian state was corporeally configured and gendered, Bosnian citizens were also positioned carefully in the discourse to reflect particular gendered and corporeal connotations. This notion, briefly addressed already in the potential orderliness of Bosnian civilians, was further uncovered in Chapter 5, when the discourse was seen to valorise this potential orderliness because Bosnian citizens could perform as ‘allies’ in the fight against organised crime. However, the use of such a militarised masculine term reflected how this assigned orderliness was perhaps not intended for *all* citizens (as a coherent corporeal group), but rather the category identifying as ‘men’.

This problematic was further observed in Chapter 6 when the discursive positioning of the most ‘orderly’ bodies in Bosnian civil society, its local law enforcement operatives, were analysed. Here, I found that although EUPM engaged much more positively with local law enforcement, giving them a greater sense of agency, trust and responsibility, this camaraderie was distinctly gendered. These ‘orderly’ bodies were only *really* considered orderly if they were male-bodied – an underlying assumption developed from stereotypical binary gender performances, as well as the reductionist understanding that an appreciation of the concept of ‘gender’ meant an engagement with those law enforcement bodies performing as ‘woman’ (thereby reducing the meaning of ‘gender’ to that of ‘women’).

These women were highly isolated and abnormalised for their gendered corporeality, which affected how they were perceived to conduct themselves in such active and public (and hyper-masculinised) positions of authority. With female police officers prided for their youth, beauty and innate emotionality, these feminised features not only associated these bodies with the aforementioned hegemonic masculine norms of feminine weakness, passivity and powerlessness, thus leading to questions of feminine orderliness, competence and professionalism, but the hyper-sexualisation of these bodies also led them to become associated with a potential sexual disorderliness, similar to that of trafficked and other disorderly bodies. Thus, even female law enforcers were corporeally categorised and assumed to represent a communally gendered group of female/feminised bodies, and these bodies were all undeniably less important to EUPM, since they would never be as orderly, as complementary, as governable, as the production of corporeal categories gendered male.

This conclusion was not only promoted by EUPM’s own articulations in the discourse, but also by the complementary articulations of female law enforcers, who agreed that women were best suited to reside in the private feminised space of the home, and that men should

conduct the more public and active societal responsibilities e.g. more physical and dangerous aspects of police work. This of course was related to local understandings of Bosnian patriarchal culture; therefore I noted that it was positive for EUPM to reflect on this local knowledge when building peace in Bosnia. However, a critical distinction needed to be located between EUPM acknowledging that cultural gender roles exist in Bosnia, in a society unlike its own, and actually perpetuating these inequalities for its own hyper-masculine gain. The discourse was careful to only ask questions about private, feminised spaces and experiences to those identifying as women, whilst men were able to avoid these questions entirely. Furthermore, as earlier noted, the reduction of gender to refer to only women not only cemented an association of meaning between gender and women, but also that female positions of authority needed to be articulated as abnormal/different. This maintained the normalcy of male positions of authority, thereby strengthening a hegemonic masculine system of power beneficial to the likes of EUPM.

A final gendered norm promoted by EUPM, one highly damaging for the success and credibility of its peacebuilding activities, was in the association of meaning between femininity and peacefulness, masculinity and violence. This was considered especially dangerous because violent/aggressive female bodies seemed to be so disorderly, that they could not be articulated, they *did not exist*. A consequence of this was found to be that these feminised threats could freely develop in a fragile post-conflict zone – an ironic point, considering how interventionists such as EUPM attempted to govern all aspects of societal life, yet seemed unable to accept that women could be a *potential* threat to peace in Bosnia.

Similarly, male bodies not only had to contend with the positive masculinised attributes of strength, activity and productive capability, but they also had to accept a much more negative identity articulation – as permanently violent, aggressive and threatening. In an environment of outright conflict, or negative peace, there may have been value in promoting these traits – however, with positive peace being the articulated goal of interventionists like EUPM, this association of meaning seemed counter-productive to a truly sustainable peace project. Indeed, I questioned if perpetuating this notion of a permanent masculine threat could make this threat a reality. Perhaps – however the discourse, when analysed from my feminist epistemological standpoint, seemed much more interested in maintaining EUPM's patriarchal governance and hyper-masculine system of power, authority and gendered inequality. Therefore, a real engagement of positive peace seemed unlikely to develop – a sad consequence of poorly engaging with gender and corporeality within EU civilian crisis management operations, and thus of being unable to truly engage with a fourth generation or hybrid peacebuilding strategy.

Thus, if seeking to rank whose bodies mattered most to EUPM, the discourse made it clear that the more compatible bodies were with EUPM's own normative perspective, the more valuable these bodies were. The sexually disorderly were the least compatible, and therefore the bodies that mattered least – a potentially surprising finding, when considering how much effort EUPM put into combating sex trafficking and related issues. Although, this effort was clearly related to how these bodies needed to be erased, or at least strictly managed to the sidelines of societal interaction, in order to make room for more compatible, more governable bodies.

Indeed, all bodies subordinated to the hegemonic masculine authority of EUPM were managed by distinctive, yet highly restrictive, corporeal categories. These categories corresponded to how EUPM could govern their fragile post-conflict Bosnian population – by legitimising particular societal categories and silencing others. These categories were also gendered, sexed and sexualised in an assumptive and similarly restrictive binary manner so to order their experiences, making it easier for EUPM to govern via legitimising compatible knowledge (and avoiding incompatible knowledge). Therefore, the power relations found within EUPM's governmentality project and outlet of bio-power not only showcased a primarily third generation peacebuilding strategy in post-conflict Bosnia – a finding that would be supported by most critical peacebuilding scholars – but also that this productive pyramid of uneven power relations was founded on the legitimisation of certain gendered and corporeal understandings.

This contribution to the study of peacebuilding is a small but critical step forward in the overarching feminist project of encouraging contemporary scholars to engage with gender, as well as corporeality (since gender is a corporeal act) – to not only ask where are the women, as second wave feminists did, but to also problematise the very notion of 'woman', and understand how this relates to a fluid gender performance of femininity, which will begin to determine how femininity intersects with a number of other concepts including sex and sexuality (the most critical intersections found in this study), age, class, race, nationality and ethnicity. Then, when locating both women *and* men in peacebuilding analysis (as well as acknowledging that non-binary sexed and gendered subjects also exist), when deciphering dominant feminine *and* dominant masculine performances of gender within post-conflict environments, it should be possible to uncover how gendered norms develop in response to gendered power relations – again, relating these gendered relations to other critical societal intersections, and therefore being able to engage much deeper, and more critically, with the analysis in question.

Whilst I do consider myself successful in having answered my central research question and thus responding to my research aim of filling a 'peace gap' in peacebuilding research, I am conscious that there are still limitations in this thesis – namely, that I have filled only the very

small, context-specific gap of understanding how gender and corporeality function within EUPM's operational response to sex trafficking in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. I cannot assume that these results would be easily transferrable to other case studies in Bosnia or other post-conflict zones, nor can I predict if sex trafficking (or indeed the concepts of gender and corporeality) is always presented this way in the EU's civilian crisis management operations.

Also, although it seems fair to assume that EUPM is reflective of the wider EU's stance, and the EU in turn reflects Western-centric international power more generally, my understanding that this power and authority is hegemonic and masculinised is highly subjective – conditioned by my own epistemological standpoint as a post-modern and post-structural feminist. Another scholar with a different viewpoint might consider this power system differently. Furthermore, as a Western and European female, I interpret Western/European features of EUPM's work, as well as expressions of Bosnian locality, in relation to my own subjective understanding of these terms.

Subjectivity, whilst discussed at length already in Chapter 3, is important to reflect on again here because my epistemological preferences not only influenced how I conducted analysis and drew conclusions, but also in how I chose the topics and data for such analysis. Therefore, I have tried to remain fully visible in my thesis, self-aware of my own limitations, and open to challenging any pre-existing assumptions that I may have had about this research topic – such as my binary understanding of orderly and disorderly, which I had to adjust when conducting my analysis. In alignment with a post-positivist research approach, I do not consider subjectivity to detract from the legitimacy and feasibility of this research, so long as I am able to reflect on the potential constraints of my subjectivity.

Putting subjective limitations aside, other more practical limitations could be addressed in further studies on this topic. For instance, it would be interesting to dismantle a major underlying assumption of my study – that EUPM itself was a coherent corporeal entity practising hegemonic masculine authority. Whilst I was able to highlight the shortcomings in personifying the Bosnian state as a corporeally unified and highly gendered figure of subordination, I did not similarly study EUPM for simplifying assumptions and potential internal fragmentations within this corporeal figure. Therefore, a study of just who works for EUPM would highlight how different individuals, with their different identities and subject positions, affect the production and prioritisation of meaning in EUPM's discourse – perhaps even drawing out new antagonisms. Another way to further the study of antagonistic meanings in the discourse would be to combine elements of rhetorical analysis with discourse analysis, to see how the interaction

between the EUPM author(s) and its desired audience(s) impacts its discursive configuration of gendered and corporeal meaning.

In addition to methodological developments, it would also be interesting to engage more profoundly with other Foucauldian theories – such as his later understandings of sexuality as a form of resistance against particular subject position interpellations. A deeper study of certain intersections of gender could also be useful for this study – focusing not only on gender, sex and sexuality, but also class – considering the critical socio-economic dynamic of the sex industry – and race/ethnicity – considering how the abject sexually disorderly often have important connotations here, due to the eroticisation of the sexual Other, and the prevailing post-colonial power relations that enact on the surface of these bodies.

However, I do feel that my study was able to begin this process of locating and adopting a more intersectional approach to peacebuilding, dismantling some key presupposed boundaries of binary meaning. This not only affords a much more expansive and productive study of peacebuilding, but it also allows for recommendations to be constructed as to how to engage better with a fourth generation or hybrid peacebuilding strategy. Then, the question of *whose bodies matter* could be answered, not with gendered and corporeal categories of idealised and highly regulated bodies – due to the normative potential they hold to existing systems of hegemonic and hyper-masculine power and inequality – but rather with a holistic response that ensures that *all bodies matter* within EU civilian crisis management operations.



## Appendix: Visual Sources



Image 1: Human Trafficking (European Union Police Mission, 2006d, p. 3)



Image 2: Domestic Violence (European Union Police Mission, 2006h, p. 11)



Image 3: Domestic Violence with Children (European Union Police Mission, 2007i, p. 4)



Image 4: Domestic Violence with Children (European Union Police Mission, 2010f, p. 9)



Image 5: Migrant Smuggling (European Union Police Mission, 2009d, p. 1)

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